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Abstract 
This thesis that I am submitting to the department of Insurance and Investment studies 
at the City University Business School is essentially a report on the development, 
formation, operation and effects of the NSSS to the local Zimbabwean market. The 
NSSS is a quasi- independent government company that operates under the National 
Social Security Authority (NSSA) whose formation was to provide a framework for 
the provision of various social security benefits by such organisations as the NSSS. 
This thesis is divided into three broad parts. The first part draws from an historical 
experience of the development of social insurance in general and Zimbabwean old- 
age insurance in particular. This part is the basis of understanding the foundation and 
philosophy behind the formation and expansion of the social security programmes as 
strong economic and political tools across the modem world. The second segment of 
this report is the focus on political and economic theories that seek to explain the 
existence of social insurance in various economies. The last part of the thesis is a 
particular study of the Zimbabwean pensions market following the introduction of the 
NSSS and draws from household survey and original source material that has not 
previously been subject to analysis. 
This study has paid particular attention to the forces that have played crucial roles in 
shaping the development of the NSSS. Contrary to what we expected at the beginning 
of this study, the NSSS has had little adverse effect to the private schemes and general 
perception in risk taking behaviour, particularly to the middle class. The NSSS has in 
fact, had a marginal and effective positive effect in changing people's attitude towards 
the risk of longevity and long-term loss of income due to perils otherwise insured 
under the national scheme. This study has also shown that there was inadequate 
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consultation prior to the formation of the NSSS and that political interests took 
priority over economic considerations. The scepticism and forces of suspicion within 
the market are explained within the framework of this thesis. 
I grant the librarian and any of the lawful employees of the City University library to 
give on application, this thesis to anybody who wants to read, refer, photocopy or 
otherwise use this thesis for purposes of furthering academic research, provided the 
rules on acknowledgement and copyright are adhered to. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
1. Introduction: This thesis is basically a report on the formation, operation and 
effect of the NSSS to the Zimbabwean financial markets in general and pensions 
insurance in particular. NSSS is an acronym for National Social Security Scheme. 
The scheme was formed as part of the furtherance of the objects of the National 
Social Security Authority, a body corporate that was established by the 
government to provide benefits of insurance nature to the people of Zimbabwe. 
The NSSS has generated, and in fact, still does generate a lot of debate from 
enthusiastic commentators of different social, political and economic inclinations. 
To the economists and academics alike the subject of debate has centred on the 
impact of the scheme to the establishment of the insurance and pensions services 
and the perception that ordinary people have of it in so far as their pensions 
insurance purchasing behaviour is concerned. 
Because non of the debates that have made headlines in the financial press and local 
media alike have been properly documented, we have had a problem as to where to 
start when researching for this report. I say we, because this report is not an output of 
one person, but many people that have contributed in their various ways. Partly 
because of the inadequate documentation of the NSSS and the Zimbabwean financial 
consumers, this report has had to draw from personal views of the market leaders, 
regulators and so forth. The literature available, most notably by Western scholars 
has, undoubtedly, influenced our general approach to this report. We need not 
mention the obvious, that the principles developed by these Western scholars have 
acted as a guide, yardstick and above all as a leverage of direction of many of the 
issues that we raise, examine and test in this report. The incomplete records that we 
had to contend with in the course of the preparation of this report meant that at times 
we had to make some speculative analysis and decisions alike. 
The NSSS like most of the government quasi-independent companies was formed as 
an anti-climax of various economic and political considerations. The culture of the 
ruling party and its philosophy reflect vividly in the structure, organisation and 
operation of the NSSS. The same is true of the other factors that undoubtedly 
influenced the formation of the NSSS. The economic and social forces played a lesser 
though a crucial role in determining the establishment of the national scheme. The 
scheme was as such formed as a result of that cluster of factors, conflicting at times. 
The lifecycle theory has been used by various academics to model the consumer 
behaviour of different classes of people. As the lifecycle literature and consumer 
behaviour is abundantly available we thought it unnecessary to dwell onto long 
lengths to explain how as a theory explains the disposal of labour earnings over the 
lifecycle of a household. That the lifecycles are different and that the Zimbabwean 
lifecycles are different from the life cycles in the developed world, we thought it 
important to emphasise. The difference in lifecycles possibly explains the variations 
in consumer behaviours of people from different geographical circumstances. 
In this report we find little evidence of the absolute negative contribution to the 
Zimbabwean pensions market by the NSSS. Instead, there is in most cases, either no 
effect or awareness effect that will undoubtedly work to the advantage of the 
competitiveness of the Zimbabwean pensions market. Particularly less affected by the 
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introduction of the NSSS are the middle-income workers. Men in that group, being 
the least responsive to the introduction of the national scheme. On the other hand, the 
working-class consumers showed much appreciation of the NSSS with the women 
more appreciative of the new national scheme. That being the case, it was interesting 
to note that the same group had more people least willing to contribute voluntarily to 
the national scheme. 
The saving for retirement or otherwise of the people of Zimbabwe has been 
insignificantly affected by the introduction of the NSSS. The place value that most of 
the respondents in the survey put on the NSSS is testimony to that. Besides that, there 
are a lot of people who would have possibly had their saving behaviour swayed by the 
NSSS who are excluded from the NSSS scope of cover. These are the people on low 
incomes and mostly the contract and manufacturing employees who are by any 
standard the biggest percentage of the workforce. As urbanisation and development 
continues and more and more people become aware of their rights under the national 
scheme, the observed trend will undoubtedly change. 
The views of the market executives do not suggest a gloomy future in so far as the 
Zimbabwean pensions insurance is concerned. There is clear evidence that there has 
been gross exaggeration by both independent and partisan commentators on the 
adversity of the NSSS to the pensions insurance market. Contrary to fears that have 
been postulated before and after the introduction of the NSSS, the market growth has 
been tremendous and the confidence of the traditional recipients of the private market 
schemes is little moved by the coming of the new state scheme. The lack of 
confidence in the national scheme is evident across the body. The people's knowledge 
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of the rules and their general rights in so far as the national scheme is concerned is 
disappointingly low. That is so including the formulae used to calculate benefits, the 
particular benefits that they can claim, the method of claiming and so on. However, 
the most encouraging reflection of most of the respondents to our survey is that 
almost everyone agrees that the NSSS is a positive development that can be modelled 
to the benefit of the workers and their beneficiaries. 
The current low confidence in the present government undoubtedly influenced the 
views and perceptions of many of the respondents about the NSSS. That is also true of 
the economic and political instability that is threatening to rip the society apart. There 
is however, a solid structural foundation for the development of the NSSS and the 
pensions market in general into world class icons. 
1.1 Motivation for this report 
The research that has culminated in this report has been triggered mainly by the 
unavailability of Zimbabwean literature on this subject. Most if not all the 
professionally script written literature are statutes and other government instruments. 
The reports that have been produced by the department of social welfare have tended 
to be of partisan nature and lack the requisite intellectual analysis. The controversial 
claims and debates by the market commentators on the impact of the NSSS to the 
established schemes undoubtedly influenced our interest in the subject. Some of the 
fallacy in the arguments has been so articulated that one would have no option but 
investigate independently to establish the truth. The claims that the NSSS has led to 
the fall in the demand for conventional private pension schemes have been made 
without prior research to ascertain the validity of such claims. So also have been the 
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claims about the NSSS depressing individual household saving through other 
instruments. 
My teaching of the "Pension Planning and Administration" and Social Insurance has 
undoubtedly driven me to this research. It is my hope that this report will at least 
serve as the basis for the teaching of social insurance to the fourth year students at the 
National University Science and Technology. This report will be of invaluable use as 
a foundation for further studies and research in the area of social insurance in 
Zimbabwe. At least the researchers coming after us will have somewhere to start 
from. 
1.2 Conclusion 
The rest of the report comprises of seven chapters. The order of the chapters reflects 
the chronological relevance of the development of social insurance in general and the 
NSSS in particular. The individual chapters are comprehensible when read 
independently though we would encourage that they be read in the order in which 
they are in this report. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
SOCIAL INSURANCE PERSPECTIVES AND THIS REPORT 
2.1 Introduction 
In this chapter I define and explain social insurance together with its general scope so 
as to map out a sound framework of understanding the subject of this study. The 
definition adopted for purposes of this research is outlined to avoid ambiguity and 
uncertainty of terms when interpreting this report. I also spell out the aims and scope 
of the research so as to have a conceptual framework of this research. A brief account 
of the justification of the research and the major research questions that arise from this 
report is made with a view to explaining the importance and necessity of this study. 
The multi-methodology approach used in preparation of this report is explained 
together with the sampling procedures that were followed. This chapter also explains 
the arrangement of the chapters in this report. 
2.2 Defining social insurance and pensions insurance 
In the developed world where the welfare state programmes are mature the word 
social insurance is possible one of the best known and let alone the least understood 
by the majority. The reasons for this are vast and diversified but most notable are the 
obvious ones such as lack of intellectual development of the subject relative to other 
disciplines such as banking and finance. It does not call for exceptional intelligence to 
note that had social insurance been developed in the same conventional academic 
preference, as was other wise accorded to the other subjects of economics, some of 
the mysteries surrounding the subject would be irrelevant today. Nonetheless, despite 
that developmental let down by the founding scholars, some attempts have been made 
21 
to define the subject and its scope. One of the earliest attempts to define social 
insurance is by Rubinow (1914). In a nutshell, Rubinow says social insurance, as a 
matter of principle does not differ in a single iota from the principles governing 
private insurance. In his own words he talks of it as being: 
".... An organised movement to prevent the destruction of wage working 
families as consuming units by any of the ordinary emergencies of modem day 
existence. It means the establishment of national or public institutions to help 
and encourage the various forms of insurance, which the workman needs for 
protection against the various hazards of his existence. It means the 
willingness of the social body to assume a substantial part of the cost of 
insurance, to assume a part of the burden which otherwise the wage working 
class must carry on its shoulders. " 
From Rubinow's definition one may safely deduce the following 
characteristics of social insurance schemes. First, such schemes are based on 
the law of large numbers, as is the case with fire or life assurance. The second 
issue and usually less emphasised in modem literature is that such schemes are 
intended for the benefit of the low income cohort, the wage labourers not the 
middle nor the upper class. That prognosis raises other questions such as to 
why none labourers have to contribute to national schemes when they are 
prima-facie not the intended recipients of the benefits. The political and 
economic theories discussed in chapter three of this thesis answer some of 
those questions though there is inevitably a scope for debate beyond the two 
theories. 
The last but fundamental issue is that the states must make a contribution that is very 
substantial towards the cost of insurance. In essence what it implies is that the insured 
person under a social insurance contract does not need to bear the full cost of 
insurance but rather make an unfair contribution. By an unfair contribution I mean 
one whose actuarial equivalence does not match the benefit otherwise payable under a 
normal insurance contract policy. 
McCleary (1930) discusses the development of national health insurance schemes in 
Europe and makes an interesting description of what he understands about social 
insurance. He says by a national scheme he does not mean one that insures the whole 
population of a country, but one which, though limited to the insurance of workers in 
certain defined occupations, nation-wide in its extent and subject to some measure of 
state supervision and control. He goes further to say that such a scheme need not be a 
scheme of compulsory insurance as such. 
From McCleary's definition, at least four deductions can be made from it. The first 
and possibly most important is the fact that such schemes need not insure the whole 
population. The national scheme may cover just a group of employees. That is to say, 
it would be perfectly within the domains of social insurance for it to target a particular 
section of employees defined by trade, income, and so forth. The other outstanding 
feature is that such schemes need be under state supervision though the state need not 
be responsible for the every day running of the scheme. Lastly, a point reiterated by 
Rubinow (1914) is that compulsion of membership to a national scheme is not 
necessary. 
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Lyrio (1993) says social insurance must be understood in the context of social 
security. He defines social security, as a set of programmes ruled by the public sector, 
of which amongst its integral sets is included social insurance that encompasses the 
state pension schemes. Lyrio (1993) says social insurance and state pensions as such 
are a proper subset of social security, but the former are responsible for programmes 
concerning benefit area, that is retirement insurance, unemployment benefits and so 
on. He goes further to argue that social insurance is distinguishable from other social 
security programmes by its high degree of sophistication as it operates in the field of 
well defined compulsory payments and financial allocations under a series of pre- 
established rules. 
Lyrio is one of the authorities that believe that compulsion is an integral feature of a 
National Insurance scheme. As would be seen later in this report, some of these 
arguments about making national schemes compulsory are flawed as a matter of 
principle. Booth and Dickinson (1997) make an interesting evaluation of the 
insurability in the private markets of some of the risks that have otherwise been 
traditionally thought to be outside the scope of private markets provision. 
There are many other attempts to define social insurance whose content and context is 
of less relevance to this paper. See for example Lalor (1995), Collin (1986), The 
Oxford English Dictionary (1996) and so on. How ever, in short and judging from the 
definitions that have been explained by the various authorities, I can conclude that the 
key features of a social insurance are that it is a state propelled, more often than not 
compulsory and non- means tested contributory insurance scheme for wage earners 
and other such people on low income. I how ever note that there are some permissible 
variations to the actual structure and operational functions of this otherwise complex 
branch of economics. The intention of national schemes seems to be one and that is 
that of helping labourers or otherwise people of low income overcome some of the 
risks that they would otherwise fail to place in the private markets. 
2.2.1 My Definition for purposes of this research: 
In this paper I consistently use the word social insurance and state pensions 
interchangeable as if they are one. Broadly speaking, state pensions are a proper 
subset of social insurance but for purposes of this research I am not being fastidious 
about the finer technicalities that may imply an explicit difference. By social 
insurance I mean one of the many varied national schemes whose objective is to pool 
and manage financial contributions of workers or those made on their behalf with the 
primary intention of improving their risk positions in light of the unforeseeable 
financial risks that they stand to incur as a result of old age, poor health and accidental 
injury arising from work related activities. 
As said already in this paper I am not concerned about other forms of social insurance 
but state pensions insurance. In the case of Zimbabwe, when I am talking about the 
social insurance, I am referring to the National Social Security Scheme (NSSS). The 
state pensions referred to are the non-means tested benefits receivable by virtue of 
satisfying the eligibility contribution record to the national scheme. Such benefits as 
would be seen later have to be distinguished from the other means tested old age 
benefits that are found in virtually all the civilised parts of the world as part of the 
national social assistance programmes. In my report, I am not fastidious about the 
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difference between social security and social insurance and may use the two to refer 
to pensions insurance as is covered under the National Social Security Scheme. 
2.3 The spectrum of social risks 
In the context of my study I felt it imperative that I define the spectrum of social risks 
so as to give the reader a wider appreciation of the scope of social risks. Broadly 
speaking, social risks fall into four distinct classes. The first group includes risks that 
are generally referred to as the private risks. That is risks that are particular to 
individuals and whose occurrence is not fundamental to descent survival of mankind 
by standards acceptable by the general populace. To guard against contingencies of 
this nature, the individuals so exposed have to buy private insurance policies or risk 
having to bear the cost of the consequences of crystallisation of such risks. Typical 
examples of private risks would include such risks as theft of personal belongings, 
damage to private dwellings by insurable or non- insurable natural or man-made perils 
and so on. 
The second class of risks is that of risks that can potentially affect a large cross 
section of the population and insurance in the private markets is not viable for reasons 
of efficiency or cost or other such economic/actuarial considerations that may render 
it uninsurable in the profit seeking markets. The risks in this category are generally 
classified as the social security insurance or simply social insurance risks. 
Conspicuous in this group is the unemployment insurance benefits and old age 
pension schemes. The financing of such risks varies from country to country, though 
the widely used approach is the pay as you go system directly dependent on current 
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payroll taxes. The benefits so provided are generally not correlated to total 
contributions made but mere uniform across the insured group. 
The third group of risks is that of risks that affect the general populace but at a smaller 
scale and more haphazard in structural nature compared to the risks described above. 
Because of their nature whose behaviour cannot be predicted or controlled effectively 
by the private markets, risks in this class are generally not insurable in the 
conventional insurance markets. The social assistance programmes that are means 
tested in most cases make this class of risks. The benefits payable under social 
assistance schemes, in addition to being means tested, may in fact come in the form of 
benefits in kind rather than cash. Examples of state assistance benefits tend to vary 
from country to country depending on the economic and social circumstances of 
individual countries. The housing benefit and food relief schemes for the families 
earning or living below the tolerable poverty line or those suffering from mental 
infirmity are good examples of such schemes to help the less privileged. The 
financing of these risks is generally through the treasury from general taxation though 
special levies may apply to some high earners in other countries. 
Last, there are those risks that can hardly be quantified in numeric terms. That is those 
risks that do not have an actuarial equivalence. These scarcely manifest themselves in 
physical form. Pain, grief and sentimental loss are difficult to quantify let alone in 
currency quanta. Such losses are found in every risk class I have discussed above. The 
vein diagram below shows the mathematical relationship of the risk classes. 
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Figure 2.1: Source derived from risk assessment 
Key to figure2.1: 
A= Social insurance risks 
B= Social assistance risks 
C= Private insurance risks 
X= Sentimental loss risks 
As can be seen from the vein diagram above there is a lot of theoretical overlap in the 
relationship of risks that is also evident in practical life. 
2.4 The scope of social insurance: 
The span of risks insurable under social insurance schemes varies from country to 
country. In a very broad sense the social insurance falls under four groups. These are 
Pensions, Unemployment, Health and Workmen's Insurance. It is also worth noting 
that in some countries the legal expenses insurance is incorporated in the national 
social insurance scheme. This is the case with the United Kingdom. I briefly look into 
each of the broad classes of social insurance below. 
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2.4.1 The Pensions insurance: 
The pensions insurance objective from an individual assured perspective is basically 
of two principal purposes. First and foremost, it is viewed by many as a precautionary 
saving for one of those rainy days. It may be seen as an insurance against the 
longevity risk. That is, risk of income loss due to old age and incapacity to provide for 
oneself. Alternatively it may be viewed as a saving for other motives other than 
insurance. This is generally known as the saving motive of pensions and generally 
associated with bequest theories. See Abel (1985), Hubbard (1985) and Kotlikoff and 
Summers (1981) for some of the accounts on precautionary saving and bequests. I 
will also discuss that subject in chapter three of this thesis. Diamond (1977) expands 
well on the subject of pensions as insurance and may be very useful to audiences not 
familiar with the business of pensions and insurance. 
The provision of pensions by the state leads to other issues such as forced saving, 
adequacy of such saving, implications of such savings to the capital formation 
requirements of a country and many other issues as may not be covered in a report of 
this size. There are no immediate answers to some of the questions that may be raised 
under some of those headings as various studies have shown before. 
The pensions insurance covers three risks as a generality. These are old age, invalidity 
and premature death of the insured. The latter two risks are covered as a matter of 
gratuity as it is possible and often advisable that a person must have a separate life 
policy against premature death and another separate personal accident/injury policy. 
The state pension schemes are as a generality not that generous though they tend to 
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cover the three risks without limiting their scope of cover to longevity risk 
exclusively. 
The different national schemes have different rules relating to minimum qualification 
period, retirement age and so on. In the EC the Barber case led to the requirement of 
the standardisation of the retirement ages between men and women. It is worth noting 
that this requirement will take some time to implement fully. In the UK for example, 
it will not be until the second decade of this century before the equalisation in 
pensions in payment takes place. The benefits also vary and very few schemes have 
significant lump sum payments. 
2.4.2 Unemployment Insurance: 
In the greater part of the nineteenth century, it was generally acceptable that the 
responsibility of finding a job was an individual's responsibility. Those who could not 
find one often found themselves having to rely on charity or other such organisations 
as the church, feeding houses and so forth, and that is where such institutions existed. 
For the history of unemployment insurance see for example Tillyard (1949). As a 
result of Otto Von Bismarck's radical reforms in Germany, it soon became acceptable 
almost through out Western Europe that the states had a responsibility to shoulder the 
burden of unemployment. This philosophy has since gradually spread to most parts of 
the world though it is still alien in many. To ease the problem of financing such big 
schemes, most countries adopted a tripartite approach to financing unemployment 
insurance benefits, whereby the employees, the employers and the government 
contribute towards such a scheme. 
In many countries the trend is that unemployment insurance benefits schemes cover 
workmen in factories, commerce and industry while the agricultural and self 
employed persons are excluded for underwriting and logistical reasons. The benefits 
provided under unemployment insurance schemes are generally both in cash and in 
kind. Benefits in kind would normally entail retraining and counselling. 
2.4.3 Health Insurance: 
The primary purpose of national health insurance schemes is to improve and maintain 
certain minimum health standards for the workmen and the general populace. The 
blind view has tended to be that the benefit of national health insurance accrues to the 
insured public. The implicit cost that firms stand to incur in the form of recruiting and 
training a replacement employee in the event of elongated absence through sickness 
or death of an employee is more often than not overlooked. Other indirect costs such 
as diminished production output as a result of poor health or low moral from working 
in a sickly environment hits employers and the government indiscriminately. It is also 
worth noting that low production means lower revenue for central governments to tax. 
That explains one of the theoretical foundations for the economic rationale in the 
tripartite financing of health insurance. McCleary (1930) discuses the subject of the 
history of health insurance very well and may be a good source for elaborate reading 
in the subject. 
The national schemes would as a generality give both preventative and curative 
benefits to the insured population. Some schemes do cover funeral expenses, usually 
in the form of a single lump sum grant predetermined in the scheme rules. 
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2.4.4 The workmen's compensation insurance scheme: 
This is a national version of the group personal accident insurance schemes 
underwritten in the private markets. The core risks insured under such schemes are 
accidental injury or death and fortuitous contraction of a disease during and in the 
course of one's employment. Many national schemes of this nature usually exclude 
small employers from participating'. 
The benefits so provided under such schemes are both in cash and in kind. The 
benefits in cash will normally be a percentage of one's full earnings (usually 75% to 
80%). Such payment is generally made until the insured has recovered his ability to 
work though there may be some time limits as to the maximum number of years one 
may claim such a benefit. If the insured becomes permanently disabled a lump sum 
settlement may be payable of which there after he may have to live on invalidity 
pension, depending of course on his contribution record and other qualifying 
requirements for such benefits and the general social security provision in place. 
In addition to the above, some national schemes may offer rehabilitation or other such 
benefits in kind. In Zimbabwe the national scheme owns a number of such 
rehabilitation centres including its own medical clinics. The practice as already said 
varies from country to country. 
1 There is no apparent rationale for this anomaly though problems with enforcing this insurance 
requirement o small firms are often used to justify it. 
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2.5 The aims of this study 
My first object in this study is to survey the existing literature, make historical and 
theoretical foundations for the existence of social insurance in general and state 
pensions insurance in particular. It is my hope that by so doing I may provoke fresh 
thinking and some academic debate on some of the pertinent issues relating to pension 
insurance provided by the states through various public institutions. 
The second and probably most important of all my objectives is to review and 
evaluate the effects of the introduction of the NSSS (social insurance) to the 
Zimbabwean economy. In particular, to examine how the national scheme has 
impacted to different market agents such as the assured public, traditional pension 
firms and so on. I also make some analysis of the immediate past and current 
experiences in Zimbabwe as perceived by those that matter most in the development 
of the insurance and pensions markets. It is also my intention to discover and 
highlight through narrative, analysis and comment on some of those contributions of 
social insurance that have not been subject of debate in Zimbabwe in the past. 
Thirdly, it is my aim to use the previously unused data to test empirically the 
theoretical arguments about the effect of state pensions on the demand for private 
pensions. Prima facie there may seem to be an obvious case that state pensions reduce 
demand for private pensions, but given the complexity of the demand factors for 
pensions insurance it is of paramount importance that this hypothesis is subject to 
some empirical examination before any conclusions are made. 
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The issue of the economic impact of state pensions in Zimbabwe has never before 
been fully examined at this level. It is my hope that despite the problems of both 
political and economic instability at the time when we were researching for this thesis, 
our submissions would be able to set a framework of analysis of the Zimbabwean 
pensions markets that is intelligible not only for purposes of satisfying the 
requirements otherwise expected of research at this level but also for use by the policy 
makers and/ or other such groups that have interest in this area. 
Finally, it is my hope that this study will form the starting point for some other people 
interested in this area of research in Zimbabwe. Not only do I hope that our thesis will 
form the basis of future research but also that it may form the basis for future 
theoretical and policy formulations in so far as the Zimbabwean and other related 
Southern African markets are concerned. 
2.6 The scope of the study: 
This paper is not influenced or restricted by any form of political or religious 
allegiance or any other force. The only limitations came in the form of time upon 
which the sponsors of this research expected me to be through with it. The other 
sources of restriction were sources of data and the strict financial budget under which 
this research was carried out in the past three years. The other restrictions are in no 
way different from those that any other researcher in our field would encounter in the 
work of this magnitude. 
The subject of social insurance wide as it is cannot with any reasonable analysis be 
evaluated at this level as a single occurrence. This report, as such focuses on the state 
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pensions insurance and its immediate peripheral markets. Having given a broad 
perspective environment of the markets in general and pensions insurance in 
particular it starts by tracing the development of social insurance in general and the 
British and Zimbabwean cases specifically. It also briefly explains the structure and 
financing of the two schemes after which it draws at the specific economic issues that 
arise from the two models. I go on to make a careful review of the Zimbabwean NSSS 
in the light of the wider social, political, and economic and international experiences 
with social insurance schemes. Salient features from both social and economic 
theories developed by western academics are visited in the context of the 
Zimbabwean experience in a bid to determine the extent to which Zimbabwe national 
social security scheme conforms to those observations. 
A full list of references together with the bibliography is available at the end of this 
thesis. The appendices are also attached at'the end of this report. 
2.7 Justification of the study: 
The issue of the development of social insurance as a general subject is as fascinating 
as the debate on how pensions affect our capital stocks. At the moment there is no 
consensus on both originality and effect of social insurance. Contradicting accounts 
and effects have been widely availed in the academia literature. In fact, different 
economies seem to respond in different ways to the otherwise similar or related social 
insurance schemes. It is in that regard that we felt obliged to carry out further research 
so as to establish how the Zimbabwean market responds to such a development. 
While tracing the origin of social insurance is one of our many objectives the central 
core of our research centres on the economic effects of social security pensions. As is 
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shown in the later part of this paper, most of the previous empirical work has been 
based on the US data. There is no evidence of similar work that has been done using 
the Zimbabwean data. By doing this research, it is my hope to provoke similar 
research but using different sources and origins of data. In so doing, it is my hope that 
may be some of the mist of public pensions and private pensions markets may be 
better understood and policy implications applied accordingly. 
The controversy of compulsory and voluntary pension provision apart from being 
critically reviewed also forms a substantial part of my debate in this research. It is my 
sincere hope that our findings in this area will contribute to the pool of knowledge 
about the provision of pensions and most importantly how national schemes ought to 
be arranged particularly in small economies such as Zimbabwe. 
We feel that this research would be of interest to both the academia and policy 
makers. The simplicity of language and uncomplicated statistics used in this paper 
makes my research readable by people from a diversified back ground. The envisaged 
wide spectrum of readership will at least, I hope widen the horizon and understanding 
of the subject at various levels. 
2.8 Literature review 
Different professionals ranging from political scientists to actuaries have made a vast 
of very wealthy literature available in this subject area. To say I was able to visit all of 
that literature is not true with all possibilities. I try to make as such an appraisal of that 
which relates meaningfully to this thesis. The rest of the avalanche is left for others to 
chew. 
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Ogus (1982) traces the development of social insurance in Britain from 1882 to 1982. 
The work covered there can be a good starting point for those not familiar with the 
development of social insurance in Britain. Maseko (1991) makes a related account 
on the Zimbabwean private occupational schemes. The latter in fact, gives an insight 
to some of the traditional structures of the Zimbabwean pensions insurance market. 
Barr (1986 and 1998) gives a good framework for a foundation on both the political 
and economic theory of social insurance. His broad work compliments that of various 
authorities that have contributed individually in the many political economy journals 
and other such publications. 
The subject of measuring household saving dates very far back. Many incumbents in 
this area are known but probably the most outstanding has been Franco Modigliani. 
His 1949 paper on problems in economic forecasting in measuring saving-income 
ratio is one of the earliest of the modem attempts to explain the problem of saving 
measurement. That paper has since been followed by other equally outstanding works 
such as the 1986 Nobel Prize winning paper on lifecycle, individual thrift and the 
wealth of the nations. Gapinski (1993) makes a good account of the economics of 
saving. The various saving theories are reiterated and critically examined by 
independent reviewers. 
The basis of current debate in the subject of state insurance and private savings goes 
back to Feldstein (1974). Feldstein's work is important in this area for principally 
three reasons. First he is the first to have put the controversy of social insurance on 
the academic forum for debate. Secondly, his work marked the beginning of academic 
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interest in the subject of retirement behaviour and saving. Thirdly and last, his 
theories are a solid foundation for the initiation and subsequent development of future 
hypotheses in the subject. 
Barro (1978) extended the life cycle model to include altruistic bequests and showed 
that social security had no impact what so ever on saving. In his conclusion, in fact, 
goes further than that in highlighting the fact that the uncertainty about future labour 
income may make his first submission untrue. The same result could be found in a 
model with myopic households with less regard to uncertainty about future labour 
income. The empirical results at that point become dicey in that they cannot be 
accounted for in a single model. This has the same effect with results that fall in a 
multicollinearity econometric map. Many other persons have taken the time series 
analyses. Magnussen (1994) summarises most of the recent major works in the area of 
private saving and state pensions. 
The table below shows a summary of the major time-series analysis papers that have 
been published in this subject. The papers address the question of whether or not state 
pensions reduce private saving. The papers with a# indicate that quarterly data was 
used. 
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Table 2.1: Selection of some papers on social insurance and household saving 
Authors Estimation period Country Conclusion 
Feldstein (1974) 1930-71 US Yes 
Munnell (1974) 1929-69 US Yes 
Barro (1978) 1929-74 US No 
Darby (1979) 1929-74 US ? 
Markowski and Palmer (1979) 1954-75 Sweden Yes 
Boyle and Murrey (1979) 1946-69 Canada No 
Denny and Rea (1979) 1946-75 Canada No 
Pfaff, Hurler and Denneriein 
(1979) 
1965-78 Germany Yes 
Carmichael and Hawtrey (1981) 1961-79 # Australia No 
Leimer and Lesnoy (1982) 1929-76 US No 
Feldstein (1982) 1929-76 US Yes 
Browning (1982) 1966-76 # UK Yes 
Bentzel and Berg (1983) 1955-79 Sweden No 
Lee and Chao (1988) 1930-74 US No 
Magnussen (1994) 1966-90 Norway No 
Source: Magnussen (1994) 
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Table 2.2 below shows the list of authors and their findings on the same question of 
whether or not pensions reduce personal saving. These authors use the cross-country 
analysis to interpolate their empirical results. As is normally the case, in cross-country 
analysis the authors use data for different countries over an estimation period of five 
or more years. 
Table 2.2: Cross country papers on social insurance and savings 
Author Period Countries Method Results 
Feldstein (1977) 1954-1960 15 0,2SLS Yes 
Barro and Macdonald (1980) 1951-1960 16 p No 
Modigliani and Sterling (1983) 1960-1970 21 0 No 
Feldstein (1980) 1969-1975 12 0,2SLS Yes 
In the table above, 0 stands for the ordinary least squares on average data for each 
country. P indicates regression on pooled data while 2SLS shows that the labour 
participation rate is estimated separately. 
The effect of social insurance on personal savings has also been investigated using the 
cross section analysis. Below, in table 2.3, we show some of the authors together with 
their responses to the question of pensions depressing personal saving. In the table the 
age group is specified only if a single age is investigated. 
Table 2.3: Some cross section studies on social insurance and personal saving 
Authors Data Period Observations Age-group Conclusion 
Kotlikoff (1979) NSL 1966 2124 45-59 Yes 
Feldstein and Pellechio (1979) SFC 1962 126 55-64 Yes 
King and Dicks-Mireaux (1982) CSCF 1977 12734 
- 
Yes 
Feldstein (1983) LRHS 1969 2087 58-63 Yes 
Blinder, Gordon and Wise (1983) LRHS 1971 4130 60-65 No 
Dicks-Mireaux and King (1984) CSCF 1977 8279 
- 
Yes 
Kurz (1984) PCPP 1979 4293 
- 
Yes 
David and Menchik (1985) WS 1947-64 720 
- 
No 
Manger (1986) SFC 1962 623 
- 
Yes 
Bernheim (1987) LRHS 1969 5267 58-63 Yes 
Leimer and Richardson (1992) CES 1982-83 2715 
- 
Yes 
Table 2.3: source: Magnussen (1994) 
Key to the table: All data except for CSFC are American. The abbreviations are as 
follows: LRHS= Longitudinal Retirement History Survey 
PCPP= President's commission on pension policy 
WS= Wisconsin Survey 
SFC= Survey of Financial Characteristics 
CES= Consumer Expenditure Survey 
NLS= National Longitudinal Survey 
CSFC= Canadian Survey of Consumer Finances (Supplement) 
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The results of the various authors are testimony to the diversity both in approach and 
expectation of results in this area. 
As would probably be expected in a research of this nature, we make specific 
literature reviews on particular chapters. The wide diversity of the scope of our study 
partly explains our approach. Most importantly continuous literature review in the 
respective chapters serves as a basis of understanding individual chapters. 
2.9 The major issues investigated 
¢ The nature and impact of factors that have shaped the NSSS into its current 
form. 
> The effect that mandatory state pension schemes have on the demand for 
private pension schemes. 
> The effect that mandatory state pensions insurance have on private savings 
> The perception and understanding of specific clauses of the NSSS operations 
by the assured public. 
¢ The perception and wishes of the executives with power to influence the 
development and operation of the NSSS in the future. 
¢ The viability of the state scheme in its current form and possible reforms 
2.10 Theoretical arguments behind some of the issues investigated 
The state pensions insurance can potentially impact on the above stated hypotheses in 
various ways of which the very salient are discussed here. The conventional 
explanation of compulsion of state insurance schemes is to overcome the risk of 
adverse selection of risks. That is the risk of information asymmetry arising when the 
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most at risk are the most likely to seek insurance protection or higher levels of cover. 
In the pensions insurance that implies that those with higher longevity survival rates 
would be the most likely to seek pensions insurance cover. Booth and Dickinson 
(1997) argue that adverse selection in pensions insurance is an irrelevance. 
The first hypothesis is self- explanatory. In our second hypothesis the argument is on 
how the introduction of a compulsory pension scheme will affect the demand for the 
voluntarily purchased private pension schemes. If the premium for the compulsory 
pension scheme is fair the demand for the voluntarily purchased schemes will reduce 
by the equivalent proportion. But if the premium is unfair the individual rational risk - 
averse household will almost certainly demand more private cover than would have 
had the compulsory pension scheme been fair. 
The effect of social insurance to the private saving behaviour may manifest itself in 
various ways. First and crucially, if state benefits are predictable with certainty and 
adequate, the insured may feel obliged to save no more than what he contributes as 
premium to the national scheme. In this way the household consumption will increase 
thereby leading to a reduced individual provision. 
An alternative to the above would be the case whereby the uncertainty about state 
insurance may lead to the risky averse paying less regard to the state scheme in their 
plans for providing for the future, irrespective of whether driven by bequest motives 
or post retirement income uncertainty. 
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The introduction of a national scheme may in fact increase private saving through 
what is sometimes called the "awareness" effect. The awareness effect is probably 
best associated with schemes at their infancy state, as it is hard to conceive that this 
effect would have a perpetual impact even to those schemes at their maturity levels. 
The state pensions may also affect individual household saving behaviour depending 
on whether or not tax laws have a positive or negative effect on aggregate earnings 
from labour and pensions. The tax system may discourage households from 
continuing in employment after attaining retirement age. This is part of the so- called 
tax effect on saving and retirement behaviour. 
The state provided insurance, at least in theory, can be seen as a competitor of the 
private markets supplied pensions. The advocates of private provision of pensions 
argue that deleting the state mandatory pensions from the pensions market equation 
will lead to a better deal for the consumers. It is also important that the level of 
understanding the law and rules governing the NSSS is tested if generalisations of the 
perception of the state scheme are to be used as a guide in the direction of the 
development of this market. 
The generosity of state pensions may also have a negative effect to private household 
saving. The households who may feel adequately protected by the state scheme may 
opt for earlier retirement than they would in the absence of a state scheme. This is 
sometimes known as the disincentive effect of social insurance in that it reduces the 
amount of active workforce in an economy. 
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2.11 Methodology 
As would possibly be expected with any research on this subject and magnitude it 
would not have been possible to use a single method nor would it be rational to expect 
one to do so. This research was largely twofold in approach. That is, we employed 
two distinct tools of investigation. The first instrument employed in our first four 
chapters is that of deskwork while the rest of the chapters are founded on fieldwork. 
Two of Zimbabwe's biggest cities were selected for fieldwork. That was so, for we 
felt that sample sizes from the two biggest cities would be representative of the 
current characteristics of urban trends in the country. Household surveys were carried 
out in Bulawayo and Harare between April and May 2000. Before we discuss the 
actual exercise of gathering data, we will briefly explain the questions found in our 
questionnaires and the justification of our approach. 
The questionnaires that were used in the investigation were twofold. The first was 
aimed at the employees, the assured public. The second was directed at the regulators 
and executives of the organisations in the insurance market. The first part of the 
questionnaire used for the assured public is essentially about the basic information of 
the respondent, that is gender, age, number of dependants and so on. The second part 
of the questionnaire sought to solicit information about the income and assets of the 
respondent. The amount of assets and income that employees have has a direct 
relevance to the amount that they would be willing to dispose on particular 
commodities. And as such, analysing the budget expenditure of individual household 
was deemed essential as a gauge of appreciation of the NSSS. The budget spread of 
the household on various commodities tells us about the willingness to spend on a 
particular commodity. 
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We also found it important to test the level of understanding of the law and rules 
governing the contractual obligations and benefits payable by the NSSS as a way of 
determining whether or not people understood the meaning and relevance of the state 
scheme. Testing that ability was also a way of judging the weight of the respondents' 
opinions about the state scheme. The less informed the respondent the higher the 
chances that they would make a less informed decision and provide a less realistic 
expected progression of the state scheme and the market in general as the society 
continues to learn more and more about the NSSS. 
We also found it important to test the significance of the NSSS in improving the 
welfare of the employees for it is the perceived welfare gains that would undoubtedly 
influence the assured public about continuation of the state scheme and the form 
under which it should continue to develop. Complementing answers solicited through 
some open- ended questions corroborated the views gained by including a question to 
this effect and those that developed outside the scope of the standard questionnaire as 
the interview progressed. 
The questionnaires used for the regulators and executives borrowed much from the 
standard questionnaire already discussed about the assured employees. We discuss 
most important questions that are included in the executives' questionnaires. The 
impact of the NSSS to the private markets was included, as a question, because we 
felt it important to find out the perception of the executives to that effect, for it is 
those perceptions held by executives that will help shape the NSSS. 
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The reaction of the private markets to the introduction of the NSSS was investigated 
from the view of the executives as a way of determining the sources of friction 
between the state scheme and the private markets. Including the question about the 
major obstacles to co-existence of the NSSS and the private schemes complemented 
the responses from our question soliciting the perceived life span of the state scheme. 
The open-ended question also brought to light some complementing views about the 
deep seeded suspicions between the state scheme and the private schemes. 
Questionnaires and personal interviews were used for collecting information from a 
usable- population sample size of six hundred and three households (318 in Bulawayo 
and 285 from Harare). The questions contained in the questionnaires were piloted 
between September and October 1999 in Harare by two of my research assistants, 
David and John who had previous experience in information gathering, from their 
experiences working for a national brewing company. The major concern that was 
revealed by the pilot scheme related to a general climate of mistrust and suspicion 
arising mainly from the political situation at the time. They for example, reported that 
many people were suspicious of their intentions and displayed a general feeling of 
mistrust to the whole exercise. That was all caused, to a large extent, by the prevailing 
political situation in Zimbabwe. Some of the interviewees and potential interviewees 
thought, for example, that my two research assistants were agents of a political 
organisation. The fact that the information so gathered was to be given to me in 
London at the time made the scepticism about the whole intentions of the exercise 
even worse. There were for example some unfounded rumours that my research 
assistants were collecting information for onward transmission to the British 
government agents in London. It was for that reason that we modified the original 
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questionnaire and resulting in the exclusion of certain questions that could have been 
potentially misconstrued for political intents. 
Still on that subject of suspicion, there were some people, for example, that thought 
the two research assistants were insurance agents trying to lure them into buying life 
assurance policies. Some people thought, of course wrongly, that my two research 
assistants could help them financially. Others wanted to know if co-operating with our 
team would entitle them to any benefit, most of which were social and caused by the 
economic hardships at the time. It was a mammoth task convincing the people that 
our exercise was just an academic exercise without any political affiliations. 
My friend and now Member of Parliament for Matopo, L Moyo advised us to engage 
the local civic leaders and other influential organisations to void any ambiguities 
about our intentions, a strategy that worked greatly for me. During the months of 
April and May when the actual data for the thesis was being collected, the national 
parliamentary elections were not only looming but were also just a month away. The 
political violence that preceded the elections made it not only unsafe for me to collect 
the data but also posed a serious threat to the sensitivity and otherwise independence 
of opinions of the interviewees. For that reason my team and I had to be occasionally 
escorted by some makeshift local youth securities when we in the high-density 
suburbs were violence was most rife. We had to be very alert as we moved from place 
to place as would be expected for an investigative data gathering exercise in a country 
like Zimbabwe. 
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The level of suspicion and mistrust was better in offices than in the individual 
households and street surveys that we visited during our data gathering. It however 
suffices to mention that even the office staffs were not willing to talk freely at first. It 
was for that reason that we had to employ tactical strategies to get the confidence of 
the people we had targeted. 
At times my team was to blame for the suspicions that were raised by the 
interviewees and our potential interviewees, as at times we tended to deviate from set 
down questions in the questionnaires. In the process the interviews ended up being 
longer than initially budgeted for. Partly because of that and to a large extent owing to 
the economic-political developments in the run up to the parliamentary elections, it 
was not possible to get information that was absolutely unbiased. The extent of bias 
and the ultimate effect to the overall picture of this report may never be fully 
ascertained. 
The managers and other interviewees were difficult to find, as they all seemed to be 
operating under very stringent time budgets. My patience was brought to test on 
several occasions, as I had to wait in some of the managers' offices for more than I 
would have liked to. Some I had to make lunch appointments and discuss issues over 
lunch and have the questionnaires completed at the same time. There was equally 
little joy with the parliamentarians as most of them were preoccupied with party 
businesses in the run up to the parliamentary elections that were themselves very 
tense and closely contested. Assuring the Members of the House of Assembly that I 
was soliciting their views on social insurance for no other purpose other than the 
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academic exercise that I was carrying out proved a mammoth task. Most of them 
emphasised that their views were "off record" and did not want to be quoted. 
We were also given some access to the life assurance annual returns statements and 
reports to the registrar of pension and provident funds and the commissioner of 
insurance's crude annual reports by various companies and those by the commissioner 
himself. Though a large percentage of reports were either incomplete or up to date, 
they were quite useful for purposes of our research. We need also not emphasise that 
because of that we had to make some speculative analysis and conclusions at times. 
Approaching a thesis from the angle we have done will inevitably attract criticism 
from certain quarters. We are however, not the first to use such an approach. Other 
people have employed different methods before successfully. Guduza (1996), Layman 
(1994) are examples of some of the people who have used a similar approach. The 
limitations to our data and methodological approach are briefly explained below. 
Some of the shortcomings are explained in the particular chapters. 
2.12 Limitations of our method and data: 
First and foremost, since I do not claim virginity in this area of study, it follows 
therefore that my theoretical framework has been influenced in one way or the other 
by the works that precede mine. As has already been shown above, some of the data 
used in this thesis was collected by people who had nothing to do with this thesis and 
certain aspects of the issues that are germane to this report were found missing 
resulting at times to speculative analysis and conclusions. The rest, if ever any, of the 
shortcomings are not significant in anyway as to warrant special mention. Lastly and 
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probably most importantly, I ought to mention that the time framework put upon me 
forced me to speed the process of this research to such an extent that I was not 
afforded a chance to make repeat observations on certain issues that I might have 
liked to. 
2.13 Organisation of the thesis: 
This thesis comprises of eight distinct chapters. The order of this thesis reflects the 
chronological development of the main issues that are subject of our investigation and 
analysis in this report. The order of the thesis also reflects some coherence of our 
analysis. Below I detail the core subjects of the respective chapters that make this 
thesis. 
Chapter two lays the foundation and defines the salient concepts of the subject. Broad 
conceptualisation of markets and in particular state insurance and pensions are made. 
The general framework upon which our research centres is also made in this chapter. 
Chapter three sets out approaches to social insurance markets as developed by the 
academics from the Western world. I discuss the principles of insurance provision and 
seek to explain here the reasons behind the emergence and continued existence of 
state provision of some of the insurance services. This chapter also gives a literature 
review in this debate as a prelude to testing the relevance of those structural, 
organisational, political and economic arguments to the Zimbabwean experience 
bearing in mind that they have been developed with Western economies in mind. 
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In chapter four I trace the development of social insurance in general and look at the 
specific developments relating to state pensions in the UK and Zimbabwe. In this 
chapter I also discuss the present pensions structure in the two countries. Some core 
salient features of the two schemes are carefully noted in this chapter, as are the broad 
economic policy implications of such features. 
A critical analysis of the state pensions insurance in light of the present pensions 
market structure in Zimbabwe is made in chapter five. It is in this chapter that I also 
make a critical review and appraisal of the National Social Security Scheme in view 
of the wider socio-economic policies in place. 
Chapter six continues where chapter five left. I use a simple model to explain the 
demand effect of the Zimbabwean NSSS to the local market. As with any other work 
of this nature, our mathematical analysis was determined by the circumstances of our 
data. 
It is in chapter seven that we look at the various market findings in Zimbabwe. The 
effect of the NSSS on the personal household saving trends is tested in this chapter. 
The results of our field- work are discussed here and where necessary compared to the 
experiences from the tried and established markets such as the UK. In chapter eight 
we make some broad conclusions from our research and high light areas that have not 
been fully addressed or that need further research in their own right and possible 
reforms that can be done to improve the NSSS. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
PERSPECTIVES ON STATE PENSIONS AND INSURANCE MARKETS 
"The political process has a short electoral time scale: governments respond to current 
dissatisfactions, well founded or not... (There) is a tacit conspiracy to maintain the 
welfare state (as) it is still a powerful way to win votes. The contests between the 
parties preserve and inflate the system... Expenditure (has) has been taken as a 
measure of effectiveness. " Seldom (1996) 
3.1 Introduction 
In this chapter we seek to make an informed approach to state pensions insurance and 
insurance markets as developed by the academics from the western world. It is 
essential from the onset to mention that the concepts that we discuss here were 
developed primarily to explain and at times to justify the state pensions in those 
developed insurance markets. The economic and other econometric models that have 
been developed and used were developed primarily with the western economies in 
mind. It is as such not surprising that they have tended to fit so well to the western 
arguments, data and experiences. In this end we seek to set a framework upon which 
the same tools developed by those academics can be extended so as to explain their 
relevance and applicability to the Zimbabwean experiences. I find this an important 
academic cause for never before has the Zimbabwean state pensions insurance system 
been scrutinised at this level in terms of the broad financial markets within the 
domains of both economic and political spectrum. 
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A lot of empirical work has been done in the developed economies in moves aimed at 
least to prove that social insurance can be explained in terms of conventional 
principles and models of economics. The US works take a lead in that aspect see for 
example the works of the likes of Feldstein (1974) Katona (1965) Wentworth and 
Mortley (1970) and many others. ' Recently there has been a fair wide spread of 
research in this area of social insurance and particularly on how it impacts on 
individual saving behaviour and capital markets at large. Reports using empirical data 
for countries such as the UK, 2 Italy, Norway to advance or dent some of the 
longstanding views about social insurance and household behaviour are abundant by 
whatever standards. The same view can be said with regard to comparability studies 
on social insurance systems; that is their organisation, financing, performance and so 
forth. But such works seem to have been limited to the Western and North American 
experiences with East and Central European and Latin America featuring mostly on 
pensions reform. 
It is not easy to come out with a universally acceptable definition of an insurance 
market nor does it sound rational to expect one such definition. Various academics 
have attempted to introduce relatively acceptable definitions of insurance markets. 
Carter (1974) defines the UK insurance industry as that paradigm of firms consisting 
of companies, societies and individuals producing closely competing services. He 
refers to the whole totality of participants as the UK insurance market. I will for our 
part seek to define the insurance market as that totality of suppliers, consumers and 
regulators of the insurance services in any given economic set up. As may be noted, 
1 See for example Wittee (1962) "The Development of the Social Security Act" University of 
Wisconsin Press, Madison. 
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the actual insurance market in practice is far more complicated than that. The 
diversity and intermingling within the paradigm of participants that constitute the 
market itself explain that complexity. 
The insurance market unlike other markets is unique and thus calls for a unique 
approach. The pensions insurance market is a proper subset of the insurance market as 
a whole that is it self-a proper subset of the financial services market at large. The 
state pensions insurance market exists as an integral part of the whole system. The 
relevance and impact of the state pensions insurance market depends to a large extent 
on how it is organised and financed. 3And more importantly, on how it is perceived 
and interpreted by the private participants in the market. In addition to that there are 
other forces that shape and determine the pace and direction of the debate about social 
insurance and its effect or future likely effect on the economy. Most notably being the 
political pressure groups, the social policy research institutes, actuarial discoveries 
and many others. 4 
The nature of the commodity that is the subject of pensions insurance explains its 
variance from the other conventional economic markets. The unique physical nature 
of pensions includes the following: "its high cost of supply, long-term investment, 
quasi-homogeneity and poor liquidity in the short run". 5 In addition to these, because 
2 See for example Magnussen, K. A (1994): Precautionary saving and old age pensions. Discussion 
paper 108, Statistics Norway. Browning (1982): Savings and pensions: some UK evidence. Economic 
journal 92 
See for example Casey (1993) "Employer's choice of pension schemes: London HMSO. 
4 See Dilnot A, Disney R, Johnson P and Whitehouse E (1994) Pensions Policy in the UK : An 
economic analysis, London: The Institute of Fiscal Studies. S Note that firms selling insurance products are statutorily required to meet minimum capital 
requirements before they can be licensed. The long-term liability reserves that the government 
actuaries recommend make pensions a business for the financially sound only firms. 
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of susceptibility to fraud and financial loss due to firms failing to perform, pensions 
have to conform to generally tight regulatory obligations meant to protect the public. 
Insurance business (pensions included) is about buying deferred promises. Pension 
provision may be viewed, as an insurance against the risk that the individual will 
outlive the age at which he is capable to continue in effective employment. As such 
pensions insurance is a prepaid benefit realisable only when the individual insured 
reaches the pre-agreed retirement age. The economic benefit that the insured enjoys is 
the certainty of income in the life after retirement. The insurer, at least in theory, rests 
on the risk that the individual life will drop before retirement age. In practice it may 
not be so as the insurance companies are generally generous enough to pay the 
accumulated capital sum to the beneficiaries of the insured's estate should the latter 
die before reaching the retirement age. 6 It is also normal for the suppliers of pensions 
to invest the individual sums paid as premiums in highly profitable ventures and make 
profit despite having to pay huge pay outs in respect of lives that drop before 
maturity. 
The whole contract of insurance is based on the principle of "utmost good faith. " 
That is the legal duty to disclose all the relevant material facts without 
misrepresentations by both parties to the contract. In pensions the subject of 
disclosure is of less relevance as the ability to see one's life through to retirement age 
is independent of the individual insured's control. If ever the insured were to 
influence the risk, it would have to be through cutting short his life, which in theory 
would be to the advantage of the insurers. 
6 Booth and Dickinson (1997) "The Insurance solution" European policy forum, London 
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A pension as a product is characterised by amongst its important features the non- 
liquidity and vulnerability to inflationary pressure that may lead to social costs if not 
properly meditated. Investing in pensions may thus be viewed in the context of the 
individual's life cycle consumption. There has been some works aimed at modelling 
pensions as a function of the human life cycle, see table 2.1. The non-liquidity of 
pensions as a commodity stems from the fact that pension insurance is a long-term 
investment. Money invested in pensions may as such not be used to finance short- 
term financial constraints. This is normally in black and white in the contract. This is 
true in respect of both the state and private pension provision. 
When a house- hold decides to invest in a pension policy, it defers a part of today's 
consumption to a future date after retirement. 7This deferred income may not, as a 
generality, be touched until the agreed retirement age. It is partly because of this that 
pensions as are other long-term assurances, are governed through a strict financial 
code through both statutory Acts and self- governance in the form of professional 
bodies. 8 The latter in particular tend to exercise strict ethical codes that the affiliate 
members are expected to abide by. Failure of which may result in expulsion or de- 
registration as it is often called in the professional world. A system of prohibitive and 
punitive fines may also be used depending on the gravity of individual misdemeanour 
to curtail members from acting in a manner that puts the reputation of the profession 
into disrepute. 
7 See Barr (1998) "The Economics of the Welfare State", 3`d edition, Oxford University Press Oxford. 8 See the Financial Services Act (1986) HMSO London 
The stringent regulatory framework and high ethical expectations in the market cut 
out potentially "bogus" firms from entering the market. Firms with short-term life 
spans are kept out by the capital and long-term reserve requirements. It is rather 
rational to expect that only firms with long-term projections will be willing to hold 
large sums of money in the form of relatively non-liquid form such as investments in 
land and estates. 
The issue of inflation, a subject that we will turn to later in the report brings yet 
another dimension to the pension debate. Neither the insured nor the suppliers of 
pension have control over inflation. It is the central government that is in principle the 
sole custodian of curbing inflationary sores. The cost of inflation in state provided 
pensions insurance is as a generality fully met by the suppliers where is in privately 
run schemes the insured is normally left with a substantial cost of inflation to contend 
with. It is for that reason that only the state can offer inflation insurance that the 
argument of public provision of pensions is enhanced. 9 It is in fact the only principal 
feature of pensions that even the opponents of state provision find difficult to ignore. 
The inflation variable thus brings to question the suitability of private provision of 
pensions in view of the fact that private suppliers cannot fully hedge against the risk 
of inflation. 
It is because of this broad diversity of pensions insurance aspect that this subject has 
been approached from various disciplines and schools of thought. Principally it has 
been approached from the angles of political science, psychology, philosophy, 
economics, actuarial science and sociology. This broad diversity in approach explains 
9 Barr (1987) "The Economics of the Welfare State" Weidenfield and Nicolson; London 
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the apparent polysemy and interpretation of the insurance markets and in particular as 
they relate to state insurance. The rich theoretical background in support of these 
various approaches hows how varied their scope is. 
We will now thus attune this chapter to the fundamentals of the major schools of 
thought in pension provision. To achieve that, we disentangle our analysis into two 
distinguishable broad cells comprising of ideology and political and economic 
theories. The former two are generally intertwined and are as such best understood 
when discussed simultaneously. This is so primarily because they both seek to address 
the issue of social justice in the society where is in the case of economic theory the 
substance of debate lies with the economic efficiency of systems in resource 
allocation. 
3.2 Ideological phenomena 
Barr (1998) contends that amongst the core aims of the developed western world are 
efficiency in the use of resources: their fair and just distribution and the preservation 
of individual freedom. The interpretation and applicability varies according to 
different schools of thought. 10Most other developing nations as are some of the 
poorest states do adopt similar mission statements to those upheld by the developed 
western countries, namely to provide and uphold individual freedom, security and 
justice. " The undeveloped economies have only tended to differ from the rest of the 
world in failing to implement honestly and truthfully the spirit of this largely 
universal mission statement. Having said that, it must not be failed to realise that there 
are some other reasons that explain this anomaly in the developing world, notably of 
10 Ibid. 
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which is lack of adequate resources, divergence of cultures and economic beliefs and 
the impact of neo-colonialism. 
The subject of security, freedom and justice has been applied in various humanity 
needs in particular where human rights are pivotal. Pensions insurance has not been 
an exception as in fact has been the case with any other insurance and other 
fundamental needs of mankind. 12 The question of exceptions has tended to arise only 
when issues of "to what extent" have been invoked. And it is this question that 
distinguishes the Libertarians from the socialists and the latter from the utilitarian and 
the former and others. 13 It is within these ideological idioms that the political eclectic 
running of pensions insurance comes to play. Not withstanding the fact that it is a 
mammoth econometric task measuring these concepts that are distinguishing 
characters, there still remain strong theoretical arguments for and against these 
ideological schools of thought. It is where this chapter will now focus. 
11 See the UN charter on individual freedom, security and justice 12 Typical considerations are housing, medical, legal protection schemes and so on. 13 Note that these focal groups are many and their impact in our society varies extensively. See Barr (1987) The Economics of the Welfare state Weidenfeld and Nicolson London 
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Table 3.1: The three broad theories of social justice. 






total welfare Thornely (1993) 
Advocates of Maximisation of 
capitalism with efficiency and Gorovitz (1975) 
Liberals government action equity 
Socialists Government action Equality, freedom Laski (1967) 
& equality and fraternity 
Source: Compiled from Barr (1998) The economics of the welfare state Oxford, 
Oxford University Press and Seldon (1981) Wither the Welfare State London Institute 
of Economic Affairs. 
3.2.1 The Libertarians approach 
The Libertarians are of two groups, namely the natural rights and empirical class. The 
latter class argue that state provision of services reduces total welfare while the 
former are against intervention in the markets on the grounds that it is morally wrong 
except in very limited circumstances Barr (1987). The "Thatcherist" approach in the 
UK falls under the empirical Libertarian. The two classes view the society in terms of 
individuals rather than group and give weight to individual freedom with unequivocal 
support for private property and the market mechanism. They both view the state 
involvement in taxation and redistribution with circumscription. '4 
In the insurance market the Libertarians philosophy would mean leaving the private 
market to sort itself out. The individuals would thus be expected to be rational and the 
markets to be able to provide with minimal or no difficult at all. The people who share 
the views of the libertarians thus view the public-subsidised state pensions insurance 
with contempt. The role of the state, including regulation, in the market as far as they 
are concerned is best left at very minimal levels. 
The Libertarian approach while it may be applied with relative ease and compromises 
in other commodities such as in housing as the Thatcher government once attempted 
in the UK, it is unlikely that the same could be said with old age pensions insurance. 
This is primarily for reasons of inflation that are beyond the scope of control of 
individual suppliers or markets. Booth and Dickinson (1997) argue that the private 
markets can in principle provide successful in pensions. They note that from a pure 
underwriting point there is no obstacle what so ever, see table 3.2 on insurability of 
14 Ibid. 
various social insurance schemes. They conclude that from the supply side there are 
no significant constraints that can hinder the private market being the major or sole 
supplier of old- age pensions. Of significance is that Booth and Dickinson (1997) do 
not discuss the subject of adequacy of pension that the individual household would 
seek to buy from the private market. The cost of inflation is also not discussed. 
Drawing these two important variables to the discussion would possibly have led to a 
different conclusion. 
The libertarian approach does fail as a matter of principle to address some of the 
fundamental principles that are traditionally in the heart of the spirit of social 
insurance. These are some of the most important: vertical redistribution of wealth 
from the rich to the poor, the social solidarity of the workforce, distribution of wealth 
from the young to the old. And above all, the states' moral obligations to contain 
extremism in free markets. 
3.2.2 The liberals belief 
The liberals are of broadly two classes, namely the Rawlsian philosophy and 
utilitarian approach. The liberals unlike the libertarians discussed above believe in a 
"mixed approach. " That is they recognise that the central governments alone cannot 
deliver efficiently in those areas where private provision is otherwise an alternative. 
More over they realise that private provision alone is inadequate and not to the best of 
interest of the consumers. Because of that the liberals argue that the government and 
private sector partnership is the solution to the social justice conflict arising from the 
economy adopted. From their view it is the combination of capitalism and 
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government action that jointly maximises efficiency and equity Barr (1998). We will 
now seek to make an overview analysis of the two approaches by the liberals. 
3.2.2.1 The Utilitarian philosophy 
The intellects that argue under the banner of utilitarianism share the foundation with 
the empirical libertarians discussed above. The utilitarian scholars are concerned 
about the maximisation of total utility in an economy's distribution of resources. To 
achieve that resources have to be distributed efficiently and equitably though not 
necessarily equally. '5 Figure 3.1 below shows the equitable distribution line sought by 
the utilitarian philosophers. This figure represents a simple model consisting of two 
people A and B. The total income to be distributed being AB would imply that A's 
marginal utility is represented by the line as (read from left to right) and diminishes as 
the income increases. 16B's marginal utility declines from right to left and is 
represented by the line bb. Total utility is maximised when income is shared equally, 
in fig. 3.1 that is when A's income is AC and B's income is BC. 
To justify state intervention for purposes of redistribution of resources the utilitarian 
scholars cite the egalitarian cause that comes by through government action in the 
market. This as Barr (1997) rightfully says depends crucially on the sample 
population having identical marginal utility of income functions. There are other 
econometric variables that have to be satisfied. 17As is shown in fig. 3.1 changing B's 
marginal utility function to line b*b* leads to an unequal total welfare maximisation 












Figure 3.1 : Source Barr (1998) pp49 
The utilitarian argument is as interesting as its short falls. From a practical point of 
view it is quite difficult to visualise as to what extent it has to be conceived. Apart 
from the obvious flaws such as the abstract mathematical measure used to measure 
utility and its functions there is also a fundamental question of compatibility with 
other prime objectives that are pivotal to social justice. '8 
In the pensions market the utilitarian approach raises some crucial moral and ethical 
questions. For example, it is difficult to say whose income satisfaction and security 
has to be used as a distinct line for the state intervention in the provision of pensions. 
More over is it ethically correct to penalise those members of the society that are 
irrational and can, as such not take adequate precautionary steps to hedge their 
"See Mdartz (1987) The econometrics of the welfare state University of Wisconsin Press Madison 18 There are some inevitable points of conflict that may render realisation of social justice objectives 
impossible. For example, in this instance the concept of individual freedom has to be compromised if a 
total maximisation of welfare under utilitarianism has to be achieved. 
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earnings against the foreseen difficulty of old age retirement life? On the other hand, 
is it morally justifiable to sacrifice the well- being of the rich few in order to 
maximise total utility? Taken from a pure economics point of view, there is an 
essential question of capital formation vis-ä-vis whether it has to be sacrificed for the 
benefit of attaining total utility in the society. 
Finally, above all the question that all these considerations lead to is the appropriate 
action plan in the form of government policy towards the provision of pensions. 
Because of the difficulty in satisfying all the members of the society equally, the 
decision would tend to be political rather than economic. In this instance of pensions 
that would mean for example sacrificing the pension needs of the rich few for the 
benefit of the poor many constituting the majority electorate. 
3.2.2.2 The Rawlsian philosophy 
The Rawls approach puts social justice as the prime aim of institutions. The argument 
starts essentially from a moral perspective and centres on the perception that 
institutions have to be perceived as being just. 19 The Rawlsian approach is based on 
an assumption that people are rational, egocentric but bound by social contract 
principles that are negotiated by individuals as free agents to determine the 
distribution of goods Gorovitz (1975). The individual participants in the negotiations 
are assumed to be behind a mask of veil of ignorance in so far as the individual details 
about individual self are concerned. That is they are thought to be well informed 
about all the relevant facts surrounding them serve for the specificity of the 
occurrence of those events that will trigger the applicability of those principles agreed 
19 lbid pp44 
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upon. Failure to agree and be bound by such pre-agreed principles would lead to 
chaos as individual adversely affected members seek to violate the social contract 
principles in pursuit of individual remedy and equalising advantage? ° It is from that 
point that this approach may be viewed as morally justifiable as the principles are 
determined in advance in the absence of individual prejudice. It is within the same 
analogy that Rawls himself argues that the principles of justice so derived rationally 
and unanimously will, because of the veil of ignorance, result in maximisation of 
liberty for the sample at large. 
The Rawls theory is expounded dichotomously into first and second principle. These 
are the liberty and the difference principle respectively. The former is explained in 
terms of the individual's equal right to the most extensive basic liberty compatible 
with a similar liberty for others Rawls (1972) cited in Barr (1998). Having achieved 
that the individual negotiators will then focus on other goods21 other than liberty with 
each rejecting any principle of distribution that could leave him disadvantaged or 
exploited. 
While the principle of equality is upheld as of primary importance it goes without 
saying that the advocates of this theory realise that the individual negotiators do 
uphold the principle of inequality for the best of the social contract. By way of 
example if introducing a non means-tested non- contributory old-age pension 
eliminates the burden of poverty and begging nuisance, the negotiators may find it 
advantageous to curve in even if it means that scroungers who do not want to work for 
20 By way of example, consider a case where all the society members agree that a drug abuser has to be 
executed. When out of the blue an individual family is faced with this predicament, their interest becomes to the contrary of the general interest. 21 Goods interpreted widely to include other essentials of mankind such as security, freedom etc. 
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their life after retirement are to benefit. It is as such not misleading to conclude that 
where there is social benefit or reduction of social cost the negotiators will be willing 
to give in to inequalities in distribution of goods and resources. 
The second principle also known as the difference principle justifies social and 
economic inequalities if it satisfies the following conditions: First if the inequality is 
such that it is to the most benefit to the least advantaged. And secondly attaches to 
offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity. 22 The 
possibility of a potential conflict between the two principles is ruled out by a priority 
principle that gives the first principle absolute priority over the second. 23 
Having said that it does not follow that this theory goes without its flaws and ifs and 
only ifs. 24 Of particular significance is the obscurity as to how Ralws reconciles the 
concept of being just without losing efficiency in the process within the social 
contract that the negotiators enter into. The Paretian efficiency measure wildly 
appreciated in modern economics hardly befits in the Rawlsian approach. 
In the old age pensions market the application of the Rawls theory is as fascinating as 
is its importunate questions that it generates. First and foremost, it is difficult to 
envisage a pension insurance policy that may be deliberately tilted to the benefit of 
the privileged without posing a mandatory subsidy by the rich. Within the same 
analogy, even if it is the state that meets the cost of subsidy that, still results in double 
contribution by the well off in respect of their pension contribution in the economy. It 
22 Ibid cited page51 
23 ibid 
24 For a detailed analysis see Gorovitz (1975) "John Rawls: A theory of Justice" edited by Crespigny A. 
and Minogue k. R, Contemporary Political Philosophers, London: Methuen. 
68 
is in such flaws that the Rawls approach fails to justifiable meet the justice concept 
that is so much sought after by the liberal theorists. 
The desire to develop policies that benefit the least well off poses a dilemma in the 
pensions market. Not only that this is absurd on its own right but it is also strange that 
a pensions model that may make the rich richer without making the poor worse off 
will be unacceptable in a Rawls backed model despite being a Pareto improvement. 
Lastly, like any other social justice theory discussed so far, the Rawlsian approach is 
susceptible to political manipulation. Apart from determining the "yard sticks of 
measure" the politicians are known for their juggling skills in so far as pleasing the 
dominant electorate group is concerned. For that reason alone a policy drawn 
alongside the Rawls philosophy may manifest itself differently from one economy to 
the other all depending on the political muscles surrounding each. In that regard, it 
may not be surprising to find that in trying to apply the Rawls backed pensions model 
may in fact result in one contrary to the principles defined by Philosopher Rawls. 
3.2.3 The Socialists approach 
Like any other theory the socialists' theory has various theoretical approaches and 
applicability. Barr (1998) refers to the socialist theory as the collectivist views. 
Historically the socialists have always believed in collective ownership of resources 
and means of production. They as such believe that equality and social justice could 
be attained when the state assumes the control of the allocation and distribution of 
most resources. 25 
25 Ibid. 
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Despite the wide divergence in various socialist goals they remain united when it 
comes to questions of equality, freedom and fraternity. The socialist authorities differ 
widely on the relative importance of each of these three. But as Barr (1998) relays it 
neatly, it is the collective weight of equality, freedom and fraternity that make up the 
socialist definition of justice. We will seek to review how these three concepts may be 
defined in terms of the insurance markets and their relevance in so far as the 
progression of the markets are concerned. For purposes of simplicity we will define 
the socialists as of two groups, namely the socialist democrats and the Marxists. The 
latter are the extremist groups that have a total disregard of capitalism while the 
former are the advocates of a capitalist economy with a blend of government 
involvement in the market. 
3.2.3.1 The Socialist Democrats 
These socialists subscribe to active state involvement in the production and 
distribution of resources and the tradition has been that they are opposed to the 
privatisation of public goods pensions included. The social democrats unlike the other 
extremist socialist groups observe the importance of retaining capitalism as a viable 
and efficient economic system. In addition to that they do not want to lose the 
distributional role that they envisage through state involvement in the economy. The 
mixed economy approach in the UK is partly explained by this ideological 
compromise. The observation in the UK with the coming of the new Labour 
government in to power is that the difference between the liberals and the democratic 
socialists is becoming a thin line. 
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The traditional socialists by virtue of their ideological priorities will advocate a state 
pensions insurance scheme that is generally standard on the benefits side but with a 
differential contribution scale to reflect individual earnings. In so doing it is also 
hoped that the distributional objective of wealth from the rich to the poor will be 
maintained. 
The present flat rate old age pension system in the UK does satisfy the socialists' aim 
of equality in the distribution of income. 26 The subject of equality of opportunity as 
discussed by Tawney (1964) fits well to the publicly financed flat rate state pensions 
financed on a pay as you go basis that are found in most of the developed capitalist 
countries. 
With the collapse of the communist economies in the late 1990s and the current trend 
of left political parties moving in the centre left or even further than that it is not 
obvious that the current set ups in the pensions will survive long. In fact, in the UK 
with the New Labour government so in obsession with modernising every sector it is 
likely that the UK old age pension system will move very closely to the liberals 
oriented goals. The proposed pension reforms in the UK are currently under the mist 
of uncertainties but indications are that it is likely to be highly individualised stakes. 
Freedom as defined by the socialists is very broad. It includes amongst other things 
the free exercise of individual choice (which is possible only if there is no poverty and 
no substantial inequality of wealth and power) legal, political and economic security 
Barr (1998). In the insurance markets that would imply that the individual households 
26 Note that the flat rate pension mentioned here is but a part of the three-layer system under the British 
pension structure. 
71 
must exercise some power to the way they want the markets run and products 
designed and distributed. Contrary to the private markets approach where insurance 
(including pensions) is sold, it must be publicly distributed or at least have a 
substantial involvement of the state in the way it is supplied and distributed. 
Fraternity the third major value of the socialist approach implies co-operation and 
altruism as opposed to competition and self-interest. From the point of view of the 
socialist democrats that objective becomes attainable by fostering public provision of 
those essential goods that the private markets may not provide to the best interest of 
the communities that they serve. This partnership between the state and the private 
sector in the provision of goods must be clearly distinguished from the fundamentalist 
socialist approach of absolute state provision. 
3.2.3.2 The Marxists philosophy 
The advocates and writers of this approach are united on the essence of equality. Barr 
(1997) refers to this group of socialists as the "fundamentalists who reject capitalism. " 
This is particularly justifiable when one considers that the basic philosophy of 
Marxism centres on the absolute dismissal of capitalism as an exploitative mechanism 
by the elite few. The extent of fundamentalism varies invariably within the Marxists 
philosophers. But according to Marx himself, as is stated by Mishra (1981) cited in 
Barr (1998) his attitude towards capitalism was one of outright rejection rather than 
reform. How ever, as this thesis is not on pensions role in the Marxists societies, we 
will not seek to elaborate much on the finer trivialities within this theory. Instead we 
seek to make a logical conceptualisation of the theory in relation to the insurance 
markets and show how some of the Marxists arguments have been used by some 
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critiques in the conventional western economies to blame or justify the states roles in 
the market. 
The Marxist approach, as a socialist philosophy advances the importance of liberty, 
equality and fraternity. They view freedom and equality as the two central themes for 
the attainment of social justice. Freedom and equality are seen as two intermingled 
concepts contrary to the liberals' approach where the potential conflict between 
freedom and equality creates the central problem of the political economy Barr 
(1998). 
The advocates and many authors on the Marxist philosophy particularly qualify the 
question of equality. According to them equality does not imply complete 
equalisation?? Laski (1967) cited by Barr (1997) argues that the Marxist approach is 
to attend to urgent claims of all before the particular needs of some. Having achieved 
that objective the next principle relies on the concept of "individual effort or ability. " 
The economic equality envisaged by the Marxists, as is the risk of class conflict calls 
for greater government involvement in the production and distribution of resources. 
To ensure that these aims are met, the Marxists thus subscribe to nationalisation of 
resources as a means of achieving their ideological goals. In so doing the public 
ownership and worker participation in the decision- making bodies become central to 
a Marxist state. That is in line with the concept of freedom that they uphold so much. 
27 mid 
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The concept of Marxism is itself as is any other theory not immune to inherence of 
flaws; some are general while some are particular to the financial markets. From a 
natural-rights libertarian point of view, the Marxists' equality vendetta is seen as a 
violation of individual freedom. The free market philosophy blames the central 
control of both production and distribution for inefficiency. The collapse of the East 
and Central European economies in the late 1980s has been cited as one of the 
examples of the inefficiency of the socialist approach. 28 But that line of argument is 
possible flawed as what was happening in the so- called former communist bloc was 
never what the original advocate such as Marx himself prescribed. Authorities such as 
Angel and Marx never advocated the command structure as that exercised by most of 
the brutal dictators during the- hey days of the communist era in Europe. And most 
importantly they never supported the concept of oppressing the workers by the 
governing agents most notably that of dictators. 29 The list of examples of possible 
misinterpretations of the concept of socialism and what actually happened in the 
former eastern bloc may form a separate study and will as such not pursue it further. 
We will how ever, concentrate on those issues of relevance to our study. 
From a financial markets point of view in general Marxism would thus imply a tight 
control of the market through a system of central government controlled agencies. 
The exact modalities of production and distribution of the service would vary from 
country to country. Booth and Stroinski (1996) give any adequate background to the 
Polish financial market during its communist days and would as such be an invaluable 
28 See Eastern (1994) Competition and competition policy: A comparative analysis of Eastern and Central Europe, London, University of London 29 See Veane R. et al (1983)The original works of Marx and Angels The world socialist movement 
occasional paper no. 12 University of Zimbabwe. 
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reading for those not familiar with the former East and Central European economies 
before the modem reforms. 
The Marxists as a general application to the pensions insurance market advocate a 
strong government intervention in both the production and distribution of the 
pensions. The government intervention may take the form of having one state owned 
supplier enjoying monopolistic rights or the central government itself directly 
executing such duties. The pensions products so provided would normally be of 
standard value sold at compulsorily uniform premiums. In fact, the experience with 
the cold war socialist countries has been to prove this analogy we are hypothesising 
here. 
The experience with other regions such as China and Cuba conforms to the general 
observation that can be said of such countries as Bulgaria, Poland and other Central 
European countries before the reforms. Shifting the focus to African countries that 
once attempted the Marxist approach heralds a rather different synergy. Apart from 
the fact that Marxism never took up to the same extent as it did in other parts of the 
world, there is no clear record of the national old-age pensions niche being a fervent 
integral part of the government's social and economic policy. 
Lastly as will be shown in chapter three there are some countries such as Zimbabwe 
in particular that once endeavoured to implement radical socialist based reforms in the 
financial markets. In some African economies the ruling elite exploited the peasant 
majority by having obscure command financial systems under the disguise of 
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Marxism. It was partly in that concept that some dictators managed to siphon millions 
of dollars out of Africa. 30 
The Zimbabwean adventure was hindered by some technical uncertainties and some 
spurious commitment by the Zanu PF government during the years the latter sought to 
introduce a Marxist based economy. However despite that the taints of Marxist 
philosophy did manifest themselves in various forms in the financial market most 
conspicuous, being the tight regulatory control of the foreign currency exchange and 
majority shareholding scheme by the government in most of major occupational 
pension schemes. It is worth noting that the present large government stakes in the life 
assurance and pension funds was partly orchestrated under the pretext of advancing 
socialist goals of worker participation in the economy through government aided 
stakes. 
3.3 The economic theory 
3.3.1 Explaining the Pandora's box 
So far in the immediate preceding section of this chapter we have discussed the 
political philosophy in so far as it relates to social justice of mankind. The 
involvement of politicians in markets goes beyond that of seeking social justice and 
most importantly in the production of goods and financial services it is for reasons of 
efficiency. The concept of efficiency has been discussed in relation to the three social 
justice principles already discussed in the preceding sections by different scholars. 
There is no single work that captures comprehensively all the different analogies of 
efficiency and political intervention in the production and distribution of resources but 
30 See Martela et al (1994) Socialism and the sub Saharan African states: Issues and views 
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Barr (1987) and Stiglitz (1993) do provide a wide conceptualisation of the various 
theories, observations and comments. 
In this section we do not attempt to go through the rigorous exercise of reviewing 
efficiency in relation to every social justice theory discussed so far. Instead we seek to 
explain efficiency in a very broad sense applicable or at least explainable in terms of 
the various social justice theories within the context of the economic theory. Having 
done that we go on to explain the implications for the efficiency failure in markets 
and how the society has responded to such failure. The market efficiency in insurance 
is discussed in general and more specifically with regard to pensions insurance. The 
subject of insurability of old age as a risk is also well expounded in this section. It is 
our hope that this section gives a reader a brief but rich background to the conceptual 
theories of efficiency and insurance mechanism. 
3.3.2 Efficiency and state intervention in the markets 
Efficiency is the maximisation of the production output that leads to an added value 
accumulation without making anybody worse off. It can best be construed as a 
production function of various commodities determined by a particular mathematical 
equation where in deviation from the equation results in one or some members of the 
society being worse off. Vilfredo Pareto's model of price mechanism in determining 
the allocation of resources explains well the marginal social cost/benefit effect in 
reaching optimal production level. In fact when the marginal social cost is equivalent 
to the marginal social value the Pareto optimal prevails. 
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In figure 3.2 it can be shown in a simplified form that for the simplicity sake if X is a 
good whose production results in both marginal social cost and marginal social value, 
its optimum production would be at X*. 
If a market fails to produce at X* the state through the regulator intervenes to force 
the market functions to move towards X*. There are various ways through which the 
state can influence the production patterns in a free market. These include amongst 
others the use of a market regulator, assuming production, tax and subsidies. These 




X* output of good X. 
Figure 3.2: Source Barr (1998) pp 71. 
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3.3.2.1 Market regulation 
The regulation of the market centrally involves the state having power to set down the 
rules and regulations that have to be followed in the production and distribution of a 
particular commodity. Such rules and regulations may specify the method, quality, 
quantity and price that have to be adopted for a particular commodity. The principal 
objectives being to see that consumers get their money's worth and that the markets 
are efficient to the point that there is equitable distribution of resources, such market 
interference is a perpetual process. 
In the insurance and pensions market the regulation of the market involves amongst 
the principal concepts: setting minimum standards of qualification and/or experience 
for insurers, enforcing minimum capital requirements, ensuring reciprocity in fidelity 
matters and ensuring that public interest is protected. 
3.3.2.2 Tax and subsidies 
The state can influence the production equations of a market through punitive taxes 
for a particular commodity to discourage its production or to pay for the externality 
costs that its production brings about. Alternatively it can offer tax concessions for a 
particular commodity to promote its production. Other than tax rebates the state can 
give pure subsidies in respect of particular commodities. This can be in the form of 
supplementing capital requirements for huge projects that improve efficiency and 
social benefit being to the advantage of the general populace. 
In the field of pensions the aspect of taxes and subsidies can be experienced in several 
ways of which the most common is to treat pension premiums as a tax- deductible 
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item for purposes of calculating tax payable to the state. The state may in addition to 
that offer corporate tax rebates to firms that supply a particular type of pension that 
may be seen as promoting the sitting government's national pension policy. 
31 The 
exact format which these tax rebates may take is a prerogative of individual 
governments. 
The subject of subsidies in pensions markets is somewhat dicey but would most 
notably be experienced when the state decides to subsidise certain benefits within the 
pension products sold in the market. This can be in the form of capping up premiums 
payable for certain pension policies or guaranteeing certain benefits, which would 
otherwise be impossible in the absence of such guarantees. The state may also come 
forward through the provision of infrastructural support. The purchase or rent of 
former government buildings at discounted prices by the private entrepreneurs in the 
business of pensions would be another way by which the state can be seen as giving 
subsidies to the pensions market. 
3.3.2.3 Public provision of goods 
The state can assume the production and/or distribution of certain commodities if it is 
in the public interest to do so. The public interest can be of various forms but most 
central to all is state security that renders certain sectors virtually impossible to give to 
the private sector to provide. The state can also assume the production of certain 
goods if so doing will result in a better efficiency, which would otherwise be 
unattainable in the private sector. On the ordinary markets, the goods that fall under 
the jurisdiction of public provision generally include health care, education, transport 
31 For details on pension and taxes see for example Hannah (1986) "Inventing Retirement: The 
development of occupational pension schemes in Britain" Cambridge University Press Cambridge. 
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and environmental health care. The private sector does provide some of these services 
though the scale of doing so has been very low on the global average scale. 
In the insurance market the state production takes the form of the state setting up and 
financing both the infrastructure and human resources to develop and run various 
insurance schemes on behalf of the public. Apart from this initial capital input, the 
state also guarantees payment of certain benefits in return of a pre-set premium. There 
are four basic risk explanations as to why the state may be the sole or major producer 
of certain insurance services. These risks are namely, adverse selection, moral hazard, 
and informational asymmetry in risk pricing and poor risk spread. Table 3.2 shows a 
summary of the insurability of various insurance risks in the private sector. For an 
elaboration on table 3.2 see Booth and Dickinson (1997). 





Adverse selection Moral hazard 
Pensions Y Y Y Y 
Disability and 
sickness 
y y y y 
Health care y y y y 
Long term care y y y y 
Short term 
unemployment 
x Y Y Y 
Long term 
unemployment 
x X Y X 
Key: X= Potential problem, Y= No major problem 
Source: Booth and Dickinson (1997) "The Insurance Solution" European Policy 
Forum London. 
81 
The pensions insurance underwriting does not pose any substantial underwriting 
considerations from both a qualitative and actuarial mathematical analysis. The issue 
of concern in so far as the pensions business is concerned would be the adequacy of 
pensions that individual households can buy at any one given time not withholding 
the fact that a pension policy is a long term commitment. We will discuss the 
relevancy of pension adequacy when we look at the menace of inflation to pension in 
chapter five. 
3.3.2.4 Subsistence income support 
The state can affect the market activity by not interfering with the production directly 
but by influencing the buying power of the individual consumers. That can be in the 
form of paying for the product on behalf of the individual household or giving cash to 
the household to spend, as they like. The kind of financial support that is available to 
economies varies across the global spectrum. 
In the insurance and pensions markets the direct income from the state in respect of 
purchase of a particular service can principally be of the form of an insurance voucher 
system. The British housing support benefit where in the state pays the private 
housing markets to shelter its needy people is a classical example of a cash benefit to 
the individual household but paid to a private sector supplier. The long term care 
protection paid for by the state to private old-people's nursing homes is another 
example of state paying cash benefits to the private suppliers on behalf of the 
individual household. 
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The state can supply annuity vouchers that households can produce to the private 
suppliers of insurance in return for payment of the relevant pension benefit. In effect 
what this arrangement does is that the state buys annuities on behalf of the households 
from the private suppliers who incur all the other costs of supplying the relevant 
service. As such the state becomes the major if not sole customer on behalf of the 
households in a market where there could be many competitors all vying to supply the 
same service to the state. 
3.3.3 Efficient markets 
There is no single clear 
-cut definition of an efficient market other than to say it is one 
that is free of market failures. That is one perceived as being complete with no 
informational asymmetry, no barriers to entry or exit and gives fair competition to the 
participants with no externality effects. We briefly consider these causes of market 
inefficiency below. 
3.3.3.1 Complete markets 
A complete market produces all the goods that consumers are willing to pay a positive 
price that covers the production cost in respect of such goods. In real market 
situations at times such markets may be few. This is primarily due to a number of 
economic factors that influence the shape of markets. Within the market there might 
be some missing markets or no complimentary markets where the latter are the 
inevitable necessity for the existence of the original market. If the private sector 
cannot exploit the missing markets the state through its system of public enterprise 
may provide those services that fall under the scope of the missing markets. 
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The insurance and pensions markets are no exception to the above observation. There 
are risks that do not conform to actuarial insurance underwriting requirements to the 
extent that there is no exceptional best in the private sector other than leaving them to 
the public sector. This is so with long- term unemployment insurance. The absence of 
developed reinsurance markets may fail the primary markets from underwriting 
certain pure risks for no reason other than the absence of the former markets. The 
absence of capital or advanced reinsurance markets may deter certain primary markets 
from underwriting risks such as long term acute care insurance in fear of risk 
accumulation. 
3.3.3.2 Fair competition 
Markets that exist where there is a fair competition will not have conflict with price 
taking and equal opportunity. The concept of pricing calls for a large number of 
consumers and firms with no barriers to entry or exit from the market. In this analogy 
there is no single firm or consumer that can influence the behaviour of the market. All 
the participants in the market must have equal opportunity though some may 
command greater purchasing powers than others may. Both the principles of price 
taking and equal opportunity may frequently be violated in real life markets. To 
safeguard the former, laws such as the British's Department of Trade and Industry 
administered Monopolies and Mergers Commission is enacted in the public interest. 
The spirit of equal opportunity is also enforced through legislation such as the Equal 
Opportunities Act in the UK. 32 In so far as this is all to do with enforceable laws and 
regulations, it must be realised that some forces do pervert these rules leading to other 
complicated market imperfections. 
32 There are various ways of dealing with this problem across the globe. The cited examples may not 
necessarily, be the best ways of dealing with the problems mentioned. 
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In the insurance markets apart from the self- governing professional bodies found in 
most free markets the governments through various finance or trade and industry 
ministries do set broad legal frameworks under which the markets must exist. Punitive 
regulations with restitution to the victims of unfair dealing are general put in place so 
as to protect the general public. The professional bodies that keep the registers of 
members set strict practice and ethical rules that members must have to abide by, 
failure of which may lead to derecognition and/or fine. 
3.3.3.3 Information asymmetry 
Information efficiency implies the efficient processing of information that must be 
distinguished from pricing efficiency. The argument about information asymmetry 
starts from the perfect information analogy that is some how absurd in real life 
economies, hence our approach that information needs to be efficient. The absence of 
such information failure makes the participants in the markets to make informed 
decisions. The lemons-orange subsidy ceases to exist if there is full disclosure of 
information in the markets. 33 
Information efficiency in the insurance and pensions markets goes to the heart of the 
underwriting requirements in so far as it entails having full disclosure about facts 
material to the risk. That is disclosing all the information necessary to price a 
particular risk and decide whether to accept it and under what conditions attaching. 
The symmetry of information in insurance markets is crucial if the risks of adverse 
33 For a detailed discussion of this subject see Stiglitz (1988) "The economics of the public sector (2"a edition. ) Norton London 
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selection and moral hazard are to be minimised. The relevance of these two to 
pensions is minimal, as argued by Booth and Dickinson (1997). 
Asymmetric information problems limited as they may be in pensions markets can 
none the less be as a menace as never been thought before. This is in so far as the 
average individual household investor may not be in a position to distinguish between 
bad and good investment firm despite the availability of the usually complicated 
financial statements. The blind trust that consumers have in the mostly self- regulated 
financial markets poses a potential information failure. Not only does the self- 
regulating financial service supply investment policies; they as a generality employ or 
pay the agents that market their products. This on its own is a potential source of 
informational failure. In some markets such as the UK this problem has been partly 
been alleviated by the introduction of independent financial advisors. 
3.3.3.4 Absence of externalities 
Externality effects manifest themselves in various ways as is explained by the 
possibility of the flow of costs or benefits in numerous directions within the markets. 
In principle the effect of externality arises when the action of one participant or group 
of participants results in some loss or gain to third parties and do not receive 
compensation or pay a price for the benefit gained from the orchestrator of the event. 
The most common problem of externality is pollution where in the industrial firms 
produce waste that pollute the environment if not properly disposed. The general 
public does not benefit from such firms' action but the cost of cleaning the 
environment falls on the public purse. To levy certain firms that produce waste into 
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the environment is a recent approach to dealing with the externality problems in this 
area. 
In the insurance markets the externality problem is no stranger. The homogeneity of 
products in the pensions markets compounds the extent of externality problems in this 
market. A new invention in both product and its distribution can with minimum 
improvement be emulated and taken over by the competitor. The conflict between 
patent rights enforcement and free dynamic inventive market concept can make the 
policing of this externality effect complex and difficult. 
3.3.4 Pensions insurance market efficiency 
From what has so far been discussed above, we need not over emphasise that this is 
one of the key features desired for the successful performance of the insurers in 
supplying old age insurance cover. With insurance in general, the two fundamental 
that must be minimised for the viability and sustenance of cover are adverse selection 
and moral hazard risks. The insurance business thrives on the principle of "utmost 
good faith" that is essentially about full disclosure of information material to the 
assessment of risk. 
Adverse-selection is principally a lemons and oranges in one bucket in a market. That 
is a case where the price of inferior goods is the same as that of superior goods and 
the consumers are not forewarned of the inferior goods. The information asymmetry 
so created is a result of information failure in the market. In theory the assured public 
may become victims of that information asymmetry. However, in practice, it is the 
assurance firms that have tended to be victims of information disclosure failure. With 
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pensions insurance, the duty of disclosure so required under other insurance policies, 
is less relevant if not irrelevant at all. That is so for the reasons that there is not a 
single way by which the assured can influence the crystallisation of the risk leading to 
the payment of the claim. The length of one's life is independent of one's control. If 
ever the assured were to influence the outcome of the risk that would have to be 
through suicide and in theory such action would be to the advantage of the insurers. 
The question of moral hazard just like adverse selection is of minimal relevance to the 
business of pensions insurance. That is primarily so for the reasons that there is not a 
single credible way through which the insured's behaviour can be influenced by the 
inception of a pensions policy. The amount payable in the event of the policy reaching 
maturity is always predetermined one way or the other and usually by form of 
pensions formula to be used to calculate the total pension benefit payable. 
3.4 Efficiency in developing economies 
It is often said that emerging markets have a higher than usual beta in risk analysis by 
investors. This general assumption follows a general framework of analysis that 
conceptualises the emerging economies as being a good playground for the high- risk 
takers in pursuance of potential high growth opportunities. Not only do the high-risk 
takers stand to gain from the exceptional growth rates of their investment capital, they 
also stand to benefit from market dominance that is shunned by the least informed and 
low risk takers. 
The fear perceived by the investors from the western markets where information 
about their markets is efficient does influence the perception that even the indigenous 
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investors have about their own markets. There are many reasons to explain this, but 
the major single phenomenon is that most of the emerging economies are built from 
the images and shadows of the developed markets. 
The degree upon which the emerging markets fail to match the developed markets 
varies from market to market. Each emerging market has its own features peculiar to 
it but infrastructural, informational and transactional standards can be generalised of 
all the emerging markets. 34 Because of inadequate documentation of the information 
relating to these emerging economies the investors and western analysts alike have 
tended to form perceptions that is based on their psychological perceptions of the 
markets. The rationale behind these assumptions has never real been examined 
outside the context of the developed markets. 
The insurance and the pensions markets have not been an exception to these 
observations. In analysing insurance markets from the developing world the tendency 
has been to compare and contrast them with the experiences of established and tried 
western markets. The risk acuteness of various classes of insurance has often been 
tailored along the actuarial experiences of the western world markets. This raises a lot 
of theoretical and policy questions that may in fact be the basis of an independent 
study to ascertain the extent of benefit or loss that has been done to the emerging 
markets by bids to follow the western experiences. 
34 See Keane (1993) "Emerging markets-The relevance of efficient market theory Chartered Association of Certified Accountants Series number 15 
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3.4.1 The Zimbabwean market and its efficiency 
The Zimbabwean market comprises of the private and social insurance markets. The 
Zimbabwean insurance market structure was undoubtedly influenced by the colonial 
past that is evident in many structures, including buildings, design and culture of 
management used in both the private and public sectors. The risks insured under the 
private markets have become so not as a result of the local market's actuarial 
assessment, but that has come as a direct result of the influential parent companies 
based mostly in Europe. The state insurance system that has been introduced reflects 
to some extent the effect that the British systems have on the former colony. It 
suffices in fact, to mention that the British insurance system is a big part to the 
Zimbabwean insurance mechanism, particularly when it comes to complex and risky 
portfolios that are generally construed to be beyond the capacity of the regional and 
local capacity. 
The Zimbabwean market is generally lightly regulated though it does not have strong 
professional bodies to oversee standards of practice and conduct. The registrar of 
pensions and provident funds supervises the conduct of pension funds. Above the 
registrar is the minister of Finance and Economic Development who has an array of 
sweeping powers that include amongst others that to dismiss the registrar and setting 
the minimum amount that pension funds can invest in government approved stocks. 
The Zimbabwean market is by the standards of the region the second best to South 
Africa. It is a highly competent and efficient market able to shine to international 
standards. It has no barriers to entry or exit from the market. The recent mushrooming 
of both broking and underwriting firms is evident of that. Despite that, the 
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Zimbabwean market has its short falls. First, the region under which it falls makes it 
inevitable to be grouped with other poor regional markets. 
There is no prescription as to the kinds or scope of assurance that the Zimbabwean 
firms can underwrite. The licence to trade in insurance (including pensions) gives the 
firms a wide spectrum of choice on the risks and scope of cover. The only nagging 
restriction is with regard to the investment of the premiums. The government directs 
the percentage of premiums that has to be invested in government- approved stocks. 
At the time of this research the figure is forty-five percent having been previously at 
fifty-five percent until 1997. 
The registration of firms intending to deal in insurance generally requires the directors 
to satisfy the Companies Act and the Pension and Provident Funds Act. The process is 
usually uncomplicated and undertaken within a short space of time. The fact that the 
administration of the governing Acts is done through different public offices may 
mean at times that the process of registering and actual beginning to transact business 
is longer than may otherwise be envisaged. The nature of insurance services, as has 
been described in the preceding pages, explains the need to make sure that every 
procedure is met before the next can be embarked on. 
There is a new problem that foreign firms venturing into the Zimbabwean pensions in 
market face today. That is the inability to remit or expropriate profits without having 
to go through a bureaucratic procedure administered by the public service. The 
outlawing of corporate foreign accounts has not helped at all. The currency risk 
exposure makes it difficult for firms to hedge effectively against currency 
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fluctuations. The tight regulation in foreign currency makes the market less attractive 
as a destination to foreign investment. 
3.5 Demand and supply in insurance 
It has been shown in various literatures that insurance products, inclusive of pensions, 
behave in no way different from other financial services in so far as the demand and 
supply principles are concerned. Like any other product, the demand and supply of 
insurance would be affected by such factors as the price of other products, tastes and 
preferences, levels of income and distribution of such incomes in the consumers' 
market, credit availability and so on. There are however other demand and supply 
factors that have been known to be peculiar to insurance in general and pension 
assurance in particular. The purpose of the theory of demand for insurance is precisely 
about determining the various factors that affect it. 
3.5.1 Incentives for the demand of pensions insurance 
There are some interesting theoretical and practical questions that raise scope for both 
theoretical and practical arguments. Most obvious, is probably the question of why 
people would be prepared to buy pension assurance, a promissory purchase when 
there is, in fact, a chance that they may not survive to retirement age and claim. There 
is also a crucial question of why people buy pension policies when, in essence, the 
mathematical expected pay out is less than the total premiums payable to the 
assurance firms. The most logistical explanation to these paradoxical questions lies 
with the concept of risk aversion. The risk-avers individuals would rather pay a sum 
certain of money than risk the uncertainty of losing a potentially big cost. Such people 
would, as a matter of principle, get utility from knowing that certainty is guaranteed. 
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Certainty is as such a commodity yielding a positive marginal utility for which the 
risk-averse would pay a positive price. 
The pension assurance risks are predictable with a high degree of accuracy. It is, for 
example, known with almost certainty the number of people say aged sixty-two years 
old who will die before their next birthday. But the individuals in that cohort do not 
know which life in particular will drop until it has done so. The information about 
mortality rates available as it is to the individuals seeking pension assurance cover, is 
of less relevance and importance than it is to the assuring firms and their underwriters. 
To the individual assured the issues at stake are that he or she dies or may survive to 
retirement age. For argument's sake, lets look at an arbitrary example of a sole 
household earner with a potential pension of say $60000 per annum dependent on him 
foregoing $600 per annum in the form of pension contribution. If this hypothetical 
member were to decide not to join pension insurance scheme, he would be $600 better 
off every year and that he could spend as he wishes. Should he die before his 
retirement date he would have won but should he survive to the retirement age he 
stands to be $60000 worse off. It is this variation in expected outcomes that induces 
the risk-averse individuals to seek pension insurance protection. 
Because risk-aversion is some how an inborn- phenomena, individuals tend to 
respond differently to a rise pension contributions relative to perceived benefit at 
retirement. Those with higher aversion to old-age risk will as such continue to buy 
pension insurance cover despite the escalation of the cost to such a cover. They will 
cling on to membership until the utility they get from pension membership starts to 
result in negative satisfaction with each extra unit of dollar spent on the pension cost. 
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Figure 3.3 and 3.4 show the diagrammatical representation of utility satisfaction 
derived from pension assurance membership by risk-averse individuals. In figure 3.3 
it is assumed that a risk-averse individual has a wealth denoted by 12 that will fall to 
Il in the event of him surviving to an age beyond his retirement age. The following 
observations can be made with respect to pensions insurance and utility. 
First, his utility curve will follow the path BCD because of risk-aversion. Secondly, 
his expected wealth in the absence of pensions insurance would be the sum of the 
wealth II and IZ multiplied by their respective probabilities. If I represents the 
expected wealth without pensions insurance, then the rational risk-averse individual 
must be indifferent to attaining the same utility expected from the two uncertain 
events from that he stands to get from buying pensions insurance to guarantee him 
income I. The net wealth he stands to get in the presence of pensions insurance will 
be the difference between 12 and the cost of pensions insurance. Thirdly, if the risk- 
averse individual aims at maximising his utility, he must be prepared to pay 
contributions up to the level represented by the difference of 12 and I*. As our 
diagram is not to scale, the difference between these two may look some how 
exaggerated in the diagram. 
Turning to figure 3.4. If a risk-averse individual has a choice to join or not to join 
pension insurance scheme, where upon his decision will result in the two outcomes 
yl and y2 with probabilities p and (1- p) respectively, the following theoretical 
deductions can be made if y, is a bad outcome and yZ is a good outcome. The path 
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of the utility curve is as depicted in figure 3.4. Because these outcomes will certainly 
result in different utilities to the risk averse, the E (y) =y= pyl + (1- p) y2 and 
the E(U) =U= pu(yl) + (1- p)U(y2) .A rational risk- averse individual can 
obtain the expected utility in two distinct ways. That is, he can have it from a certain 
income y' or get it from the uncertain incomes y, and yz 
. 
The fair premium that 
the individual risk-averse person would be prepared to pay is marked by the 
difference between the expected average income and the income certain y*. In real 
life situations there is no way the expected average income can be obtained as the 
only possible outcomes are y, and yi only. The only exception that can lead to a 
variation of these outcomes is with the introduction of pensions insurance premium 
that guarantees a certain income. 
Utility of earnings Risk averse concave function 
D 
bsk neutral linear 
Income 
Figure 3.3: Source: Carter (1974) 
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Figure 3.4: Source Barr (1998) 
3.5.2 Supply of insurance 
The supply of insurance like any other product depends to a considerable extent, with 
all things being equal, on the availability of an effective positive demand. There are 
some instances when an insurance market may fail to perform. To that extent that it is 
important to understand those forces and factors that affect and determine the supply 
of insurance services. In a broad sense these fall under the following classes; capacity, 
affordability of risk price, availability of data, independence of events and risks 
insured and efficiency of the markets that we have already considered in the 
preceding sections. Below we explain some of these factors and how they relate to 
insurance in general and pensions insurance in particular. 
3.5.2.1 Cost of insurance 
The supply of insurance would probably stretch infinitely in the absence of the cost 
determinant. The cost of insurance is as important to the suppliers as it is to the buyers 
of insurance. To the pension firms it is crucial that they have adequate capital and 
financial reserves to underwrite a particular risk. The cost of capital as an opportunity 
is equally important. The pensions insurance depends to a considerable extent on the 
reliability of the life mortality tables to estimate the actuarial cost of providing 
pensions to the public. Because pensions is a specialised form of long-term assurance 
contract, it is important, particularly taking into account that pensions is generally 
traded according to occupational trades, to have specialised trade biased mortality 
tables. 
On the other hand with the assured under pensions insurance contracts, the cost of 
buying insurance is almost independent of the individual demands of the participants. 
Because pension assurance firms cannot distinguish between the individual assured 
lives with high longevity risks and those without such risks, it is difficult, in fact 
impossible for the firms to charge differential premiums to each risk category. Overall 
however, the cost of pensions is a straight forward underwriting exercise. 
3.5.2.2 Affordability of insurance premiums 
The insurance premiums and pension contributions in the case of pensions assurance 
have to be within the means of the assured. That is to say the cost of paying for 
retirement pensions must be affordable within the budget requirements of a 
household. It is in fact true that in the event of the price of insurance going up to that 
level where even the most risk-averse rational individuals get a negative utility from 
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pension scheme membership, at that level pension insurance is a failure as a solution 
to old age uncertainty risk. For the pension scheme membership demand to be a 
success, at least the cost that employees are prepared to pay towards their retirement 
cost ought to be bigger or equal to the suppliers' cost. That principle does not 
necessarily hold true in instances where there is compulsory or quasi-compulsory 
membership schemes and subsidised membership. 
3.5.2.3 Independent risks 
It is quite essential that the causative and occurrence of the events that are the subject 
of insurance are independent of each other. The homogeneity of events is less 
practical in real life situations. The independence of risks is crucial in the pensions 
insurance for amongst the reasons, the spreading of losses/ payments that help smooth 
the cash flow outlay of the firms. In a sense the circumstances that may lead for 
example to employee A retiring early on full pension must be independent of the 
circumstances affecting employees B, C and so on. That must be so with actual dates 
of retirement otherwise a firm may face a catastrophic payment situation. 
3.5.2.4 Data availability 
Lastly, it is of paramount importance that the insurance firms have adequate data to 
make scientific projections of the trends in the crystallisation of an insured event. In 
the case of pensions insurance, that has been made easy by the availability of reliable 
mortality tables. However, besides the mortality tables it is also important for 
individual firms to have statistical data relating to claims/payout history of the 
members insured. The payout distributions help the actuary and management to 
design general and relevant loss reserves for the pension scheme. In addition to claims 
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history, the availability of data enables the pension firm assurance to project client 
growth rates and thus come out with reasonable assumption loading rates. 
3.6 The lifecycle theory of saving and pensions insurance 
The lifecycle theory seeks to explain our economic variables as a function of income, 
wealth, consumption and age. The saving theory as a lifecycle determined function 
has been expounded well by Franco Modigliani in his various publications but most 
notable in his Nobel Prize winning 1986 lecture. The fundamental assumption behind 
this theory is that a rational household would seek to maximise the utility function 
over the entire lifecycle, wherein the utility function is homogenous with respect to 
consumption at different points of time. As a generality the lifecycle theory of saving 
can be divided into two groups. That is where there is a zero bequest and where there 
is a positive bequest. 
A typical lifecycle pattern of labour earnings and consumption in a zero bequest 
model is shown in figure 3.5 while figure 3.6 shows a positive bequest model. In both 
figures the age is assumed to start from zero and that is the date the particular 
household is formed. In many countries that start age would be around the ages of 
eighteen to twenty-five years. T is assumed to be the date of death not the date of 
active retirement. Consumption and income is best measured as a logarithm function 
to correct for inflationary distortions. The hump shape shows the gradual increase, 
peak point and decline in labour earnings as a person moves from young age to 
middle ages where labour income is at its peak and the down turn as one reaches ages 
where his skills are no longer in demand. 
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Figure 3.6: Source Darby (1979) 
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As can be deduced from figure 3.5, the lifecycle assumes a low, usually negative 
saving during he early years of formation of a young household fresh from college or 
parental custody and care. In zero-bequest models the saving at the beginning of the 
lifecycle is zero because there is no inheritance assumed and wealth accumulation is 
nil at the end of the lifecycle for there are no assets left behind. That approach in 
lifecycle does not, however, take cognisance of the fact that in real life there are some 
issues that are hard to ignore such as borrowing constraints, accuracy of projected 
labour earnings and the life expectancy assumed at each consumption period. 
The positive bequests model on the other hand has its own limitations. First and most 
importantly, the theoretical argument behind the model is flawed. The almost 
universal acceptable assumption that in developing generation model, that is growing 
economies model, the future generations are bound to be better off than their 
predecessors is not considered. Again the precautionary motive in this hypothesis 
does not explain why a household would not purchase insurance to cover against the 
medical, longevity or other such risks. Despite all that, the lifecycle does explain the 
concept that households forgo a particular consumption today in anticipation of the 
rainy days ahead. It portrays a theoretically sound distribution of labour income over 
the entire lifecycle. 
3.7 Conclusion 
We have in this chapter reviewed the major conceptual approaches to economic 
markets and in particular as they relate to the pensions insurance markets. The 
theories reviewed are those as developed by the western academics whose focus are 
the developed capitalist economies. The economic and political thought to state 
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provision of various services has been carefully noted. The issues arising from the 
various theories have been carefully noted throughout this chapter. We will test some 
of these theories to see whether they are of any relevance to the Zimbabwean markets. 
The economic theory as far as the pension insurance is concerned has been reviewed 
and issues of particular interest carefully noted. Particularly the demand and supply 
factors as they relate to pensions insurance have been carefully reviewed. The 
lifecycle as a saving theory within the pensions insurance has also been explained. In 




The Evolution of social insurance 
"There shall never be freedom without security. Without lifetime 
income guarantees there can never be security. Until we all come to 
realise the economic urgency of providing descent living conditions for 
our pensioners who have worked so hard in order for us to be were we 
are today, we will not have the freedom and security that we value so 
much. the plight of the poor pensioners is a moral problem for the 
whole nation, black and white. It is a lesson to modern workers, and 
unfortunately, an unpleasant experience to the retired workers who 
cannot move the clock back to fight for their security. "' 
4.1 Introduction 
In this chapter we aim to develop a broad framework upon which the subject of the 
Zimbabwe occupational state pensions insurance, other wise generally referred to as 
the NSSS in most of this document, must be understood. To achieve that we look at 
the specific developments and origins of the history of social insurance in general and 
state pensions in particular. In pursuance of this goal we found it imperative that we 
trace the evolutional progression of the subject from its ancient roots to date. As the 
Zimbabwean scheme was undoubtedly influenced by the developments of similar or 
comparable schemes across the world we thought it necessary that we reiterate the 
development of a varied cross section of schemes in the world. We realise that some 
of the experiences discussed may be of irrelevance to the present Zimbabwe national 
scheme. But for purposes of achieving a broadened conceptual analysis of some of the 
issues that we discuss later in the thesis, we found it logical to capture, the discussion 
of such schemes. The factors that have helped shape the evolution of such schemes 
are carefully noted. The detailed account of the British experiences explains both the 
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colonial past of Zimbabwe as much as is the influence that the British legacy has in 
the economic model thinking of present Zimbabwe. There seems always to be an 
aspiration by so many people from different spectrums of life in Zimbabwe to for 
instance, try and model and judge every policy or development according to how it 
would or was modelled by the British. 
In this chapter we also seek to highlight the strengths and weaknesses of the British 
and Zimbabwean schemes. It is in so doing that we hope to lay the theoretical 
foundation for our empirical analysis and to have certain principles of historical fact 
addressed thereby avoiding the ambiguity that may arise in the mind of the reader and 
maintain coercion in the future chapters. 
4.2 General evolution of social insurance 
The subject of social insurance has its roots stretching many years back into the 
history of mankind. Zacher (1981) says the precursors of social insurance have 
existed since the Middle Ages. There is in fact evidence to the effect that in the 
Muslim world well-developed forms of social security existed as long back as the 7th 
century. During that time those publicly run schemes were financed through systems 
of means tested taxes known as the Al-Zakat in Arabic. There was also tax on private 
property (The Al-Karaj) to finance those national schemes that sought to provide 
social security to the needy, particularly the old aged and the disabled. 
In the Arabic world, the rich were held to be legally bound to finance the cost of 
living of the poor and could as such have their private fortunes nationalised in the 
' Extracted from a National University of Science and Technology 1992-1993 Secretary General of 
Students Representative Council memo defending the workers' rights to pensions 
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interest of the general populace within the kingdom upon which their property 
existed. This scenario continued well into the Turkish invasion of the Islamic Empire 
and the absolute decline came when the European colonial powers introduced a 
system of " one man for himself and God for us all" in the form of capitalism. In the 
twentieth century most Islamic states particularly those in the Middle East had 
reintroduced very sound social security systems largely dependent on oil income. 
In Europe the first sound traces of social insurance programmes date much later 
compared to the Islamic Empire experiences. Most European Countries introduced 
Poor Laws around 160' century2. Prior to that and notably in the eleventh century, 
Charity was being widely used as the sole provider of protection during economic 
hardships. Charitable organisations were founded on different backgrounds but most 
common were those founded on religious or other social basis. Poverty was one of the 
many tasks of these charities so formed. Old age it would seem was itself on its own 
not a strong basis for a claim from the funds so generated under the charities. Poverty 
arising from infirmity and disability took priority. 
In sub Saharan Africa, the Bantu people generally lived in close family units with 
kingdoms and at times chieftainships retaining much of the wealth that those societies 
possessed. Because of the widely rural and feudal style of economies that existed in 
sub Sahara Africa before the influence of the Europeans, the social problems such as 
old-age, physical and mental infirmity, were responsibilities of the community at 
large though it was the close or immediate family members of the infirm that bore 
much of the burden of caring for such victims. The strong family links that include the 
2 See Hannah (1986) Inventing Retirement "The Development of Occupational pensions in Britain" 
Cambridge University Press Cambridge 
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extended family caring have existed in most parts of Africa until fairly recent. Caring 
for the old has in part been promulgated by the widely common belief in sub-Saharan 
Africa that when the old die they return to their families in the form of spirits to look 
after their families. This belief has remained very common and extremely respected 
by many despite the convention into Christianity of many societies. It is this 
dimension of the Bantu people's anthropology that partly explains why old-age 
infirmity has not been a monstrous problem as the experiences in Europe and other 
parts of the world have gone through. 
It is the gradual breakdown of the extended family system that has been so much part 
of the culture of the African people, partly propelled by urbanisation, emergence of a 
new breed of educated blacks that thrive to identify themselves with the Western 
world, that makes it necessary for the present working African to use conventional 
modem economic saving instruments to save for his retirement. Not withstanding the 
fact that the coming of modem economies, mostly capitalist orientated, to Africa has 
made dependence on subsistence farming unviable as a means of meeting modern 
challenges, the selling of one's labour has become the dominant means of living in 
modem African societies particularly the urbanites. 
4.3 Development of the old age State pension in Britain 
In Britain as the central government became more cohesive and stronger, particularly 
during the times of the Tudors, care for the poor became a national rather than a local 
responsibility. The Tudors nationalised the growing funds of the local associations 
although the economic help was not afforded directly by the central government. The 
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Poor Laws of 1597 and 1601 placed a direct responsibility to the local authorities to 
raise and distribute poor relief, a practice that has survived to this century. 
The 1834 amendment of the Poor Laws led to the workhouses, most frequented by 
scroungers, to being very unattractive in a bid to discourage the able bodied from 
frequenting them. The menace of old age was at this time gaining momentum in 
spheres of public debate but the state provision of national pensions was still some 
decades away. 
The nineteenth century social and political condition changes prompted many 
countries to solve socio-political problems by social insurance. The advancement of 
national health insurance schemes across Europe is among others testimony to that. 
The present social insurance schemes in Europe have been influenced in one way or 
the other by Otto Von Bismarck's radical reforms of 1881. It is as such not misleading 
to view the year 1881 as the beginning of the present social insurance schemes in 
Europe and those parts of the world whose social and economic development has 
been driven by European forces. In Britain the social insurance scheme was 
introduced more than a quarter of a century after 1881. The scheme that was 
introduced differed very significantly from the schemes in place at the time in 
continental Europe3. 
The British State pensions history in its modern form dates back to 1908 when the 
Old Age Pensions Act was first passed. Under that Act the state undertook to pay 
3 See Hannah (1986) Inventing retirement: The development of occupational pensions in Britain, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
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annuities to persons aged seventy years and above who had less than a prefixed 
amount of wealth. That meant means tested pension was provided on a non- 
contributory flat rat basis by the state. 
The social effects of the first 
-world war prompted the introduction of the Widows', 
Orphans' and Old Age Pensions Act (1925). This Ministry of Health administered 
scheme brought about the contributory flat rate old-age pension payable from the age 
of sixty- five years. The premiums were payable by use of the stamp collection 
system. 
The Old Age and Widows' Pensions Act (1940) followed the 1908 Act in terms of 
introducing radical developments in the British old age state pensions provision. 
Central among the provisions of this Act was the supplementation of widows and old 
age pensions through a needs test Ogus (1981). The 1970 National Insurance Act 
introduced a non- contributory pension scheme that covered those above pensionable 
age and already retired but were not covered by the post-war National Insurance 
scheme. The 1971 National Insurance Act provided for the implementation of a non- 
contributory pension for all persons above the age of eighty years and not the subject 
of cover by any of the pension schemes. 
The 1915 Ministry of Pensions Act introduced discretion- based pension. It was not 
until 1919 that the War Pensions (Administrative Provisions) Act was passed. This 
Act introduced a war pension as of right. The ex-servicemen pensions principles are 
founded basically on this Act. 
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Strictly speaking the current British comprehensive national scheme dates back some 
fifty years back. It came about as a result of the recommendations of the Beveridge 
report. According to the AES (1994) the important ideal of this system was an 
adequate level of benefits as a right to eliminate means tested benefits as far as 
possible. The Beveridge scheme introduced a flat rate contributory insurance financed 
by both the employers and employees on a pay-as-you-go basis. 
The original scheme as recommended in the Beveridge report suffered drawbacks 
from the funding implications resulting in the National Insurance Act (1959) that 
sought to redress the anomaly by introducing the compulsory earnings related pension 
in addition to the flat rate pension. This knew mandatory earnings related scheme was 
financed on earnings related- contributory basis. In the short run this new scheme was 
perceived as an ideal solution to the spiralling costs of the flat rate scheme already in 
existence AES4. The only fundamental overlook seems to have been the failures to 
take into account the long-term cost of the two schemes. 
The State Earnings Related Pension Scheme (SERPS) and inflation- proofed flat rate 
pension were introduced by virtue of the 1975 legislation. The employers that 
provided superior level of benefits were allowed the option to opt out of the national 
scheme. Today the average weekly pension for a single person is approximately 
twenty percent of the national average earnings. For that reason the British scheme 
has been criticised for being inadequate. That criticism seems justifiable when the 
British scheme is compared to other continental Europe schemes of similar plan. N. B 
4 Ibid 
in Germany for example, basic state pensions are approximately seventy percent of 
national average earnings. 
The home-responsibilities protection clause in the British system ensures that socially 
vulnerable groups such as women who may spend years nursing disabled children or 
such dependants do not lose out on pension benefits. The government credits such 
members with the same number of years that they would have spent out looking after 
the needy dependants. The ultimate goals being that such people have to work a 
relatively shorter period of time before they qualify for a full pension. 
At the present moment, for people retiring before year 2000 with a full pension 
record, their pension is calculated as twenty-five pence of pension per pound of 
pensionable emoluments between the lower and upper earnings limits. It is expected 
that the twenty-five pence per pound pension figure will scale down to twenty percent 
for people retiring in or after 2010. At the time of writing this report the pension is 
based on the individual's best twenty years but after year 2000 it would be based on 
the individual's entire contribution record. The pension formula is standard for both 
men and women but the state pension ages are different being sixty and sixty-five 
years for women and men respectively. 
The British national pension scheme is still undergoing reforms to this date. Most 
recent, the introduction of personal pension schemes provided by the private market 
was used to encourage people to opt out of SERPS which themselves had the level of 
future benefits cut so as to make them less competitive. At the time of making this 
report a retiree is entitled to one and a quarter percent of the excess of earnings over 
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the lower earnings limit or the ceiling for each year of contribution. This computes for 
example to 50% of earnings for a person with a forty- year contribution record. This 
as already said above would be paid in addition to the flat rate pension. 
The miss selling scandal rocked the personal pensions venture. At the time of writing 
this paper the government Green paper on social security and pensions seeks to 
introduce the stakeholders pension. It is not clear at the moment the actual format that 
these stake holders pension will take. 
4.3.1 Retirement provision structure in Britain 
In the UK the provision of retirement is best explained by figure 4.1. The same 
generality can be said for most of Western countries. The difference lies on the 
contribution, benefit structures and rules governing these instruments. The state 
pension membership, which is through the National Insurance contribution, is 
generally compulsory to all those employed in the UK. That is unlike contributing to 
the other three retirement protection instruments as depicted in figure 4.1 below. 
Of interest to this thesis as is shown in the coming chapters is not only how the state 
pension have impacted on the development of the other three but also the effect it has 
today on the respective markets under which they fall. That various scholarly 
arguments have been presented on the interplay of these various instruments is 
testimony of the enormity that they play in shaping not only the markets but also 







4.3.1.1 Basic state pension 
The basic state pension is a flat rate pension payable to all those who have attained 
state pension age irrespective of their financial wealth and satisfy the minimum 
contribution requirements as may be specified from time to time by the department of 
social security. Presently it is payable at the ages of sixty and sixty-five for women 
and men respectively. The basic state pension is currently pegged against the Retail 
Price Index (RPI). It is at the moment approximately equivalent to nineteen percent of 
the British national average earnings. It is expected to go down as a percentage of 
national average earnings as the earnings inflation index is almost certain to continue 
to grow at a faster rate than the retail price index. 
4.3.1.2 The State Earnings Related Pension Schemes 
That this is an emolument related pension payable to all those who have attained the 
state pension age must be obvious from the name of the scheme. The original aim of 
this scheme was to provide a pension of twenty-five percent of the earnings between 
the lower and upper earnings limit. 5 
s The lower earnings limit is just above the basic state pension while the upper earnings limit is almost 
seven times the former. 
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Following the 1986 Social Security Act the target of 25% has been reduced to 20% of 
Upper Band Earnings. The reduction is a gradual process and will apply fully to those 
that attain the state pension age after the year 2009. The pension under the 1986 Act is 
based on the individual's working life time with yearly revaluation done up to SPA in 
line with the national average earnings AES (1994). 
The SERPS is not compulsory, the employees and employers alike can opt to contract 
out of this state scheme in exchange for a reduced National Insurance contributions by 
both parties. However the opt out option is on condition that the employee so opting 
out would be a member of any of the following schemes: a contracted out 
occupational scheme, which guarantees a minimum pension or a contracted- out 
money purchase scheme. Alternatively the employee may take out an appropriate 
personal pension or use a free- standing additional voluntary contribution. 
4.3.1.3 Occupational pension schemes 
The employer- sponsored arrangement by which a scheme is set up for the benefit of 
the employees when they retire by reason of old age is generally known as an 
occupational pension scheme. Occupational pension schemes have a wider scope than 
other wise the name suggests as they provide in general other additional benefits such 
as: the death in service benefits payable to the spouse or other such beneficiaries as 
may be specified in the scheme. The injury and sickness benefits and early leavers' 
benefits are a common feature in most if not all of the occupational pension schemes. 
Hannah (1986) scintillatingly traces the development and forces that have affected the 
British occupational pension schemes and would certainly make an interesting reading 
6 Ibid. 
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for an understanding of the UK pensions systems. The intertwined forces of business, 
political and social nature are scrutinised well by Professor Hannah and so much that 
they contrast so well with the forces that have helped shape the Zimbabwean schemes 
discussed later in this chapter. 
4.3.1.4 Personal pension schemes 
These are basically individual retirement provisions of defined contribution nature. 
Following the abolition of making occupational pension schemes compulsory, the 
British had at least in theory, increased the potential market for the personal pensions. 
The personal pensions are financed by contributions from individuals since they are 
essentially matters of individual arrangement. There is no law that bars employers 
from contributing on behalf of the individual employees that opt for a personal 
pension arrangement. However, the law as it stands, imposes a limit that these 
contributions can be tax exempted by the Inland Revenue. The contribution limits are 
such that the minimum is 17.5% and the maximum is 40%. 
4.3.1.5 Other Personal Saving Schemes 
There are many various forms of personal savings that an individual can use in the 
UK to provide for his retirement. The personal equity plans, otherwise commonly 
known as the PEPS, are amongst the most tax efficient vehicles of saving. There are 
also other forms of savings that are offered by insurance firms, banks, building 
societies and unity trusts7. 
7 See for example Taylor (1971) Saving out of different types of income, Brookings Papers on 
Economic Activity 2. 
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Now that we have given an insight into the development and structure of the British 
occupational retirement provision, we will in the next section of this chapter consider 
the Zimbabwean experience and structure. Most importantly we endeavour to explain 
how the issues we noted in chapter two have applied in the Zimbabwean development 
and subsequent formation of the National Social Security Scheme. 
4.4 Development of occupational pensions in Zimbabwe 
The concept of occupational pensions in Zimbabwe was borrowed and in fact, 
brought by the colonial settlers in the early twentieth century. As with other 
segregationist policies, the pension funds that were set up generally prohibited black 
membership. The early pension funds that were set up were basically for the whites 
that were either settlers or descendants of settlers. Black employees that were entitled 
to retirement benefits were those that were employed in the public sector. When we 
talk of employees in the rest of this section we are referring to the white employees 
unless otherwise. 
The rise of pension funds in the then Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe since 1980) was 
influenced and propelled by various factors. Table 3.1 shows a summary of the 
different factors that have helped shape the pension fund development in Zimbabwe. 
115 








Major effect Biased Increased Recruitment Tax incentives 
awareness of longevity, in and retention 
old age problem particular to 
whites 
Period most Late 19 to late 1930s to date 1950s to date 1950s to date 
felt 20th century 
4.4.1 Segregationist Capitalism 
The segregationist Rhodesia was the second most prosperous economic area in Africa, 
after South Africa for a good part of the twentieth century. The influx of capitalists 
with investment capital saw the coming into Rhodesia of such professionals, as are 
chemists, geologists, surveyors and other professional gold diggers. This development 
created a new large class of foreigners used to European living standards and culture. 
As these people became a social force within themselves, they began to draw the 
attention of their fellow capitalist kinsmen to the need of descent retirement lives. 
The discovery of gold and other valuable minerals together with a new flourishing 
agricultural sector led to an influx of immigrant workers. The numbers of foreigners 
coming into the country increased forth fold following the formation of Rhodesia and 
Nyasaland in the nineteen fifties. Cheap labour from Zambia and present day Malawi 
led to the creation of a new class of black immigrant workers that depended solely on 
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selling their labour to the white employers for survival. Most of the black immigrant 
workers were employed in the construction of railways and roads and mines. The 
Zimbabwean natives unlike the foreign legion could resort to indigenous economy for 
survival and in particular subsistence farming. As a result of that the foreign 
employees were dependable and loyal to their employers. It was not long before the 
colonial government realised that in the long run as this new wave of black labour 
began to age, there would be social crisis caused by the welfare needs of these people 
who could not retire into the communal lands and be looked after by their own 
siblings. That led the colonial government to adopt a more positive approach towards 
making retirement provisions for the black employees. 
In the meanwhile, the predominantly white employers and other quasi-government 
public corporations had also come to recognise the need for the provision of pensions 
to the loyal and more generously to the long-serving employees. Seeing the old 
former workers live deplorable lives after retirement lifted the profile and cause of 
retirement provisions across the entire social and political spectrum of the country in 
general and more specifically to the immigrant community. That itself led to the 
increase in demand for the provision of occupational pension schemes. 
4.4.2 Improvement in medical sciences 
The improvement of medicinal science coming mostly from Europe, led to improved 
life spans for many people and in particular the African white communities that could 
afford the cost and access to medical care. Most significantly this meant that the 
employees who would have died in employment or soon after retirement now 
survived and lived many more years after retiring. Partly propelled by the desire to 
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maintain the flame of segregation that saw the white settlers and their descendants 
living a far higher standard of living compared to that of the indigenous Africans, the 
rights to pension fund membership were seen as the most cost efficient ways of 
maintaining the social status quo. That in it-self led to a further increase in demand 
and growth of pension schemes. 
4.4.3 Economic challenges 
The economic diversity in Rhodesia was so sophisticated and dynamic that it required 
people well read in their various discipline specialities. The change in technology has 
been dynamic almost through out the world and Rhodesia had not been an exception 
in that regard. To attract and retain qualified and competent employees, the new 
capitalists in what is now Zimbabwe, saw the use of pension benefits as one of the 
best baits to lure their target employees at the same time using the carrot approach to 
retire the obsolete. There was an influx in the nineteen fifties to early sixties of 
foreigners skilled in various areas, apart from generous salaries that were paid to 
geologists and other professionals, the prospect of lucrative pension benefits attracted 
many to come into the country. 
4.4.4 Legislative forces 
The tax concessions that the law gives to pension contributions and to some extent on 
the capital gains and benefits payable has been a positive factor in promoting pension 
funds growth. Zimbabwean pension funds like many other pension funds in other 
countries have enjoyed positive demand and growth as a result of the special tax 
treatment that they get from the taxman's hand. 
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Having said all this so far, it suffice to mention that the same positive factors that 
have seen the rapid growth in pension funds growth in colonial Rhodesia, continue to 
this date to be major market forces in shaping the pensions development. Despite that, 
there were some white settlers or their dependants who found themselves unable to 
save for their retirement using the conventional pension fund sources. The state 
through the welfare department paid benefits to these otherwise out-cast members of 
the white community. There are some new challenges different from these as we show 
later in this report. In the next section, we look at the present pensions structure in 
Zimbabwe, a structure that was largely developed by the settlers and their 
descendants. 
4.5. Retirement provision structure in Zimbabwe 
To a large extent the Zimbabwean retirement provision structure mirrors that of the 
British. That is true for all structures save that there is no basic state pension. The 
other fundamental difference is the second home ownership that most of the native 
Zimbabweans use as a social security in the aftermath of post urban life were the 
majority work as middle white collar workers and labourers. The second home is 
usually in the communal areas where the inhabitants do not have title deeds whereas 
the first home is usually in the urban set up, rented or council owned or mortgaged. 
While it is true that the pension funds are very significant both in magnitude and 
influence in the economy, the number of ordinary Zimbabweans that are members of 
such schemes is disappointingly low. The average unskilled worker not employed in 
the public sector relies to a large extent on the second home ownership for his life 
after retirement. 
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The occupational schemes, most run by insurance firms on behalf of private 
employers, have a history of excluding the majority of the lowly paid black workers. 
This exclusion is a result of both political and economic past of Zimbabwe. By virtue 
of the small wages and salaries paid to most working-class workers, it was and still is 
uneconomically sound to arrange pension pots for such workers in the private 
markets. On the political aspect of this inherent social crisis has been the continued 
exclusion of the working-class from participating and sharing in the growing 
prosperous pension industry. 
4.6 Emergence of the forces for state insurance in Zimbabwe 
In Zimbabwe prior to the urbanisation part though and resulting from foreign 
investment into the industrial and mining corporations, mankind had survived as close 
units dependent on the soil and each other. The old aged and the infirm were certainly 
the responsibility of the state and the immediate family members. The new industrial 
activity that the foreigners brought with them notably in the late 19th century marked 
the beginning of formal paid labour in Zimbabwe. The new culture borne from this 
new survival technique undoubtedly came with it the spirit of individual thrift. 
The attempts to model Zimbabwe then a British colony to colonial mother led to a 
new format of dependence were the rural folks depended on those in new urban 
centres. The immediate victims of the new life were unsurprisingly the infirm, the old 
aged and those other groups that could not provide for themselves as individuals 
without the assistance of the able-boded. The long-term problem was how ever, to be 
seen some years later when those previously dubbed the providers could not provide 
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for themselves and their dependants by reason of old age or injuries. It is this problem 
and how the state has sought to solve it through a system of compulsory occupational 
pension scheme that is of interest to us in this report. 
At first, as early as 1981, the government of Zimbabwe believing to be in line with its 
then controversial Marxist policy, encouraged, facilitated and financed the system of 
co-operatives for the rural peasantry and retrenched employees. That this system of 
co-operatives was bound to collapse was almost obvious. But that the poor people so 
targeted by this scheme knew it, is not so obvious. The political naivety at the time 
certainly gave a false hope to the electorate and more so the old and those that had 
lost their jobs when the new independent government of Zimbabwe came to power. 
Apart from the fact that the co-operative system did not address the problem of old 
age as a specific social and economic issue the Marxist tainted policy did little to 
address other inherent issues that go with old age such as that of the disintegration of 
the extended families dependency. The lack of sound managerial skills and financial 
discipline certainly had a contribution to the failure of the co-operatives venture. 
The failure of adequate and exhaustive research coupled with clumsy rent seeking did 
not help the co-operatives adventure. The information at hand suggests that the co- 
operatives system had little, if ever there was, positive contribution to the lives of the 
elderly Zimbabweans. The economic sustainability of this programme was certainly 
beyond the capacity of the economy. 
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It thus came as no surprise when co-operative after co-operative began to collapse. 
Before long the notion of increased national economic output through higher labour 
force activity in co-operatives was gone. The government without conceding that a 
system of co-operatives had been a flop and presumably in line with the populist 
philosophy adopted by the ruling party changed strategy. That a system of National 
service emerged is not surprising and unsurprisingly is the short life that it lived. It is 
no coincidence that the idea of a national service was met with criticism from 
backbenchers, opposition and other pressure groups and that it soon wound up. The 
overall cost to the economy has never before been fully investigated. As if to add salt 
to the wound the misery of the retrenched and the aged continued to grow as the 
economic hardships began to hit hard in the 1980s. 
With the concept of co-operatives and national service having failed, the first black 
government was certainly under considerable pressure to address the problem of 
unemployment and menace of old age. A quick solution seemed to lie on the 
formation of an insurance fund to deal with these social security problems. 
4.7 Emergence of the National Social Security Authority 
In 1983 the first debate on the subject of a national social security insurance fund was 
fierce. The then director of the Workers Compensation Insurance Fund was given 
ministerial mandate to source international recommendations from the International 
Labour Office (ILO). The scheme to be so established was to have occupational 
retirements, permanent health and unemployment benefits insurance schemes. The 
report from the ILO made various recommendations and alternatives that took into 
account that Zimbabwe was a small, newly independent and developing economy. 
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The idea of establishing a National Insurance scheme and in particular the one with 
occupational pension benefits was opposed by various groups. The Zimbabwe 
Association of Pension Funds was particularly vocal as it undoubtedly construed the 
proposed scheme as a threat to the long- term viability of private occupational 
schemes. The practical reality of the interaction between private and mandatory state 
pension provisions is discussed together with empirical testing in chapters six and 
seven of this thesis. 
Following the otherwise exclusive but substantive consultation between the labour 
ministry and finance and economic planning ministries the enabling Act was passed in 
the Zimbabwean parliament in 1989. It was not after a further five years before the 
first implementation of the Act took place. And in between those years the vast 
majority of the would-be stakeholders were kept in the dark about the future 
developments in this new venture by the government. 
4.7.1 Formation of the National Social Security Scheme 
The present National Social Security Scheme (NSSS) is borne of the National Social 
Security Authority Act (1989) number 12. It came into effect by virtue of Statutory 
Instrument Number 393 of 1993 (SI 393 of 1993). The present structure of the state 
pensions insurance scheme comprises of short term and long- term benefits as is 
shown in table 4.2. 
123 
Table 4.2: The NSSS benefit structure 
Type of Invalidity Retirement Survivors Funeral grant 
benefit Pension Grant Retirement Grant Pension Grant 
Risks covered Longevity- by Longevity -by Loss of income to Burial and other 
members who members who have dependants due to ancillary costs 
were about to attained state death of a bread- 
reach the SPA pension age winner. 
Beneficiaries The insured The insured Dependants, Who ever is 
members members spouses and responsible for 
parents the funeral costs 
The NSSS benefits as is summarised in table 4.2 are classifiable under four broad 
categories. These are Invalidity, Retirement and Survivors' benefits and Funeral 
Grant. The aim of the scheme benefit structure is certainly one to ensure the extensive 
protection from as many as possible risks that may cripple or worsen the financial 
position of member employee or that of his dependants. 
4.7.1.1 Invalidity Benefit 
An invalidity benefit is the benefit payable to the insured member or other such 
beneficiary as a result of temporary or permanent disablement of the insured member. 
The invalidity benefit comprises of a pension and a grant. The invalidity benefit is 
payable to the beneficiary from the date of incapacitation subject to the standard 
seven days excess period. This benefit is receivable continuously for as long as the 
incapacitated person continues to be an invalid. 
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An invalidity pension which is an annuity payable to a member who is permanently 
disabled is payable to those members that have attained the age of fifty years. In 
addition to the age qualification requirement the members must contribute for at least 
five years to the scheme of which not less than two years of the contributions should 
have been paid to the scheme in the past three years preceding the month of 
incapacitation. 
An invalidity grant is payable to persons who are permanently disabled and have not 
attained the age of fifty years, provided that they have contributed for a period of at 
least six months but less than five years. The concept of invalidity insurance is the 
same as that of group personal accident and injury insurance that a firm will normal 
take in the private markets on behalf of the employees. It is as such a short-term 
insurance that has been included under the scope of NSSS like funeral grants, a point 
worth noting and discussed below. 
4.7.1.2 Retirement Benefits 
The retirement benefits are payable to members who retire from active employment 
by reason of old age. Retirement benefits are of two kinds; that is retirement pension 
and retirement grant. The former is in the form of an annuity and is payable to retirees 
who would have attained the age of sixty years provided their contribution record 
spans for a period not less than ten years. 
Not with standing what has been said above, persons engaged in hazardous work may, 
if they wish retire at the age of sixty years (fifty 
-five years for females) and be 
deemed to have retired on the normal state retirement ages of sixty 
-five and sixty 
years respectively. At the time of compiling this report there is no evidence of any 
moves towards the equalisation of the retirement ages of men and women. A point we 
will discuss later. 
The retirement grant is a lump sum benefit paid to retirees who have attained the 
normal state pension age. The beneficiaries so covered under this benefit must have 
contributed or had contributions paid on their behalf for a period of not less than 
twelve months but not more than ten years. In addition to that the retirees should have 
retired from gainful employment or show to the satisfaction of the scheme that they 
are no longer employed. 
Not with standing what has been said above, an employee may opt to cash on his 
contributions plus interest earned. This is so for employees who would have 
contributed to the scheme for a period of not less than ten years but not attained the 
state pension age. The minister of Finance is responsible for fixing the rate of interest 
to be applied to the contributions8. 
4.7.1.3 Survivors' Benefits 
As the name suggests, survivors' benefits benefit the widow or widower or any other 
dependant of the deceased employee. The survivors' benefits are in the form of 
pensions and grants. In order to qualify for this benefit the deceased employee must 
satisfy some general conditions that we may not discuss exhaustively in this report. 
Below are some of the salient conditions. 
8 There is no rigidity on this as the ministry responsible for finance may use different names from time 
to time. 
126 
The survivor's pension in the form of an immediate annuity following the death of an 
employee is payable to the beneficiary provided the former would have qualified for a 
normal retirement pension or was entitled to an invalidity pension at the time of his 
death. If the deceased does not leave behind any spouse or dependant the pension so 
payable forms part of the deceased's estate. The survivor's pension is not payable in 
respect of a widow or widower where marriage contracted after the date of disability 
or retirement of the deceased. 
The survivors' pension is normally receivable by the widow or widower until her or 
his death. In the case of minors that are mentally or physically disabled, this benefit is 
payable for as long as such dependant child continues to be so incapacitated. To avoid 
doubt of any kind, a widow or widower entitled to a survivor's pension receives such 
benefit in preference to all other claimants. In the like manner, a child who becomes 
any orphan should, in preference to all other claimants, be entitled to a survivor's 
pension after the death of his surviving parent. 
The total amount of pension payable to any beneficiary of a survivor's pension does 
not as a generality exceed the pension that would otherwise be, or was payable to the 
deceased employee. There are three different rates that apply here. The scheme offers 
a 40% of the deceased's pension in respect of a widow or widower or child. But how 
ever, if the deceased employee leaves behind two or more wives or children, such 
widows or children, should share between themselves the pension as would be 
payable to a single widow or child equally9. The general manger of the pension 
9 Please note that polygamy is lawful in Zimbabwe 
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scheme has the explicit power to vary the proportions upon which such pension 
benefit can be best apportioned in the interest of all the interested parties. 
A 12% of the pension that the deceased employee would other wise have received is 
payable to either of the parents if the latter are beneficiaries. An 8% of the pension as 
described above would be payable to any other dependant or dependants other than 
those already mentioned above if they were beneficiaries in accordance with the rules 
of the scheme. That is in the event of there being more than two such beneficiaries, 
this 8% would be shared in equal proportions. The general manager of the scheme 
has, how ever, the powers to vary the proportions upon which the pension can be 
divided amongst the beneficiaries. 
The survivor's grant is in the form of a cash lump sum payable to the beneficiary 
where at the time of his death a deceased employee would have been entitled to an 
invalidity grant or retirement grant. The conditions described with respect to a 
survivor's pension apply mutatis mutandis with regard to the disposition of a 
survivor's grant. 
4.7.1.4 Funeral Grant 
The NSSS offers a funeral grant in the form of a cash lump sum. It is payable to the 
person who in the opinion of the general manager, has met or is liable to meet the 
funeral costs of the deceased employee. How ever, when a deceased employee 
qualified for a funeral grant in terms of the National Social Security Authority 
(Accident Prevention and Workers' Compensation Scheme) Notice 1990, the person 
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who would have met the funeral costs would be advised to seek compensation from 
this latter scheme rather than the NSSS. 
In order to qualify for a funeral grant, a deceased employee should be one in receipt 
of invalidity or retirement pension or one whose insurance contributions have been 
paid or credited on his behalf for a period not less than five years. 
4.7.1.5 Disqualification from Receiving Benefits 
The general manager of the scheme has the power to disqualify an employee entitled 
to an invalidity benefit or retirement benefit for a varied reasons of which the most 
salient are discussed briefly in this report. If a member becomes incapable of work 
through his own deliberate negligence such as operating the machinery while under 
the influence of alcohol or drugs he can lose his benefits. Secondly failure without 
good cause to submit oneself to a medical examination directed by NSSS may result 
in loss of entitlement to benefits. 
To reduce and deter the risk of moral hazard the scheme considers moonlighting 
punishable by loss of entitlement to benefits. That is, for example, if a member 
performs work for which remuneration is ordinarily payable, the scheme may 
terminate his benefits or refuse to pay if an application is made for a benefit. 
Lastly if a member fails, without good cause, to answer any reasonable questions 
directed to him by NSSS authority for the purposes of fulfilling the statutory 
instruments governing the scheme, may also lead to loss of benefits. 
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The disqualification rules do not apply to pension benefits payable to those that would 
have attained state pension age. As is evident above the disqualification can be short 
or long term. The general manager has the sole discretion as to the length of such 
disqualification. 
4.8 Contribution rates of the NSSS 
The present state pensions and related benefits scheme, covers a section of employees 
and their employers. Conspicuously exempt from membership is the government and 
its employees. And so are the National Railways of Zimbabwe NRZ and its 
employees. The government and the NRZ are without any reasonable doubt two of the 
single major employers in Zimbabwe. Also excluded are the farm labourers and 
contract workers and many others who in our opinion would have benefited from a 
national scheme. '° 
The employers and the employees make the NSSS contributions alike. The employer 
and the employee share a total of 6% of an employee's salary equally as a monthly 
contribution to the national scheme. There is a maximum cape, set as a fixed sum 
expressed in dollars that is set from time to time that an employee's contributions 
cannot exceed. The maximum cap has in fact remained unchanged at $1440 per 
annum since the inception of the national scheme. 
Unlike the other conventional pension contributions to the privately managed 
schemes, the NSSS contributions are not a tax deductible. There is no tax rebate that 
can be claimed from the government Taxes department arising from expenses 
10 See the Zimbabwean SI 393 OF 1993 for a fuller list of those exempt from contributing 
130 
incurred as pension contributions to the NSSS. That is so for the employees but 
employers. The employers are free to pay the total cost of contributions on behalf of 
their employees though there is no tax incentive to do so. 
4.9 Forces behind the evolution and development of NSSS 
Having noted what has been said above about the national scheme, the interesting 
conceptual questions of the forces that have helped bring about the national scheme in 
its format arise. The complex blend of Western type of free market and Marxism that 
the ZANU PF once attempted in Zimbabwe explains to a large extent the general 
political and economic perspective upon which the emergence and formation of the 
NSSS must be understood. It is not so clear as to what extent the forces of Marxism 
influenced the come about of the NSSS nor is it clear the extent of influence the 
forces of a free market had in this venture. What can be safely stated is that it was 
during the mist of disguise under both that the government came with the idea of a 
national occupational pension scheme. In fact, it suffices to mention that the president 
of Zimbabwe, an ardent Marxist scholar, boasts that the NSSS is founded on 
socialistic principles and shall be managed as such. These are the views and 
promulgations that are bound to haunt the reputation and concise culture of the NSSS 
as a corporate organisation operating in a market that is widely becoming laissez- 
faire. Below we discuss, briefly of course, the various schools of philosophy that 
manifest and reflect themselves, otherwise undoubtedly, in the scars of development 
and formation of NSSS. 
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4.9.1 The Marxist influence 
The first independent black government led by a self proclaimed Marxist teacher 
perhaps as expected showed an un wavering determination to introduce a scheme that 
would reflect some of the features of Marxist school. The generosity of the benefits 
proposed vis-ä-vis the proposed contribution not to talk of the management style, is 
evident of that. The magnitude and ambition of the spirit of the NSSS characterises 
though not so obviously the epitomise otherwise common in most socialist driven 
economic ventures. 
That the government chose a scheme with barely freedom from ministerial leverage is 
evidence of the socialist forces that call for such strong central command of the 
institutions of production. The concepts of equality, freedom and fraternity that are 
the ultimate goals of the socialist scholars are embraced, at least in paper, in the NSSS 
whose other objective aim is to establish worker solidarity and equitable distribution 
of income. The fact that the workers' movement was once run as a wing of the ruling 
party or a government agency partly explains the spirit behind the philosophy that 
fuelled the drive towards the creation of the social security system in its entirety as we 
see it in Zimbabwe. 
4.9.2 Demands for Libertarians 
With the British public institutions undergoing revolutionising under the Thatcher 
government" the wave of envy by which such change was admired did not exclude 
the Zimbabwean political and economic circles. There were some prominent figures, 
both from the remnants of the colonial administration and the returning exiles that 
The British conservative government led by Margaret Thatcher in the 1980s to 1990s 
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have been poisoned by the British style of doing business, that believed that the 
pensions markets was better off left alone to develop and prosper within the demands 
of the market mechanism. A behind the scene support from the private insurance and 
pensions firms has never before been doubted. 
The libertarians so concerned with individual freedom and rule of market mechanism 
were so determined to oppose any moves aimed at establishing a monumental pension 
scheme run by a central government. They, justifiably to some extent, thought that 
such an enterprise would distort the market equilibrium and lead to a further 
unnecessary increase in market regulation. On the other hand the new regime, of 
course being the first independent black administration, believed and times wrongly, 
that as a way of affixing political control such radical moves had to be done 
irrespective of what the predominantly white Chamber of Commerce thought of such 
developments. That was part of the struggle for supremacy in the post- independent 
Zimbabwe. 
4.9.3 Triumph of the liberals 
If the diversity of backgrounds of the Zimbabwean government ministers and their 
advisors has ever reflected itself in any government policy then it was certainly at the 
creation of the NSSS. That the advocates of capitalism with government involvement 
managed to influence the final shape of the NSSS cannot be doubted. The defeat of 
the advocates for an absolute independent and privately run national occupational 
scheme is evidence of a deal of compromise between the extremist socialists and the 
libertarians. It would appear that the desire to maximise efficiency and equity within 
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the framework of capitalism thrived over the desire for an independent market 
mechanism. 
The balance aimed at pleasing the socialist advocates most that had inclination toward 
creating systems modelled along the former communist block economies led to the 
creation of a quasi- independent NSSS. That this quasi-independent national scheme 
would compete, albeit with unfair advantage, for business with private firms seems to 
have been of little deterrent at the time the scheme was formed. Of importance it 
would seem was that both extremes had been accommodated. 
To date the legacy of the socialist taints in the NSSS continue to haunt the efficient 
and professional operation of the scheme with central government ministers exerting 
undue influence in the administration of the scheme. The negative impact of the 
scheme to the private schemes is not so obvious hence the need to do some empirical 
work as we have done in chapters six and seven. 
4.10 Operation of the NSSS 
The NSSS, the new entrant variable to the pensions markets in Zimbabwe operates as 
a quasi-independent government agency. It operates within the market that has 
developed over a long period of time modelled along the British open market system. 
The general manager of the scheme runs the NSSS on a day to day. That the 
government retains a firm arm on the scheme has already been said. Yet it still enjoys 
relative freedom when it comes to those areas that the government perceives as being 
of less national interest. The concept of national interest is ambiguously, and is in fact 
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required under section 27 of the Act12, yet the fear of manipulating the scheme for the 
benefit of the government seems to be an issue for many in the years to come. 
Figure. 4.2 below is a diagrammatical flow chart of the NSSS. 
President of Zimbabwe 
Finance and Economic 1 Labour/welfare 
f Minister 
Minister 
sembly (Parliament) MPs 




The NSSS through NASA has a varied diversity of investment portfolios both short 
and long-term. It has an unlimited, as is the private pension funds, to both short and 
long- term securities in the form of government stocks, bonds and so on. The present 
12 The National Social Security Authority Act (1989) no. 12 
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asset portfolio owned by NASA includes both physical and financial securities 
property. 
The compulsory requirement that a certain percentage of the private pension funds' 
premiums be invested in government approved stocks extends to the NSSS albeit in 
that the minister can direct that a certain percentage of the funds be invested in 
socially acceptable ventures and has the prerogative to give the scheme management 
direction of general character where national interest is concerned. The British 
pension funds following the regulations that came into force in July 2000 have a 
moral obligation to invest in the socially needy ventures. 
The opaque transparency and accountability of the present regime has had in the 
short run a knock on effect on the public perceptions in so far as the operations of the 
NSSS are concerned. This is further confirmed by the results from our questionnaire 
where in more than sixty five percent of the respondents said they did not trust the 
present government with running a national occupational pension scheme. 
4.10.1 Funds and reserves 
In accordance with the requirements of the enabling Act, the scheme has set an 
operational fund to which all the qualifying employees and employers alike pay their 
monthly contributions. The scheme as a body corporate that can sue and be sued in its 
name can, using the fund name, raise and invest funds as may be necessary provided 
such moneys and interest accrued upon is lawful. 
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The scheme through the body of governors is required to hold a certain percentage of 
the monthly contributions in liquid form such as a bank, building society or the 
government treasury bills t3. The minister of Labour, Manpower Planing and Social 
Welfare, in consultation with the minister responsible for finance approves the 
investments to which the rest of the fund goes. The former after consulting the latter 
sets from time to time the proportion of funds to be kept in liquid form and that to be 
invested in other areas. 
The scheme as required by the Act14is advised by an actuary on the level of reserves 
to be held at any given time. It is responsibility of the board of governors to ensure 
that the required margins of solvency of the scheme are maintained. The reduction of 
the reserve levels or use of reserves can only be done after a ministerial approval. This 
set up raises some interesting questions of accountability in the event of investments 
going wrong or the fund experiencing some unforeseen financial difficulties. Is the 
board of governors to be blamed or the ministers? Are political driven directives 
compatible with conventional investment decision- making process? There are many 
questions that arise than could be answered. Some of these pertinent questions are 
discussed in the next chapter. 
In spite of what we have said above with regard to the NSSS there is little evidence 
per se to suggest that the national scheme has influenced the everyday operations of 
other established schemes. That does not how ever suffice to imply that it has had no 
effect on long term strategies for the planning and provision of retirement benefits. 
The resolute by which the private institutions and press alike have shown in the 
13 The Treasury Bills referred to here must be those tendered by the Government of Zimbabwe. 14 The National Social Security Authority Act (1989) No. 12 Government of Zimbabwe printers 
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operations of the national scheme is evidence of the influence, real or imagined that 
the NSSS has in the pensions markets. That the independent financial economists and 
academics continue to follow the developments and operations of the scheme with so 
much zeal shows the level of anxiety that is generated by the scheme in the markets. 
4.11 Conclusion 
In this chapter we have discussed in general, both the origin and development of the 
subject of social insurance. We have considered the specific developments of the 
NSSS and shown that the processes have been a product of a cluster of complex 
political and economic factors. The related developments in other countries that are of 
interest to this study have been discussed and carefully noted. We have further noted 
how the NSSS has been influenced by the developments in other parts of the world. 
The contribution and benefit structure of the NSSS has been stated clearly. The 
development and structure of the British retirement provision structure has been 
explained. The operation and relative position of the national scheme in the pensions 
markets has been carefully noted. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
A review of the NSSS in light of the wider economic, political and social 
environment 
5.1 Introduction 
In this chapter we look into the NSSS from an analytic and critical view. We look into 
the NSSS in the light of the wider economic, political and social perspective. An 
Analysis of the scheme design and benefit structure is also made. Issues of both 
actuarial consideration and qualitative economic importance are given a careful 
review. The government's economic and social development programme is reviewed 
in light of the emergence of the NSSS. The areas of potential conflict between the 
aims of the NSSS and the economic and social development programme are 
highlighted and commented upon. 
5.2 The NSSS Design 
The design of a pension plan is the foundation upon which a superstructure of 
administration and performance is erected Marples (1965). It is with a sound pension 
plan that the administrators of the pension fund can ensure growth and development 
of a security plan adopted. As a generality, the onus of running a scheme is placed 
with the trustees whose appointment to the board of trustees is normally spelt out in 
the rules of the scheme. The trustees will as a matter of practice appoint professional 
people such as the actuaries and underwriters to do the everyday running of a pension 
scheme. And the trustees as such formulate broad policies for implementation and 
administration by the specialists in the various aspects of the fund management. 
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The NSSS by virtue of its design mirrors the conventional private occupational 
pension schemes in many respects. First and foremost it is a quasi-government 
occupational scheme whose operations have been entrusted to a board of trustees 
appointed by the government. While the employers' organisations and employees' 
organisations submit names of possible board members, the final decision lies with 
the government through the minister for Public works and Social services. From a 
distant observation it may look as though the powers of running the national scheme 
are vested with the employers and employees alike. A closer look however, creates a 
different view as the members so appointed from employers and employees' interest 
organisations could have their appointment terminated by the minister. The enabling 
Act' in fact gives too wide a scope for the minister to exercise his discretion in 
appointing and firing board members. Section 10(b) of the Act for example says that a 
board member may be asked to vacate office by the minister if such a member has 
" Failed to comply with the conditions of his office fixed by the minister in 
terms of subsection (1) of section seven. " 
The drafting and interpretation of the terms that have to be complied with is the 
prerogative of a government minister and could as such be abused to achieve short- 
term political goals. A member acting in the interest of the employees could become a 
victim if say for example, a particular opinion he has is not compatible with the 
political interests of the sitting government. More over, the Act is not clear as to 
whether the employers and employees' interest organisations ought to submit fresh 
names for consideration by the minister in the event of a member having to vacate 
1 The National Social Security Authority Act (1989) No. 12 Government Printers Zimbabwe 
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office prematurely. The essence of all these examples is that the NSSS despite its 
having a board of trustees that in theory is meant to be representative of the interest of 
employers and employees alike, is far from being a government partisan group in 
actual life. It is with that background that the true objectivity of the running of the 
national scheme can be brought to question. 
5.2.1 Stakeholders' rights and obligations 
With private pension schemes and particularly the employer-sponsored occupational 
pension plans, the pension plan is the single most important document. That is so, for 
the pension plan sets forthwith the details of the rights and obligations of the scheme 
member-what benefits he may claim and when, how the amount of the benefit is 
calculated and what information has to be furnished with the claim, and whether he 
has to make contributions during his participation. 2 The pension plan as a matter of 
general practice is produced as a booklet and made available to all members and 
members recently joining the scheme. 
The NSSS as a scheme modelled along the funded employer-sponsored pension plans 
should have endeavoured to produce informative booklets for circulation to all 
employees contributing to the national scheme. The available documents are statutory 
publications such as the Act itself and the statutory instruments detailing specific 
issues in pursuance of the spirit and objects of the 1989 Act. We need not emphasise 
the fact that statutory publications are fraught with complex legal jargon perplexing to 
legal professionals at times. The plainly written documents from the NSSA are 
basically promotional publications aimed at the general public and not specific on real 
2 Ibid 
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crucial areas of interest in so far as the average employees are concerned. Because of 
that the benefits and obligations of each part to the national scheme are very cloudy 
and at times subject of speculation and uncertainty. The unavailability of the scheme 
booklet makes the legal relationship of the employees and the national scheme 
uneven. There is as such, a need to improve communication and more crucially in so 
far as the obligations and rights of each of the parties to the NSSS is concerned. 
5.2.2 Actuarial Management of the NSSS 
All pension schemes as a matter of generality and practice require at one time or the 
other the services of an actuary. The actuarial cost estimate is crucial in the initial 
determination of benefits and cost. It becomes even more important when a scheme is 
running where periodical actuarial evaluations of the fund makes it imperative that the 
sponsors of the scheme are within the projected estimations of the cost of running the 
fund and where fall outs have occurred remedial action is taken. The basic concept of 
making actuarial valuations is to make known the present values of such benefit 
considerations as are death benefits, refunds and so on. 
Not withstanding what we have said above it needs not much emphasis that the NSSS 
requires the constant services of an actuary no less than any other occupational 
pension fund in Zimbabwe. The prescriptive statutory instrument upon which the 
NSSS is founded requires that the national scheme fund be subject to valuation at 
least every three years. One need not be a specialist to note with great concern that the 
minimum periodic valuation is inconsistent with the otherwise turbulent political and 
economic environment in Zimbabwe. The interest rates and inflation rates alike have 
been very volatile and fluctuating between fifty percent and eighty percent for the 
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good part of the last eighteen months yet the actuary has not only revised the 
contribution rates but the reserves and projected benefits have also remained 
unchanged. The salary indexes have been adjusted several times of which a 
proportionate adjustment of the contribution rates would have been the most 
reasonable response to this vibrant economic development in Zimbabwe. 
There are many and varied actuarial areas that are worth noting with regard to the 
NSSS. We look into these issues under the headings, "membership participation, 
mortality, salary progression, interest, disablement and post disablement mortality and 
normal retirement rates". In addition to that we consider the general expenses that are 
relevant in the efficient management of a scheme to ensure that it meets the financial 
obligations in the form of benefits and refunds to the members. 
5.2.2.1 Membership participation rate 
The NSSS is at the time of writing this report using old participation rates that were 
assumed more than half a decade to this date. Not only that the employment trends 
have changed but more importantly the labour participation rates have for a good part 
of the last twenty-four months been subject of every men's guess. The employers' 
confederation and the workers' unions estimate the fall in rate at well over forty 
percent while the government figures are somehow conservative at twenty or so 
percent. The importance of keeping track with employment fluctuations is core to the 
actuarial needs in so far as determining the employment survival rate that is itself 
crucial for purposes of determining the probabilities of the scheme making premature 
benefit payments and funding reductions in contributory schemes as is the case with 
the NSSS. The significance of higher withdrawal rates than was assumed at inception 
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of the policy is that it affects the magnitude of contributions flowing to the scheme 
funds from employees and employers alike. That is to say in the event of the scheme 
experiencing more than expected withdrawal rates, the fund's ability to sustain 
promised benefits becomes squeezed of which there being sound actuarial 
management would certainly lead to revision of the assumed withdrawal rates. 
The other area worth noting with regard to the withdrawal rates currently in place and 
used by the NSSS is that the government actuary assumed an economic growth rate of 
4.5% to 5.5% yet the experience on the ground is proving to the contrary and very far 
from the NSSS' projections. In the last three years the economic growth has been a 
staggering average of between 0.8% and 1% and international experts expect it to go 
further down in the coming years before it picks up again. That change of direction 
will depend to a large extent on the political and economic reforms that are more than 
needed in Zimbabwe at the moment. The fall in economic growth rate implies that 
there is an inevitable fall in people getting formal employment in the sectors targeted 
by the NSSS for the funding. In theory what this entails is that the assumed growth 
rate of the fund is failed while on the other hand the liabilities emanating from NSSS 
contribution refunds and deferred pension rights increase. 
5.2.2.2 Mortality rates 
Mortality rates are important in the administration of any occupational pension 
scheme. The relevancy of mortality tables is twofold, first during the period before 
normal retirement age and secondly with regard to post retirement period. In the first 
significance, that is before the employee reaches normal retirement age, though 
generally small by comparison to withdrawal rates the mortality rates just like the 
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former reduce the estimate of the survivors to pension age and thus diminish the 
factor "probability of payment" Marples (1965). In the second part, after retirement, 
the mortality rates are important in that they are the core factors reducing the 
probability of payment to less than one. High mortality rates produce a large reduction 
and lower mortality rates produce a lesser reduction. It is the pensioners' mortality 
rates that determine the annuity values of the benefits. 3 
Turning to the Zimbabwean experience and the NSSS we need not emphasise that the 
AIDS epidemic and the general fall in living standards have changed the look of the 
mortality tables. While there is no evidence of robust study into the effect of the AIDS 
on the Zimbabwean mortality tables, there is a general consensus across the entire 
international and domestic spectrums that the rates have substantially increased. 
Judging by number of deaths and United Nations estimates and projections there is 
urgent need to apply instantaneous flashlight into the old rates assumed by the 
government when the national scheme was designed. From a qualitative point of 
assessment there is no doubt what so ever that the current latency in reviewing rates 
more regularly as reflective of the turbulent nature of mortality statistics in Zimbabwe 
is a "debt risk bomb" that will explode in the years to come with far reaching 
consequences for the state finances. 
As a new and young scheme the NSSS requires the constant watch of an actuary if it 
is to meet the expectations of both the workers and the government. The NSSS 
enabling Act requires that the rates be reviewed and evaluated at least once every 
three years. The bureaucratic process inherent in most public services makes the 
3mid 
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submission and implementation of the actuary's recommendations of the reviews and 
evaluations a much longer process than otherwise sought by the spirit of the 
legislation itself. 
Because the NSSS is still at its infancy and will continue to be so for up to the next 
twenty five years or so, it is important that it has constant and increasing cash flow 
that is distinct from interest and capital gains for it is this cash received from 
employers as national insurance contributions that is essential for the purchasing and 
building up of property assets that will eventually entitle the scheme to further income 
gains. It is thus very imperative that the national scheme must endeavour to keep as 
up to date as is reasonable possible, the mortality and withdrawal rates. 
5.2.2.3 Salary progression rates 
Since the NSSS and in particular pension benefits are salary-linked, it means that 
there is great need to keep track of salary developments by the scheme's actuary. The 
salary progression scale that the actuary must adopt in the cost-benefit design of the 
scheme is generally a case of compromise between employees and the sponsors of the 
scheme, usually though generally not always employers. In the case of the NSSS the 
government is the ultimate sponsor of the scheme and bears the risk of scheme 
projections "ballooning" out of proportion including new salary scales on immediate 
benefits payable to scheme members. 
The statistics at hand suggests that the salaries for middle- income earners have 
increased by disproportionately huge percentages ranging from two hundred fifty to 
five hundred percent in the past seven years. If that trend is to continue and the 
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contribution rates continue not to be reviewed as often as we would have expected 
there is absolute danger and risk that the national scheme would face financial crisis 
in the near future when substantial pension benefits become payable. 
5.2.2.4 Interest rates 
The interest rates assumption is one of the crucial decisions that an actuary has to 
make when a pension scheme like the NSSS is set up. As a generality, it is true that 
the realistic rate would be earned from the assets of the fund over the entire lifespan 
of a member. The interest earned from the scheme assets helps bring down the 
contribution rate by employers and employees. It is as such crucial that the national 
scheme keeps a sound investment portfolio that takes cognisance of the assumed 
interest rate in the scheme design. 
Of particular concern to us is the independence of the scheme from government whips 
in making investment choices. It would be particularly difficult for the national 
scheme to make investment mixes that take into account the dynamic effects of 
interest rate volatility bearing in mind that the NSSS rules have a provision that states 
that the government through the minister responsible for the running of the scheme 
may " give to the Authority such directions of a general character relating to the 
exercise by it of its functions as appear to the Minister to be requisite in the national 
interest. " Such a provision makes it easy for politicians to use political muscles to 
force through certain investment programmes that would in the absence of this 
loophole not go through. 
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5.2.2.5 Disablement and post disablement mortality rates 
These are used to interpolate the number of employees that are expected to retire by 
reason of invalidity, physical or mental occurrence. The mortality rates are then used 
to estimate the annuity value for incorporation in the calculation of the present value 
of the pension after invalidation Marples (1965). As a general practice there is no 
standard assumption rate. There is however, usually an applicable range of rates 
within certain classes of employees so insured under a pension fund. 
Turning to the Zimbabwean national scheme there is need for the authorities to set up 
or cause to be set up an independent statistical data bank to collate the relevant data 
for future use by the national scheme's actuary. We realise that the record keeping of 
accidents and deaths of employees is not co-ordinated so as to reflect the true across 
the sectors statistical picture. There is thus need to have a professional agency with 
expertise in statistical science that will collect and collate data on behalf of the 
national scheme. The statistics from the Central Statistical Office is unreliable in 
many respects and more fundamentally lacks detail. 
5.2.2.6 Normal retirement rates 
Strictly speaking normal retirement ages are a matter of individual professions. 
University lecturers may afford to work beyond the age of seventy- five years and 
excel in the profession at that old age. On the other hand for manual mechanics, it 
would generally be unrealistic to work without absolute strain to the age of say 
seventy years. The essence however of the normal retirement rates is that they impact 
directly to the cost estimations of the pension scheme. In the absence of other benefits 
in a pension scheme, the only risk becomes that of longevity. That is the risk of an 
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employee surviving to normal retirement age and thereafter surviving many more 
years during pension period. 
The NSSS has an absolutely low normal retirement age. While the state pension age 
in most if not all the industrialised countries is sixty-five years4, a trend common in 
the developing Latin American countries, the NSSS has age sixty as the normal 
retirement age. In view of the advent of the AIDS epidemic whose actuarial cost to 
the pensions insurance has not been quantified exhaustively, it may be justifiable that 
the normal retirement in the national scheme has been set at the relatively lower figure 
of sixty years. The general economic and academic debate in this area of retirement 
provision has lately centred on the theoretical need to increase the normal state 
pension age from sixty-five to say seventy or so years in view of the fact that 
pensioners are increasingly living longer than say in the sixties and seventies. The 
improved medical and other factors ranging from standards of living to environmental 
factors justify the need for an increase in the state pension age in most of the 
developed countries. The customary sixty-five years used in most if not all the private 
pension schemes in Zimbabwe is now more of a tradition than a true actuarial 
reflection of the longevity cost determinant. 
In the long run, assuming that the AIDS epidemic and current political-economic 
disturbances are a mere market general shock wave that will surpass with time, there 
would be a need to adjust the state pension age to conform with other international 
4 There is however a difference in retirement ages for females and males, an anomaly that is in the 
process of correction in many countries. 
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practices where it is much higher and is scheduled to be increased in the years to 
come. If the cost effect of doing that is not considered now, there may be some 
unsustainable adjustment costs when that need eventually becomes an absolute 
necessity. 
5.2.2.7 Administrative expenses relevant to the NSSS 
In private markets these administrative expenses are treated differently by different 
employers and pension fund managers. The normal practice is for the sponsors of the 
scheme, the employers in general, to bear the cost of such expenses as statistical 
gathering, cost of disbursement of pensions and so on. There is no reserve fund set in 
respect of such expenses. The actuary of the scheme though would in most cases 
apply a loading factor to the initial contribution rates to cover part of these costs. 
Looking at this issue from the perspective of the NSSS and the current fiscal 
constraints that the Zimbabwean treasury is going through, it is difficult to envisage 
how the NSSS will manage to deliver efficiently without having to cause further 
financial constraints to the treasury already operating a knife- edge budget line. The 
national scheme as a board corporate that can sue and be sued in its corporate name is, 
at least judging by the spirit of the enabling Act, expected to meet the full cost of most 
of all the expenses falling under this category. In practice and more so when the 
national scheme begins to have more pensions in payment, it is bound to find it 
difficult to meet all its financial obligations without having to increase its debt or 
borrowing from the Central treasury. We are not being judgemental in our prognosis 
but are merely using the logic of events to extrapolate this aspect of both economic 
and fiscal speculation. 
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There are various other actuarial management cost variants that will undoubtedly be 
of much interest and debate in so far as the NSSS is concerned. We cannot however, 
discuss every actuarial consideration in a report of this nature and size. The report 
from the Zimbabwe Actuaries Society and other commentary publications by this 
group on certain specific issues within the NSSS would certainly make an interesting 
further reading in this area. 
5.2.3 National Social Security Scheme Contributions 
With private occupational pension schemes the employers are generally the heavier 
contributors and hence the major source of pension security. It is difficult to envisage 
a pension plan without employer contributions that are paid regularly and in 
substantial volumes. The employee contributions on the other hand merely promote 
the security that would have been established by employer's contributions. The debt 
as such that may accumulate as a result of inadequate funding of a pension scheme is 
the responsibility of the employer. The other general international practice is that the 
employee contributions can be withdrawn and paid to the leaving employee together 
with interest that would have been pre-fixed. 
Looking at the NSSS from a pension funding perspective, it is difficult to make a 
robust judgement about the adequacy or inadequacy of the rate that is used to 
determine each member's contribution from both his salary and employer's 
contribution. What is however certain is that for as long as the NSSS continues to 
have a contribution cap that is not reviewed regularly and frequent enough, there 
would always be a prima-facie case that the risk is high that when the scheme matures 
it would have to do with large sums of pension deficit. As if that is not enough, there 
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is an even more compelling worry from a worker perspective that to finance the 
ensuing deficit the government may have to resort to sharp increases in contributions 
thereby leading to a sudden drop in households disposable incomes. These are just 
speculative analysis scenarios that can be abated by the NSSS if it can take immediate 
cognisance of the effects of the policy currently in place with regard to pension 
contributions to the national scheme. 
Another important angle upon which to view the NSSS contribution policy is to put in 
the perspective of related other schemes elsewhere in the world. As comparing the 
volumes of currency spent as national insurance contributions would not be 
comparing like with like across boarders, we see it fit to use the gross domestic 
product ratios calculated from the figures provided by the central banks, to build a 
picture of the NSSS contributions policy within the international context. We also use 
the average of national insurance contributions as a percentage of gross salary to 
create a reflection of the NSSS within the international framework. This comparison 
is essential not least that the NSSS has the establishment of reciprocal arrangements 
with other countries' schemes as one of its crucial international objects. 
In table 5.1 we show the contribution levels from selected countries into the national 
insurance schemes. Table 5.2 shows the annual expenditure on old-age state pensions 
from a selection of countries. As can be seen the Zimbabwean contribution rates to 
the national scheme are per ser smaller than those from the rest of the sample. To 
make a direct comparison just like that is, how ever, very misleading as it is not 
realistically comparing like with like, but does give a general picture of the NSSS 
policy within the light of the international context. There are various economic and 
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social aspirations in each of the economies and need not emphasise the varying 
standards of living. And most importantly there are various economic and political 
constraints determining the domains of state expenditure on old age pensions and 
contributions hitherto by the employees and employers alike. 
Table 5.1: State pension contributions as a% of salary and GDP: a selection of states 
Country Zimbabwe UK Sweden Chile USA 
Social assistance No Yes Yes Yes Yes 









Pension Type Funded PAYG PAYG Funded PAYG 
State pension age 60 65/60 65/60 65/60 65 
* Indicates the employers' contribution rate and ** indicates the administration 
charges. 
Source: Various World Bank computations 
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Table 5.2 State pension as a% of GDP 
Period 
Country 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
Estonia 5.5 6.4 6 5.7 6.6 6.9 
Poland 15.1 14.3 13.6 14.5 N/a 13.3 
Czech Republic 8.1 8.2 7.4 N/a N/a 7.7 
Ukraine 8.9 8.5 8 N/a N/a N/a 
Bulgaria 8.7 N/a 8.8 8.7 8.5 8.4 
Hungary 9.8 10.4 9.7 N/a 9.4 N/a 
Zimbabwe 5 12.4 13.5 14.6 15.4 16 
Source: Computed using World Bank and other experts' estimates 
5.2.4 Retirement and eligibility for pension 
The eligibility or otherwise a right to a pension benefit is not a complicated issue with 
private schemes for such a right would normally be clearly spelt out in the rules of the 
pension scheme. When an employee changes employers he is usually entitled to his 
contributions or a right to transfer his pension pot to another pension plan, usually that 
sponsored by his new employers. When the scheme is a defined contribution plan, 
there would be no hassles with regard to benefit calculations. On the other hand when 
it is a defined benefit and final salary determined scheme, the employee who would 
have taken a big knock down during employment move may receive a substantially 
reduced pension. Private schemes would normally have measures in place to curb this 
eventuality whereby an employee may end up being penalised for moving from one 
employer to the other. 
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Now looking into the NSSS and eligibility for a pension, it is clear that the national 
scheme as is in fact the spirit of the enabling Act, was designed with a view to having 
near full employment rate in the economy. That is itself a flawed assumption judging 
by the past precedence of economies in the same class as Zimbabwe and the 
employment patterns of Zimbabwe herself. The NSSS rules do not specify how the 
workers who move to inferior paying jobs would be treated in calculating their final 
pension benefits. It would be absurd to penalise for instance an employee who would 
have contributed on a higher scale for say three quarters of his working life before 
moving to a lower paying job during his last quarter of working life before normal 
retirement age. 
That the normal state pension as provided by the NSSS is worked as a percentage of 
the final salary, where the final salary is defined as the five year average of the 
emoluments before normal retirement age, makes interesting reading. And 
emphatically so not least that that works as a disincentive for workers that would be 
so affected to continue working after attaining the ages of fifty years. There is in fact 
a clear inducement for relatively high-earning people in the middle fifties category not 
to look for alternative work in the eventualities of them losing their jobs. This is so 
because they would be mathematically better off having the NSSS use the immediate 
past salaries for computing their pension benefits. Such a development would 
certainly have adverse impact in other areas of the economy such as personal saving, 
mortgage insurances and so on. We cannot discuss the nitty-gritty of every aspect of it 
in a report of this size. But however, other related arguments are discussed in chapters 
six and seven of this report. 
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The general practice of the private schemes is to specify in the rules of the fund the 
relevant years by which a member becomes entitled to a benefit under the scheme. 
There is for instance a minimum age by which a member can qualify for an early 
retirement, qualify for an invalidity pension, qualify for a normal pension and so on. 
Technically there is nothing amiss in having varying retirement ages, invalidity 
retirement age and so forth for each class of employees. In addition to minimum ages, 
there is normally the minimum service of contribution or membership that has to be 
satisfied before an employee qualifies for a particular benefit. 
The NSSS as a scheme modelled alongside the private pension scheme to a very 
large extent, borrows heavily on some of these private pension scheme principles. The 
issues that are of concern with the NSSS are in fact, that there is no actuarial 
adjustment in contributions to cater for such variances. The members employed in so- 
called hazardous professions are allowed to retire on full benefits payable to members 
on average five years earlier than those employees engaged in other normal jobs. 
Because the contributions by the employers and employees alike do not recognise this 
variance, there is likely to be a funding debt that may become financially intolerable 
as the scheme grows towards maturity. If that eventuality happens, the national 
scheme does not provide how that debt would be financed. Will the state reduce 
pension and other benefits levels? Or will it increase national insurance contributions 
by employers and employees? Or will it use the state treasury resources to finance the 
resulting debt? Questions of this nature need full consideration before one can make a 
sound judgement of the development of the NSSS. It is the future insecurity with the 
old-age state security system that is likely to be worrying to the average employees 
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who naturally would be inclined to cherish state pension security. That sense of 
insecurity is bound to increase with uncertainties revolving around these questions. 
5.2.5 Termination of the plan 
With private occupational pension schemes, the rules will, as a matter of general 
practice, have a dissolution clause that spells out the action to be taken in the event of 
a fund winding up. If the pension fund is rich enough, the assets of the fund could be 
disposed through paying pensions or distributed immediately, in cash or annuity 
contracts with life assurance companies or other such financial arrangement as may be 
found to be suitable within the financial markets. The Act upon which the NSSS is 
founded upon and the Statutory 393 of 1993 that essentially spells out all the legal 
technical details of the national scheme do not point out the exact method by which 
this scheme would be wound up should this eventuality become necessary. Instead the 
Act merely states that: 
"The Minister may, by notice in the Gazette, establish one or more 
schemes for classes of employees as may be specified in the notice, 
and may in like manner amend or abolish any such scheme. " 
As is clear from the above statutory clause the winding up of the scheme is very 
vague and discretionary to the Minister tasked with administration of the scheme. The 
rules do not specify the circumstances under which the national occupational pension 
scheme can be wound up. And most importantly, the rules are silent on the 
circumstances that can lead to the necessitation of such a move by the government. 
Disclosure and specification of such details would be crucial in the risk judgement of 
the fund by the contributing employees and beneficiaries alike. 
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The state scheme's commitment to fulfilling its contractual obligations is 
unquestionable just like the state's undertaking that in the event of the scheme being 
wound up, all the financial obligations and rights accruing to members and 
beneficiaries would be honoured fully by the government. What is however uncertain 
is the financing of the debt that is likely to have accumulated when the NSSS is 
wound up. The inverse of the scenario is also unclear. What would happen to excess 
assets in the event of the scheme having such assets at wind up time? Such 
uncertainties would certainly haunt the future development of the national scheme 
particularly that worldwide there is a general trend of privatising state utilities and 
other such public bodies. We are convinced that the NSSS would be subject of 
privatisation programme at some later stage. The distribution of windfall or ensuing 
debts would be an interesting subject of both economic and political debate at that 
stage. 
5.3 Benefits 
It need not be emphasised that the ultimate goal of any pension plan is to provide a 
retiree with a descent lifetime income. As we have already said before, it is quite 
essential just like in any other assurance contract for the pension scheme to specify all 
the circumstances and conditions under which a claim may become payable to a 
member or any other claimant in accordance with the provisions of the scheme. The 
method of calculating any benefit should as such be unambiguous and in fact, must be 
clearly spelt out in the scheme rules. The benefit formulae used is basically an 
actuarial management issue that has to be discussed by the actuary and the sponsors of 
the relevant pension scheme. Broadly speaking the benefit formulae lie into two broad 
categories, namely the defined contribution and defined benefit plans. In the latter 
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schemes the chief primary consideration is the level of benefits whereas in the first 
schemes the contributions per employee or each member are the most important 
considerations. Money purchase schemes are the most common defined contribution 
schemes while the career average and final salary schemes are generally the most 
common of the defined benefit plans. 
5.3.1 Defined Benefit Schemes 
With these types of schemes the pension benefits are predetermined while the cost of 
the scheme is worked out. An employee contributes a fixed percentage of his salary 
say 6% to the occupational pension scheme. The employer's subsidy in respect of 
individual employees is a matter for the employer. Some employees, particularly the 
senior management employees, would be subject of heavy pension contribution 
subsidies from the employers. In short, the employer's pension liability in so far as the 
funding of the plan under defined benefit schemes is concerned is unlimited per se. 
These defined benefit schemes are many and of various mathematical specifications. 
They are however, classifiable under three broad categories, namely the flat rate, the 
career average and the final salary schemes. It must be pointed out that there are no 
strict and fast rules on these formulae as the determination and application is a matter 
of actuarial science assessment. More over these schemes can apply differential rates 
such as for example, in cases where a final salary can be used to work out the first 
fifty percent of the total pension while the defined contribution formulae is used to 
calculate the other fifty percent of the total pension. 
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5.3.1.1 Flat rate schemes 
Under such a scheme the rules provide for a flat rate pension defined as so many 
pounds or dollars per month. Though almost obsolete the practice with such schemes 
across the developed world was that the pension formula would provide a fixed 
monthly pension subject to minimum qualification period. In simple terms what these 
schemes usually entailed was that the benefits are payable to all those that qualify at a 
flat rate irrespective of service or salary. They guarantee a general certain standard of 
living for all in the old socialistic ways. 
With flat rate benefit schemes, there is an inherent problem in that a retiree cannot be 
guaranteed of a continued enjoyment of the standard of living otherwise enjoyed prior 
to retirement. They as such fail to meet one of the occupational pension schemes' key 
test, that of income replacement ratio since they do not take cognisance of earnings 
prior to retirement. More crucially and reflecting from what we discussed earlier on in 
chapter two, fails to address the redistribution of income from the rich to the needy. 
5.3.1.2 Career average schemes 
These are sometimes known as the credit benefit formulae schemes primarily because 
the benefit percentages are applied each year to the salary of that year and the total 
pension is the aggregate of the calculated figures of each year. 5 The mathematical 
effect of such schemes is the same as multiplying the benefit rate by the years in 
service and the average salary through out the period of employment. Amongst its 
most distinct features is that for each year that passes by, there is a definite and exact 
portion of total pension that accrues to the member. And as such, the subsequent 
Ibid 
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increases in salaries for what- ever reason would not affect the portion of pension 
already earned in the years prior to promotion. 
The strength of the career average schemes is that the pension benefits are linked to 
the salary in a stable and logical manner that is payroll friendly. That is particularly so 
taking into consideration that the cost of pension provision would not be sensitive to 
salary increases during the years the employee is promoted or salary rewarded for 
what-so ever reason. That marks a big and substantive difference with the final salary 
schemes that we discuss below. The sponsors of the scheme, the employers as is often 
the case would under this type of scheme experience a stable finance budget in terms 
of pension financing. Most strategically to the employers, the onus is on them to 
determine whether or not to increase the pension rates. During times of prosperity and 
financial stability, the employers would normally have no problems in taking steps to 
make for the shortfall in pensions expectations. 
The major short fall with the career average schemes is that, and in particular 
unpredictable economies, the sudden sharp increases in salaries cannot be fully 
compensated of in this kind of arrangement. The employers may as such have to 
supplement the inadequate pensions through some other means if there is absolute 
need to do so. In most countries the pensions industries have substantially moved 
away from these career average defined benefit schemes towards the revalued career 
average and final salary. The concept of revalued career average earnings is 
essentially to convert previous years' earnings into today's table of earnings. While 
the strategy of such schemes is almost certainly one, that is to take cognisance of the 
effect of promotional and inflationary salary increments into account when working a 
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pension, the indexing and rates used is up to individual schemes. The rules may for 
example provide that the revaluation of the previous years' salaries would be done in 
line with the commodities price index or earnings indexed or what ever appropriate 
indexation that the employers and the actuary can agree upon. 
5.3.1.3 Final salary schemes 
A pension benefit worked out using a final salary approach takes into account the 
years in service contributing to the scheme, final salary and accrual rate. The final 
salary is usually not the exact final salary in the year of retirement. To speak of final 
salary is probably misleading as the phrase "final pensionable earnings" sounds more 
appropriate. It is so primarily that these final salary schemes use a predetermined 
number of years to work out the average salary that will constitute the final salary 
used to calculate the pension benefit. The mathematical specification of final salary 
pension benefits is as follows: b= ps * fps where the letters stand for pension 
ar 
benefit, pensionable service, accrual rate and final pensionable salary in that order. 
The accrual rate is determined by the desired net replacement ratio. Most schemes use 
or So accrual rates in working out the retirement pension. There are many 60 
advantages of using a final salary scheme as we explain below. However, there are 
also some costs and funding disadvantages that need careful consideration before a 
decision is made to use the final salary benefit method to work out pension 
entitlement. 
The major strength of the final salary schemes is in that the retiree's pension is 
directly linked to both his service and salary just before retirement. In a way the 
employers can use the pension scheme to reward loyal and long-serving members of 
162 
the scheme. And more relevantly to the retirees, a standard of life enjoyed before 
retirement can still be enjoyed. 
There are some instances however, where under the final salary schemes, benefits are 
not linked to years that a particular employee would have spent contributing to the 
relevant pension scheme. That usually happens with specialised or high-demand 
employees where the new employers may be willing to buy the past service of a new 
arrival employee and incorporate it as a credit in pensionable service. That is to say 
for example, if a highly skilled employee whose age next birth is say forty years, 
decides to join a new firm, his new employers may be willing to buy his past service 
and guarantee him that his final pension would be worked as though he had joined the 
firm some fifteen years earlier than the actual date he started contributing to the new 
employer's scheme. That is done as a bait and inducement for prospective employees 
to quit their current contracts and join the new firms. 
5.3.2 Defined Contribution Schemes 
With these types of schemes the employee and employer contribute a fixed percentage 
of the member's salary though in some instances the employer may have to contribute 
a certain desired balance to make up for the difference required to get up to the target 
pension levels. An employee may contribute say 5.5% of his monthly salary to the 
scheme and the employer pay what ever balance would be required to get to the 
required pension. The pension payable to the member upon retirement would 
generally be determined by the formula M *f =b where m is the member's 
c 
contribution to the pension fund, c the total contributions of all employees, f the 
value of the fund and b is the pension benefit. The value of the pension benefit is 
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usually used to buy an annuity that could be immediate or deferred. In the next 
section, below we make a dichotomous analysis of the defined contribution and 
defined benefit (final) salary schemes with a view to ascertaining whether the decision 
by the government to adopt a defined benefit was the better of the two options. 
5.3.3 Defined contribution or Defined benefit, what was best for the NSSS? 
In defined contribution schemes, as we have already said, the contributions by the 
employee are worked as a fixed percentage of the earnings. The subsequent pension 
that the retiree gets upon retirement depends on the total contributions that a retiree 
would have made into the fund during his entire career while contributing to the 
scheme and the value of the fund to which all the employees have been contributing 
to. The major advantages and disadvantages from an employee and employers' 
perspective between the defined contribution and defined benefit schemes are 
summarised in table 5.3. We will not discuss the individual points mentioned in table 
5.3. However, we apply the principles derived from the strengths and weaknesses of 
the two types to the NSSS framework and make our conclusions on that strength. 
0 
Table 5.3: Strengths and weaknesses of the Defined contribution and Defined benefits 
Defined contribution Defined benefit schemes 
Advantages Disadvantages Advantages Disadvantages 
Employers Minimal investment Contribution Contribution Pension debt 
risks inflexibility flexibility trap 
Easy to manage Vulnerable if Complex to 
Direct control resulting benefits administer 
are poor Costs control 
difficult 
Employees Flexible benefits Inflation risk Predictable Poor benefits to 
Comprehensible Uncertainty about benefits early leavers 
Investment choice benefit level Bigger Complex 
and control Poor security to benefits and Inflexible in 
long-serving security to benefits 




Since the NSSS is funded by the contributions of the employers and employees with 
an obscure and rather unknown commitment to participation in the financing of 
benefits that the national scheme offers by the government, it would have been very 
logical for the government to adopt an occupational scheme that has minimal 
investment risk. To the contrary the NSSS is a defined benefit scheme run as a quasi- 
government agency that seeks to get the best of all worlds. Unlike private schemes 
sponsored by employers engaged in active production in the economy and essentially 
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in the business of making profits, the guarantee in NSSS investment risks is uncertain. 
The NSSS is silent on how it will make good the short fall in the funding of the 
pension benefits should the investment returns be poor and thus fail to match the 
benefit requirements. As we have said before with private schemes that risk is borne 
by the employers, but with the national scheme that ultimate risk may end up being 
the tax- payers' responsibility. In the worst of scenarios the NSSS benefits may be cut 
to the disappointment of many people particularly the poorly paid. 
It would have been a wise strategic risk management if the NSSS had split the 
funding cost risk into two by employing both the defined contribution and defined 
benefit salary methods in its benefit calculation. The inflationary and poor investment 
returns of the fund risk would be greatly mitigated if say the employers' contributions 
could be used for defined contribution benefits while the employees' contributions go 
towards a defined benefit based on a stringent final salary method. In essence what 
that would have meant is that for at least fifty percent of the total pension benefit, the 
employees would have borne at least fifty percent of the cost of inflation risk. The 
NSSS under that arrangement would be faced with a flexible cost responsibility 
towards pension provision. For a scheme such as the NSSS that is at its infancy stage 
and build up stage in terms of asset and reserve built up, it is of paramount importance 
that a large percentage of contributions received are invested in long-term securities 
so as to build a strong financial base for growth and expansion. 
From an employee perspective the NSSS is generally a very generous scheme in so 
far as the employees who would have contributed to the national fund for a short 
period are concerned. For those that would have contributed for periods above twenty 
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years the NSSS is not so generous compared to some of the best private schemes at 
that contribution rate as is shown in table 5.4 below. The estimates in table 5.4 were 
worked by the actuaries from the Zimbabwean Actuaries Society using present rules 
from the NSSS and randomly selected private pension schemes with the given accrual 
rates benefits. A final salary of $5000 is being assumed through out the calculations. 
Another point worth noting here is that for those employees earning low salaries the 
scheme will be less favourable to them for in contribution terms they would be 
contributing almost as much as everybody (because of the maximum cap) yet the 
pension benefits would be salary linked. As has already been said before the NSSS 
normal pension is payable from the age of sixty years and earlier for certain 
professions that are classified as hazardous trades by the government. 
Table 5.4: NSSS pension benefit compared to private schemes; Source: ZAS 







10 $1500 $833 $909 $1000 
20 $1875 $1666 $1818 $2000 
30 $2250 $2250 $2750 $3000 
40 $2625 $3333 $3636 $4000 
5.4 The'NSSS and Economic and Social Development Plan 
The social security programme that Zimbabwe has committed itself into has to be 
interpreted and understood within the wider socio-political and economic framework. 
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It is a specific part of a general programme that the government is implementing to 
attain short-term and long-term goals. The NSSS as a form of social insurance can be 
seen as a crucial weapon through which a government and the country at large can 
achieve political, economic and social development. To understand the relationship of 
the NSSS to these three pillars of a society, it is important that we start by spelling out 
the objectives of each of the three under the government's social and economic 
transformation programme. We cannot discuss every detail of the Zimbabwean 
government's economic and social development in a document of this size, but 
however, we endeavour to capture the relevant salient components below. 
5.4.1 Aims of the economic and social development plans 
The aims and objectives of the government in this area are largely borne out of the 
economic reforms that were first introduced in Zimbabwe in 1990. The basic aims of 
economic reforms are to privatise state enterprises so as to raise revenue and increase 
efficiency in the delivery of certain utilities. The hope and in fact, the spirit behind 
privatisation being to reduce the national treasury burden on under performing public 
utility bodies and in the process to have greater participation of private enterprises and 
individual Zimbabweans in the economic growth and development in the country. In a 
nutshell, the programme is essentially about moving away from a tight regulation and 
having market forces playing a greater role within the government's economic and 
social programme. Today the programme of trade liberalisation and social 
empowerment is being managed and implemented under the government's new 
economic and social transformation programme. 
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The Economic, Political and Social Transformation Programme (ZIMPREST) 
supersede the Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP). The core aims 
and features of the two programmes are the same in many respects. Essentially the 
ZIMPREST is about economic liberalisation and social empowerment of the native 
people of Zimbabwe. For purposes of this report we discuss the broad aims of the 
ZIMPREST that are relevant to this report under three headings, namely economic 
liberalisation, regional development and co-operation under SADC6 and social 
empowerment of the people. 
5.4.1.1 Economic liberalisation 
As already said the economic liberalisation programme dates back to the year 1990 
when the then minister of Finance, Economic Planning and Development introduced 
his "Economic Policy Statement-the Macro-Economic Adjustment and Trade 
Liberalisation" in the House of Assembly. Under the economic liberalisation 
programme the government seeks, amongst other things, to promote economic growth 
rate to at least 5% of the Gross Domestic Product in real terms in the short run. 
Reduction of budget deficit to sustainable levels below 4% in the long run is one of 
the key objectives of the liberalisation programme. Probably more crucially the 
government intends to use borrowed capital for productive investment rather than 
social services. Lastly the other major ambition of the economic liberalisation 
programme is to create an environment conducive to employment creation that is high 
enough to absorb a substantial number of those joining the labour market every year. 
6 Southern African Development Community 
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5.4.1.2 Social empowerment 
From the word go, the government envisaged that the economic reform programme 
will result in some social hardships particularly to those segments that are most 
vulnerable such as are the old-aged, poor, poorly paid workers and so on. With more 
investment targeted towards productive investment rather than social relief 
programmes, the prospects of a general disillusionment with the reforms has remained 
imminent ever since. However, the government in a bid to mitigate the social 
vulnerability of these groups following the implementation of these reforms has come 
up with several measures aimed at improving their financial positions. The most 
crucial steps that the government aims to take are reiterated here. 
The promotion of the informal sector industries is one of the core aims that the 
government intends using to mitigate the financial plight of those likely to be victims 
of the economic reforms. It is however, not very clear how the promotion of the 
informal sectors would be financed. The potential growth of the informal sector is 
itself unclear as it has not been subject of serious investigation at a non- partisan level. 
With the government committed to cutting subsidies on major utilities and social 
services in general, it is the government's hope that by promoting a culture of small- 
holder investment, a new breed of entrepreneurs will emerge with innovative ideas for 
the benefit of the general populace. The other area that the government hopes to use to 
hedge against the adverse effects of the reform programme is in the disposal of state 
utilities to private investors. By giving the locals a preferential consideration ahead of 
the foreign investors the government hopes to empower the local people 
economically. The exact modalities of that preferential treatment are not yet clear. 
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5.4.1.3 Regional development and co-operation 
Opening the Zimbabwean frontiers to foreign investors in areas such as mining, 
manufacturing and financial services is seen by the government not only as a way of 
inviting foreign investment into the economy, but also as a means of furthering the 
objects of SADC in so far as regional co-operation and integration is concerned. 
Through active participation in the activities of the SADC and other international 
organisations, the government hopes that the Zimbabwean business firms will not be 
left out in the development of international trade and industry. The government's 
commitment to minimisation of boarder barriers in so far as the movement of goods 
and human beings is concerned, is an important move in terms of regional integration. 
However in the long run, with SADC social security systems not designed to conform 
to a certain set of minimum standards, there is a risk that the NSSS would be 
overwhelmed by the influx of pensioners from other parts of the region. It would not 
be surprising as such to find a more than disproportionate number of people about to 
retire in the SADC economies opting to retire in Zimbabwe where the old-age 
benefits would be relatively higher and generous in terms of contributions. 
5.4.2 Conflict between the NSSS and the economic and social development aims? 
There are potentially many areas of solidarity and conflict between the NSSS and the 
government's programme of economic and social transformation. First and most 
importantly the NSSS is about giving the workers and their dependants some social 
security through pensions or other such benefits as the invalidity benefits, retirement 
grants and so on. The paradox, however with the economic reform programme, is that 
it is envisaged that it will cause short run insecurity before the fruition of the entire 
programme come to reality and provide sustainable security. The short-run period is 
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vaguely defined. Now looking at the NSSS and the economic reforms, there are at 
least three clear areas where it is difficult to see how the objectives of the national 
scheme can be reconciled with the economic and social transformation programme 
that the government has put in place. 
First and most crucially the concept of informal trading is likely to cause logistical 
problems to the Department of Taxes and the NSSS itself in terms of collecting tax 
contributions. Since the informal sectors that the government is encouraging would be 
generally under minimum or no regulation at all, then one is at loss finding the ways 
or means by which the new informal employers would be whipped into registering 
their employees with the NSSS so as to pay their national insurance contributions. 
Judging from the past experiences and the general displeasure that mankind has with 
paying taxes it would not be surprising if many of these informal sector employees 
evade paying national insurance contributions. The social insecurity that may result 
from such a programme is a matter of guess at the moment. 
That the economic reforms would certainly result in some job losses has already been 
said but that such losses would certainly hit the very heart upon which the NSSS 
structure is based on has not been emphasised. Since there is no statistics or any 
projections of any kind as to the number of job losses or firms likely to close down 
following the introduction of the economic reforms, it is therefore difficult to say with 
reasonable accuracy the extent to which these envisaged mishaps will affect the 
actuarial cost projections that were assumed by the actuaries in drafting the NSSS. 
What is none the less certain is that should economic reforms lead to massive job 
losses or large scale closures of firms, the contributions, essential for the functioning 
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and development of the national scheme as has already been said, would be scaled 
down in terms of volume receivable by the NSSS. It is these uncertainties that raise 
potential and in fact conflict between the national economic and social development 
programme and the NSSS that are a cause for concern when the future of the national 
scheme and the ZIMPREST programme are considered simultaneously. 
The government's decision to run the NSSS as a quasi-government agency rather than 
an independent private scheme conflicts with the government's ultimate aim to reduce 
its responsibility on public utilities and social services in general. If the national 
occupational pension scheme could be run by private pension fund consultants there 
would not be a need to worry about potential government responsibility in paying out 
the promised benefits. If history of public institutions is anything to go by in 
Zimbabwe, then certainly it is not going to be long before the NSSS start calling for 
subsidies from the central treasury department. 
The South African system of old age is totally different from the NSSS since it is a 
PAYG mandatory scheme and the Namibian programme is not comprehensive though 
the preliminary evidence suggests it is most likely that it would be modelled along the 
South African scheme. In the other neighbouring countries there are no developed 
schemes worth talking about at the moment save for the expensive Zambian scheme 
that spends an average of 52% of GDP on old age pensions and other social security 
programmes. That essentially leaves the Zimbabwean and South African schemes as 
the two major financially relevant social security programmes. 
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5.5 The NSSS and the financial markets 
The NSSS has a potential to provide the base for the development and further research 
into social and private insurance risk for the benefit of the entire insurance market in 
the country. With the convergence of the marketing of financial and insurance risk 
getting closer and closer, the NSSS may have to play a greater role in the entire 
financial markets than previously anticipated. The amount of resources at the disposal 
of the national scheme and the scope of operation gives the national scheme a 
theoretical foundation upon which to set the scale of research and development in the 
market. The success of such a programme of research would certainly depend on the 
extent to which the national scheme is to operate and remain non- partisan to the 
government. And in particular, the ruling party's "unofficial interventions" that have, 
of late tainted the image of the once flourishing public institutions such as the post 
and communications that are now making losses despite being monopolies. 
The NSSS can potentially benefit from the establishment of the state's second 
university, the National University of Science and Technology that has introduced 
some insurance and other financial risk management programmes of study. Through 
joint research or other collaborations the two institutions can enjoy mutual benefit in 
both the short and long run. The NSSS can develop into being a reference point and 
market leader in the insurance and financial markets. The size and volume of its 
investment portfolios in fact, if projections are anything to go by, will make the 
national scheme the biggest financial security organisation in the country within the 
next two to five years time. Already in terms of currency contributions received by 
the NSSS, it is slightly above Old Mutual Life Assurance the country's biggest private 
financial institution. 
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5.6 NSSS and income redistribution 
As said in chapter two, the social insurance schemes are viewed by many people as 
the mechanisms by which the national incomes can be redistributed, presumably 
evenly amongst the members of a particular society. Most importantly is the 
distribution of income from the rich to the poor. That argument of redistribution 
makes logic particularly with the pay as you go schemes, but since the NSSS is a 
funded pension fund modelled along side the private pension schemes, it is difficult to 
envisage how the state scheme aims to address that issue. In public the government 
ministers have claimed that the NSSS will help redistribute national income. Other 
than using the controversial Section 27 of the NSSA Act (1989) that says the minister 
may give the general manager of the national scheme directions of a general character 
relating to the exercise by it of its functions as appear to the minister to be requisite in 
the national in interest, there is no other evident way that the scheme can use to direct 
redistribution of national income. Since the Act7 commands that the scheme 
authorities must, with all due expedition, comply with any direction given in terms of 
section 27(l), then certainly that is the only way that is apparent by which the state 
can channel certain resources of the NSSS into the needy areas without breaching law. 
There are many other areas of income redistribution that can be solved by using the 
social insurance principles. The rules of the NSSS in explicit or implicit, do not 
address the need to redistribute income from the young to the old or from men to 
women. On the latter group, as if that is not enough, the national scheme does not 
provide family friendly benefits. For instance the national scheme does not credit the 
working- women for years spent bringing up a family. Because it is almost only 
Ibid. 
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women who are likely to spend years at home looking after a young family, it is 
unfair that the NSSS as a social insurance scheme fails to balance the distribution of 
income between men and women. 
One interesting but controversial area where the NSSS has failed the poor working- 
class workers is in the rate of contribution between employers and employees. 
Levying a higher national insurance rate on conglomerate and other big corporations 
would have been logical bearing in mind not only the size of the profits that they 
make relative to wages bills, but also crucially that these big companies have for 
many years exploited cheap black labour during the segregationist Rhodesia days. 
Rather than the mere 3% levied on employers across the board, a higher percentage of 
say 5% without an upper limit would be a reasonable contribution towards social 
insurance not least that such a move would reflect a positive role in income 
redistribution by the big multi- companies and other such employers. 
5.7 Broader policy issues 
First and most importantly there is a great need for the government to provide strong 
institutions that will support the principles of the NSSS and most importantly realise 
its ultimate goal, that of assuring descent and competitive pension and related benefits 
to Zimbabweans so insured under the national scheme. There are various ways upon 
which that could be achieved. The establishment of independent or promotion of 
charitable organisations with interest in the welfare of the adult population and 
employees in Zimbabwe is crucial for the respectability and involvement of all 
stakeholders in development and growth of the NSSS. To ensure that the NSSS 
develops into a viable occupational pension scheme that will deliver to the people of 
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Zimbabwe, there is need to tighten the accountability of the scheme. It could for 
instance be made accountable to an independent board of professionals representing 
all the major stakeholders in addition to the present accountability to the House of 
Assembly through a government cabinet minister. 
The other crucial consideration that is worth recommending is the need for the 
scheme to expedite in establishing reciprocal agreements with other countries. This is 
not only important in that it would impact directly to one of the core aims of the 
NSSS, that of mobility of employees within the community, but more crucial it will 
help create a standard yard stick of measure to judge the NSSS against the other 
regional and international institutions instituted to provide social security to 
employees and retirees. Above all such a move would be great step towards meeting 
some of the international obligations that Zimbabwe is bound to by virtue of being a 
signatory to certain declarations on workers' social security guarantee. The 
International Labour Office's declarations to which Zimbabwe has committed itself 
are many8. 
5.8 Conclusion 
We have in this chapter of our report reviewed and analysed some salient issues that 
relate to structure, functions and operation of the NSSS within the context of the 
wider economic, political and social environment, both in the local and international 
perspective. We have highlighted and argued that the NSSS has some inherent defects 
that are both of economic and actuarial concern. The comparison between the defined 
benefit and contribution has been done within the perspective of the NSSS. Evidence 
B See Mchena et al (1989) The Zimbabwean Labour laws and the ILO requirements Conference paper 
to mark the workers' day in Zimbabwe 1989 
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from a qualitative perspective suggests that the option not to adopt a defined 
contribution was a serious oversight might return to haunt the authorities of the 
national scheme as the scheme matures with years. The areas of conflict between the 
state's social and economic development plans have also been carefully noted, as are 
the implications of such conflict. In the next chapter we look into the theoretical and 
practical economic issues that are germane to the understanding of occupational 
pension provision and retirement saving from an economic perspective. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
The demand effect of state pensions insurance on the private retirement pension 
provision markets and retirement behaviour 
"Under the pressure of rapidly expanding social security expenditures and along the lines of the 
deregulation movements, a restriction of statutory insurance requirements was proposed by politicians 
and economists. One might ask how the demand for (voluntary purchased) market insurance is 
influenced by the existence of compulsory insurance and how it and individual welfare will be affected 
by a decreasing level of compulsory insurance coverage. "1 
61 Introduction: 
In this chapter we examine the effect of the compulsory state pension scheme on the 
demand for the privately provided schemes. We look at the state pension effect from a 
general lifecycle perspective. In this chapter we consider the role of the state pensions 
insurance, the NSSS, using the empirical data to determine amongst other things 
whether or not there is a direct relationship between state pensions and the private 
schemes. We also look at the effect of the state pensions on the retirement behaviour 
by using the retirement expectations and savings data. The Policy implications of the 
mechanical and philosophical relationship of the NSSS and private schemes are also 
discussed. 
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6.2 The basic life-cycle model 
The basic life-cycle model inarguably simplifies the behaviour of human mankind and 
the way the latter conducts his affairs, more relevantly as it relates to the labour 
income and its disposability over the entire life- time. The rationality behind some of 
the assumptions of course does raise some complex economic questions. There is to 
date no other theory that best simulates the behaviour of mankind over his life cycle 
without attracting criticism. Seeking to extend the basic life-cycle theory to include 
many more variable contents simultaneously invariably leads to other problems, 
particularly those that relate to the interpretation of results. 
The life cycle model in its simplest form entails the household planning its labour 
earnings and consumption over its entire expected life span. The individual household 
is assumed to know the expected duration of their working life2. In the absence of 
other risks or were other risks are separately insured or provided for by the third 
parties, the rational household if risk-averse will seek to smooth its consumption over 
its entire expected life span. If the household knows with certainty its expected 
working life and has no immediate recourse to other sources of income other than that 
earned from working and borrowing from financial institutions at prevailing market 
rates, its ultimate dilemma is how to spread consumption over the entire lifecycle3. 
1 J. M. Grf v. d. Schulenburg (1986) Optimal Insurance Purchasing In the Presence of Compulsory 
Insurance and Uninsurable Risks The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance, 11(No. 38, January 1986) 
2 This argument is corroborated by the assumption that at least the information relating to these issues 
would be generally known or statistical workable. 3 See chapter three for a theoretical framework of the life cycle theory. 
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Figure 6.1 below illustrates a classical lifecycle pattern in a zero bequest model of 
occupational earnings by an ordinary employee as a function of his working life. In 
this simple lifecycle 0 is not the age at birth but the year by which an employee starts 
his working while E denotes the earnings and T is the age at the time of death. 
We have decided to use this specific model in our case for principally three reasons. 
First and foremost the positive bequest model would be in all probabilities very 
irrelevant to the present Zimbabwean set up. It is irrelevant in that the present 
workforce that is the target of our investigation in this report has barely inherited any 
assets of meaningful economic value. The reasons for that being both political and 
economic in that the Zimbabwean economy in its modem form is barely a century old 
and the black work force constituting the bulk of the contingent has been in active 
participation of the descent urban jobs for scarcely fifty years. Because of the short 
time span it would be therefore very unrealistic to try to simulate the Zimbabwean 
savings market within a lifecycle with positive bequest model. 
Secondly we have decided to use this model because it conforms to the general 
observations that the average household disposes its accumulated wealth rapidly 
toward the end of the life cycle. In Zimbabwe the disposed wealth is normally the 
value of the house were one in every three of the heads of the households sell their 
houses at retirement in order to spend the rest of the life hood in a rural home were 
there are presently no title deeds to property held there. The statistics is correct at least 
as per our surveys in preparation of this report. Lastly the zero bequest model suits the 
Zimbabwean scenario in that the average populace has low saving propensity as is 
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evidenced by previous research works into the saving trends of the Zimbabwean 
workforce. At the moment the expected net saving of ordinary workers in Zimbabwe 
over the entire life cycle of a worker is zero. This should not how ever, be confused 
with the positive aggregate fiscal saving that benefits the economy from year to year 







Schlesinger (1986) rightfully makes the following generalisation for a household in a 
perfect market with interest rates fixed at r and the expected working life- time given 
as T: The household's ultimate wish is to maximise lifetime utility that satisfies the 
T 
following identity; U- JU(c(t))e_&tdt. In this identity U is the individual's utility 
0 
function and c(t) is the consumption flow at time t with 8 being the rate of time 
preference and L(t) the leisure flow at time t. With the assumption that utility is 
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strictly concave this simple life-cycle model implies that there would be positive flow 
of consumption and leisure through out the life cycle4. In this model time not spent 
on leisure is spent working for a wage, the same wage that has to be allocated to the 
various unit periods of the household's entire life. 
6.2.1 Demand for pensions within the lifecycle 
The individual demand for a pension has been explained in detail in the previous 
chapters. There are some issues worth reiterating or elaboration or both to make this 
chapter meaningful particularly at this juncture. First, the risk of longevity is of 
concern not only to the individual but also to the state and those close to him or her. 
Without the involvement of the latter two the burden of ensuing a descent life after 
retirement would fall solely on the individual concerned. Thus the ultimate goal 
during one's working life would be to smooth consumption over their entire life. The 
breakdown of the extended family system in many economies for reasons beyond the 
scope of this report, have made individual provision rather a necessity. 
The second issue worth noting is that the endogenous benefit so derived from a 
descent standard of living by a pensioner is a matter of individual satisfaction. The 
individual pensioner thus determines this level of satisfaction. Without other variables 
the level of anticipated satisfaction and other demand factors discussed in chapter 
three will determine the level of demand of pension provision. 
4 Ibid. 
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In chapter three we have discussed the theoretical explanations as to the need, true or 
presumptuous, of the state involvement in the provision of otherwise services that are 
a matter of the individual financial markets. The controversy does not end there. The 
justifiability and/ or otherwise the practical effect of the state participation in the 
provision of services financial or otherwise alongside the private firms is an issue 
worth both economic and academic debate. 
Lastly, the distortion caused by the introduction of the compulsory pension insurance 
to the retirement provision equation attracts a number of key issues that warrant 
discussion at this juncture. To start with the precise relationship between the demand 
for private pension and the state schemes has never before been subject to rigorous 
empirical testing. The available empirical results are not conclusive. There are how 
ever, very sound if not convincing theoretical formulations that explain this otherwise 
complex relationship. Schuleburg (1986) for example proposes an interesting though 
complex model function to explain the effect of compulsory insurance coverage on 
the demand for private market insurance. 
Notwithstanding what we have said so far, the perception of state pensions as a tax or 
insurance contribution is not so obvious. Does the society have a general perception 
about state pensions? Do people consider state pension before they decide to purchase 
private retirement pension plans? After all, is the relationship between state pensions 
and private markets mechanical or philosophical? The framework bordering closely to 
these questions dictates the direction of the rest of this chapter of our report. 
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6.3 The effect of compulsory state pensions on the demand of private pension 
When the simple lifecycle model discussed above is extended with its generalisation 
to the analysis of the effect of compulsory state pensions insurance to the market 
insurance demand, some intricate theoretical observations can invariably be deduced. 
To start with, it is probably rationale to start by viewing the private market insurance 
by extending the arm of assumptions already made to include the following; That the 
household is faced with one risk insurable by one policy and unlimited on the form 
and scope of cover. And that risk being the longevity risk. If the rational household is 
risk averse as already assumed then the following deductions are true with regard to 
pensions insurance purchase; if the premium exceeds the expected pension benefit by 
a proportional or risk dependant factor, it is sub- optimal to buy full insurance. 
Secondly full insurance or no insurance at all will be bought if the loading factor is 
fixed. Thirdly if the loading factor is proportional to the expected insurance benefits 
the excess is the optimal cost sharing arrangement from the individual household 
point of view5. These generalisations attract some functionality criticisms in so far as 
the human behaviour is not so simplistic though of course rational in cases that merit 
analysis and reasoning. In the rest of the chapter we assume this rationality and 
observations hitherto to insurance buying behaviour. 
s These deductions have been made using observations by Schulenburg (1986) "Optimal insurance 
purchasing in the presence of compulsory insurance and uninsurable risks" The Geneva papers on risk 
and insurance, 11 (number 38, January 1986). 
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6.3.1 Effect of the state pensions on the middle class workers 
We had a usable population sample size of two hundred and forty in this group of 
employees. The middle class workers are basically of two backgrounds, that is those 
that have risen through the ranks to become who they are and those learned and 
skilled workers, most with university degrees or other tertiary education qualification. 
We find that on average more than 70% of all respondents had a formal qualification 
while 30% reported that they did not have any formal or professional qualification. Of 
those with formal qualifications, at least 60% said had university degrees of which 
20% said had post- graduate qualifications. The average starting age for full 
employment is found to be 24 years in this cohort. Table 6.1 below shows the basic 
information about the background of the middle class employees that were contacted 
as part of this research. 
Table 6.1 Middle class employees background information 
Key: OH = Own home, RH = Rent a home, M= married, S= Single, A20-30 = 
Age 20 to 30 years, A31-40 = Age 31 years to 40 years, A41-50 = Age 41 years to 
50 years, A51 = Age 51 years and above, FQ = Formal qualification and NFQ = 
No formal qualification 
OH RH M S A20-30 A31-40 A41-50 A51+ FQ NFQ 
Males 97 47 105 39 38 32 39 35 98 46 
Females 60 36 51 45 30 35 20 11 70 26 
Total 157 83 156 84 68 67 59 46 168 72 
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A significant percentage of 24% of those with degrees report that they revisited their 
retirement plans soon after the introduction of the NSSS. They report that they did 
consult their pensions agents immediately after the national scheme was introduced. 
Of the 24 `% that consulted their agents after the introduction of NSSS at least 69% 
revised their sums assured leading to higher monthly contributions to their private 
retirement schemes. Figure 6.2 shows the distribution of the immediate aftermath 
reaction of the middle class following the introduction of the NSSS. The long-term 
considerations show some slight variations from the intuitive reactions that the people 
did or thought of doing following the introduction of the compulsory national scheme. 
In the rest of this section we look at the perceptions that have been built over the 
entire life of the NSSS following its establishment in the Zimbabwean market. 
©Contacted their agents 
"Wait and see 




The level of educational qualification has a significant contribution effect to the over 
all perception conceived by all the respondents to the relevance of state pensions in 
making their retirement plans. We find that by excluding those respondents without 
graduate qualifications from our sample, the percentage of respondents disregarding 
state pensions before considering buying a retirement plan increased very 
significantly. Table 6.2 shows the statistical relation between having a formal 
qualification and disregarding the NSSS while planning for one's retirement. The 
results are drawn from the responses to question 1(c) of part two of the survey 
questionnaire sent to this cohort. The results are suggestive that the educated middle- 
class do not consider state retirement provision to be a significantly influential or 
relevant retirement plan. The general observation that the middle class is always 
critical of government plans may explain the adverse view that is held by the middle 
class. This theory is in fact enhanced by our observation that, despite the high and 
significant percentage of respondents here not fully informed, or aware of the benefit 
formulae used in the NSSS, many still felt that the state scheme was not a variable in 
so far as determining their retirement saving plans was concerned. 
Table 6.2: Responses to NSSS as a factor to retirement plan options 
NSSS would be a strong factor before 
purchasing a retirement plan 
AG SAG DAG SDAG DK 
Females with formal qualification 10 4 15 35 6 
Males with formal qualification 13 8 23 50 4 
Total from sample 23 12 38 85 10 
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Key: AG = Agree, SAG =Strongly agree, DAG = Disagree, SDAG = Strongly 
disagree, DK 
= don't know. 
The most common comment made by the graduate respondents is that state pension 
insurance contributions is but one of the many forms of tax. This was mainly from 
responses to question 8(3) of the survey. The general conviction in this group is that 
there is no security perceived from being a member of a national scheme. The notion 
of the state pension scheme being a social relief fund was said by a significant number 
of respondents in this group. This could explain the low value that is being attached to 
the national scheme by this other wise prestigious and prosperous class in Zimbabwe. 
The class pride may partly explain the reasons as to why this cohort distinguishes it- 
self by not appreciating national scheme membership. 
Interesting enough, a very significant number of respondents in this cohort have never 
before bothered to work out how much state pension they would be entitled to in the 
event of them retiring at state pension age with rules unchanged. This total disregard 
of the state pension mystifies the argument that state pensions reduce positive demand 
for the private pensions. That is of course with regard to the educated middle class 
that feels more valued by the private providers of pension insurance. The generality 
does not hold for everybody as is discussed below. The observations to this pattern 
were largely drawn from responses to question 14(a) in part two of the questionnaire 
used in this target group. Table 6.3 below shows the breakdown of the responses to 
the question; "If you were to be entitled to a benefit payable under the NSSS, will you 
be able to calculate on your own how much benefit you are entitled to? " 
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Table 6.3: Workers' ability to calculate benefits payable under the NSSS 
Able to calculate NSSS benefits? Yes No 
FQ NFQ FQ NFQ 
Males 44 28 54 18 
Females 18 10 52 16 
Sample population 25.8%% 15.8% 44.2%% 14.2% 
Key: FQ = Formal qualification, NFQ = No formal qualification 
The content or high regard of state pension by those without graduate qualifications is 
not so obvious to explain but could be explained by some complex sociological 
factors beyond the scope of this report. Without offending intentions, one may not be 
wrong to suggest that amongst the reasons, it could be that the less academic inclined 
are more trusting of state or less critique of the state or both. Of the respondents with 
no graduate qualification, at least 6% reported that they had or would consider the 
value of state pensions before considering increasing their spending on old age 
provision. 
The behaviour of the middle class employees without graduate qualification towards 
state pensions could also be explained by the close correlation that is there between 
the " have no degree" and owning or intending to retire in a communal home. That 
most of the non- graduates intend to retire into the communal lands where the cost of 
living is comparatively very low could explain again why they, on marginal terms, 
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value state pension that is given modest appreciation by the more scholarly "have 
degrees" cohort. There is however no obvious explanation as to why the have not 
should prefer a rural retirement to urban retirement. Some other complex sociological 
models that are certainly beyond our study could explain this puzzle of retirement 
behaviour that we have observed. 

















When the value of total real wealth, exclusive of the pensions wealth, is contrasted 
against the given expected point retirement ages we realise that there is a strong 
statistical relation between expected retirement year and size of wealth accumulated. 
That is those with relative higher portfolios of wealth expect to retire earlier than 
those with modest wealth. The inclusion of state pensions in the equation of analysis 
makes no meaningful difference at all. 
The point that is none the less clear is that the private insurers and other pension 
schemes have a market that is undeterred by the presence of a national scheme in the 
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educated middle class workers. The overall effect of the state scheme on the middle 
class workers in so far as the demand for private pension is concerned is one of 
positive contribution. That view is cemented by the general observation that despite 
some relative content with a national scheme by those without university degrees, 
there is no indication that their attitude towards buying private pensions has been 
adversely affected. 
6.3.2 Demand effect of the state pensions on the working-class 
The bulk of the Zimbabwean labour force comprises mostly of these ordinary 
workers. The average earnings are very low compared to the middle class earnings. 
The average starting age for full time employment in this cohort is relatively low at 
seventeen years. By virtue of their early starting age into full time employment one 
would expect this cohort to have more years to contribute towards their retirement 
provisions. The results of our survey, however, seem not to support that hypothesis. 
There is for example clear evidence that most of the respondents in this group become 
more conscious of their retirement needs at the age of 40 years compared to 30 years 
reported by the middle class workers. 
The introduction of the state pension in Zimbabwe had an awareness effect to at least 
15% of the ordinary workers who had previously not heard of a retirement provision 
scheme. A significant percentage, 65% of the 15%, went on to inquire about private 
retirement plans after. That is a positive influence that the state scheme undoubtedly 
has had on the ordinary employee. Cagan (1965) made a related observation when 
investigating the effect of pension plans on aggregate saving. Interesting though with 
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our survey is that ironically those with positive response that led to policy issuing 
cancelled their new find insurance policies within a short period of time citing 
affordability problems of the insurance premiums. 
There is a close statistical relation between the age and positive response to the 
introduction of the national scheme not least that almost all the entire 15% that had 
first heard of a retirement plan through the national plan and had an awareness effect 
were in ages above 40 years. There are various explanations that can be made of this 
latency by the younger generation. The dormancy from the lower ages could be a 
result of that people, in particular the less educated, tend to be aware of the risks they 
face when thy get closer to the risks themselves. The differences in risk taking 
behaviour by the different social classes could well explain this generality being 
made. The depth of this argument is beyond the scope of this report but interesting 
readings could be found in risk-taking psychology texts6. 
Table 6.4 shows the foundation background to the usable sample of three hundred and 
sixty three respondents. The rest of the statistical details are available as appendix to 
this report and this table and others that follow should be interpreted within the 
context of the wider statistics in the appendix. 
6 See any good text book on risk taking behaviour and psychology 
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Table 6.4 Background statistics to the working-class employees. 
OH RH M S A17-A19 A20-A30 A31-A40 A41-A50 A51+ 
Males-FQ 6 4 3 7 0 2 6 1 1 
Males-NFQ 80 98 93 85 13 33 49 36 47 
Females-FQ 4 3 0 7 0 4 2 1 0 
Females-NFQ 58 110 88 80 11 42 57 37 21 
Total 148 215 179 24 81 114 75 69 
Key: OH= Own home, RH= Rent home, M= Male, F= Female, FQ= Formal 
qualification, NFQ= No formal qualification, A15-A19 = Age 15 to 19 years, A20- 
A30 = Age 20 to 30 years, 31-A40 = Age 31 to 40 years, A41-A50, A51+ = Age 51 
years and above. 
The responses to question 1(c) of the survey questionnaire make an interesting 
observation. A very significant number of people in this cohort reported that they 
would consider the existence of the NSSS before making a private pensions purchase. 
This contrasts dramatically with the observations made in the preceding section by the 
middle-income earners. As can be seen in table 6.5, there are a lot of respondents who 
agree with the statement. This could be used as a justification to the thesis that the 
markets for middle-income pension consumers are different from the low-earners' 
markets. However the number of people reporting that they "don't know" is quite big 
accounting for more than 19% of the sample size. 
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Table 6.5: NSSS as a factor in pensions purchasing 
NSSS would be a strong factor before 
purchasing a pension 
AG SAG DAG SDAG DK 
Females with formal qualification 2 2 2 0 1 
Females without formal qualification 74 57 16 10 11 
Males with formal qualification 3 1 0 1 5 
Males without formal qualification 60 29 25 11 53 
Key: AG = agree, SAG = strongly agree, DAG = disagree, SDAG = strongly 
disagree and DK = don't know. 
In question 14(a) the respondents were asked about their ability to use benefit 
formulae to work out their benefit entitlements. As the results in table 6.6 show, there 
was a large proportion of employees who answered in the negative. The various 
formulae used to work out different benefit entitlements under the national scheme 
were perceived as being too complicated by most of the people in this group. The 
wide inability to work out future benefits hardly explains the attitude of employees in 
this group to pensions insurance. With most people being unable to workout their 
benefit entitlements, questions have to be asked as to how positive ability would 
affect the ultimate demand of state and private pensions. And most importantly how 
the state can intervene to redress that anomaly. In theory, however, it is logical to 
expect employees to make more informed choices if they can work out expected 
benefits. If the benefits were to be perceived as being worth the premiums paid, the 
resulting effect would most likely be positive. On the other hand, if the employees 
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were to be able to work out their benefit entitlements and found the premiums to 
unworthy the benefits, the effect would be a negative demand. 
Table 6.6 Low-earners' ability to apply NSSS benefit rules 
Able to work out NSSS benefits YES NO 
using relevant formulae FQ NFQ FQ NFQ 
Females 4 23 3 145 
Males 6 44 4 134 
Percentage of sample 2.7 18.5 1.9 76.9 
The most common comment mentioned under the complementary question to 14(a) 
was the inflexibility of commutation of pension benefits. Because of that, we found it 
important to comment briefly on that aspect of pensions. The inflexibility of the 
pension schemes adversely affects the demand requirement for the younger ordinary 
workers. A very common point of wary made by the respondents in this cohort is the 
unfair rigidity imposed by the retirement age requirements. With the uncertainty of 
one's health condition in the light of HIV and related infections, the younger 
generation has a legitimate fear of being short changed by insuring themselves against 
the longevity risk when it is almost obvious that there is a realistic chance that they 
live to live not that long. The recent United Nations report on population trends 
estimates that more than 20% of the current 15 year olds in Africa south of the Sahara 
will not live to see their 40th birth days due to AIDS. 
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Not withstanding the views and of course the comments made above, it is not wrong 
to suggest that the AIDS wave effect has skewed the natural life cycle so much that 
the same observations that we are making today would not have held true had the 
national scheme been introduced say 30 years ago. While the pension plans are 
designed with a life cycle going beyond the ages of sixties and seventies, few of the 
young work force can expect to live beyond their sixties let alone the seventies. That 
the ordinary workers of less educational attainment would almost certainly have a 
poor investment to their own health security is common sense. But that consequent to 
it follows the sub conscience not to invest in the insurance against long- term risks, 
such as the longevity risk need not be overemphasised. Below we show the 
perceptual change in the normal working life cycle of an ordinary young employee. 
Our figure 6.4 recognises the factual shortened working and life expectancy as a result 
of the uncertainty caused by the HIV epidemic in Zimbabwe. 
E ings 
0 
T TT Age 
Figure 6.4 
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In figure 6.4 above the curve culminating at T may be construed as the new life cycle 
with a shorter life span as perceived by the young employees most at risk of the HIV 
related infections while TT denotes the conventional cycle constructed using old 
mortality tables that do not take the cognisance of the AIDS threat. The pensions 
insurance policy insures the risk of living beyond the TT period when the perceived 
active working life ends at T. The difference between TT and T shows the degree of 
divergence in the life horizon from the perspective of the young employees and that 
perceived by the state in coming up with a state pension age. The more realistic the 
life cycle horizons as depicted by the closeness of the points of contact T and TT, the 
more relevant the state annuity to the demand requirements. That both the private and 
state schemes have sixty years, (for both men and women) as retirement age by 
which full pension rights can be drawn7 could possibly be an explanation to the puzzle 
of silence to the introduction of a national scheme by the younger generation. That 
would be seen as collaborating our earlier suggestion that the less affluent and 
uneducated workers would tend to have less forward planning and thus try to deal 
with risks as they get to the relevant risk hurdles. While we acknowledge that the 
rational concept of the economics of insurance requires that those least able to 
shoulder risks must seek to share or pool their risks, it is sad to note that in real 
practical life, it is those that are financially least capable to absorb the risks that rarely 
bother to take insurance cover. 
7 Note however, that the NSSS has a provision for earlier retirement with full pension credits for 
hazardous occupations such as bus driving, miners and so on. 
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The notion of the life cycle horizons being out side the conceptual old age insurance 
requirements is further supported by the observations we make about the significant 
percentage of the respondents in the lower ages stratum reporting "don't know" in 
response to the questions: When do you expect to retire from active employment? 
And " are you physically fit and healthy? Disney and Turner (1999) in their paper, 
"What can we learn from retirement expectations data? " make an interesting analysis 
and theoretical suggestions about don't know responses. They in fact, argue that 
"don't know" may be a rational response when individuals face greater uncertainty 
over their retirement date. Their argument centres on that those most uncertain about 
their intended retirement dates are most likely to report a "don't know" response to a 
question seeking a point answer. They also provide evidence that we find credible to 
support that hypothesis. That at least 10% of our male respondents in this cohort 
reported that they did not know when they expected to retire while a significant 23% 
reported that they did not know whether they were physically fit and healthy gives a 
theoretical foundation for suggesting that a realisable percentage of people have 
difficulty with forward planning for reasons of uncertainty about their health statuses. 
Rather than dismissing these people as uninformed it may be beneficial to commit 
investigations into understanding the social dimensions of this unique stratum of 
employees. 
The responses to question 9(b) about the expected retirement ages make a good 
reading. The percentage of women reporting that they did not know when they 
expected to retire was inexplicably higher than that for men at 19%. The uncertainty 
about future marital statuses that is itself an important forward planning variable may 
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explain this discrepancy bete een men and women. At least 25'-o more women than 
men reported that they did not know whether they were physically fit and healthy. It is 
not obvious wwhý stich a bid: percentage of women would have doubts or uncertainty 
about their health statuses. It may be that female members of the society feel 
vulnerable to many health risks or have a general less confidence in their health 
status. The AIDS %%ave current s%%eeping severely in Sub Saharan Africa cannot be 
ruled out as factor influencing the self- assessment. These figures in fact make 
interesting similarities %%ith the UN estimates and projections of infected people in 
Zimhabý%e. 
Expected retirement apes 
Figure 6.5 
It must be noted that in figure 6.5 W in the retirement age shows that the sample 
referred to is that of females. That is for example "Age55 W" stands for retirement 
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Probably most importantly in this section, we are not absolute as to the actual factor 
contribution, of the "don't know" response to the overall demand for pensions 
insurance. How ever, what can be said with utmost certainty is that this variable 
affects a significant percentage of the population. The uncertainty about expected 
survival chances to retirement age owing to uncertainty about one's health or physical 
status of individuals may trigger a "don't know" response. Those confident of their 
physical and health status are likely to report their expected retirement ages. And it is 
those confident of their health status that would certainly endeavour to make a split 
reaction to the stimulus brought about by a retirement provision instrument into their 
life cycle plans. The certainty about one's health and physical fitness may imply 
confidence in living a full life cycle hence need to respond to futuristic predictions on 
factors likely to affect certain specific points within the life cycle. 
6.3.3 Effect of state pensions on the occupational pension schemes 
The state pensions insurance and occupational pensions have a lot in common that 
stretch beyond the ordinary similarities that most ordinary readers may envisage. The 
political and economic philosophies behind the two schemes have already been noted 
in chapters three and four. The degree of conflict and rivalry in the two instruments 
both seeking to alleviate old- age suffering emanating from incapacity to provide for 
one-self as a result of old age has been discussed before by various scholars and 
commentators. As was noted in chapters three and four there is a lot of controversy 
and conflicting theories about the role of the state in so far as the provision of 
retirement schemes is concerned. The correct role of the state in the provision of 
pensions insurance, factual or perceptual is a matter of individual philosophy. That 
201 
there is an inextricable puzzle of both economic and political nature emanating from 
state roles in pensions provision has already been discussed. And so has been the view 
that there is no infallible methodical theory to test the economic relationship between 
the state schemes and private markets. 
Speaking in 1963 at the company's staff annual conference the Legal and General 
manager said, 
" The fundamental question is whether we are to regard the state as a partner 
or competitor. For my part I still cling to my original opinion that this package 
of legislation provided and continues to provide a springboard for new 
business. "s 
This relatively unknown to many quotation that was adopted by professor Leslie 
Hannah from private Legal and General documents shows that the perplexity 
surrounding the state and private markets is an old debate. It is further evidence that 
while the state schemes may be seen as rivalry competitors to some they are the basis 
for new challenges and business opportunities. The same diversity of opinion and 
change of fortune following the introduction of state pensions insurance can be seen 
in the Zimbabwean markets as we argue below. 
6.3.3.1 Reduction in pension contributions 
Prior to the introduction of the NSSS the average pension contribution as a percentage 
of an employee's salary was about 7.5 %. We note that after the introduction of the 
1 Adopted from professor Leslie Bannah (1986) "Inventing retirement: The development of 
Occupational pensions in Britain. " Cambridge University Pres Cambridge page 46 
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national scheme the contribution rate declined by an equivalent of almost 1.5% that is 
much lower than the mandatory 3% contribution to the national scheme per each 
employee and employer. The reduction was evidently done mechanistically following 
the recommendations made by the actuaries. This mechanical shift of the consumption 
line must be distinguished from a consumption shift prompted by the preferential taste 
when two or more goods are on offer in a market. We have no doubt what so ever that 
there is clear evidence that the almost matching reduction in pension contribution to 
the occupational schemes does not reflect the perceptual value attached to the 
occupational schemes vis-ä-vis the NSSS by members. A closer analysis of the 
contribution trends, though not absolutely conclusive, taking into account the sample 
size under examination, suggests that members of the occupational pension schemes 
on moderate or relatively low incomes have had to reduce their contributions to the 
company sponsored occupational pension schemes by an average of 2.5%. On the 
other end those on management and other high- income brackets appear to be 
contributing far less than the mandatory 3% of their salaries and in fact, contribute an 
average of 1.2% or less of their salaries. 
Tables 6.7 and 6.8 show the average amount spent between the state scheme and the 
company- sponsored for moderate and high- income earners respectively. As can be 
seen from table 6.4 the % spent on national pension scheme decreases as an inverse of 
the salary increment. We have argued in the previous section that the lowly paid 
workers place so much value to the state pension scheme that it almost certainly has 
an influence in their retirement plans as for example evidenced by the coincidence of 
intending to retire at the age of sixty-five years, the state pension age. This 
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phenomenon of having national insurance contributions being a substantial burden to 
the ordinary workforce is not peculiar to the Zimbabwean experience. And so is the 
substantial pension benefit perceived from the state scheme membership. That is 
particularly so for those on modest income. Many of the British occupational pension 
schemes, did for example, reduce the contribution or benefit levels for the lowly paid 
after the 1925 Pensions Act. That is how ever, contrary to the experiences of the 
professionals who had joined firms of employment after having been enticed or lured 
by lucrative retirement packages offered by the company sponsored occupational 
schemes. The same trend exacts itself in the Zimbabwean market though of course at 
a different scale. By comparing table 6.7 and table 6.8 the argument becomes very 
vivid. 
The demand effect of the state scheme on the private occupational schemes varies 
across the workforce. The variance is generally of two fold. It is very significant in 
the negative to the demand for private occupational schemes within the lines of the 
modest earners. But because of the insignificance, both in terms of contribution and 
benefits envisaged in the end by the high earners, the state scheme has little or no 
effect at all to the higher income bracket earners' overall contribution to the company 
sponsored private occupational pension schemes. This view is further corroborated by 
the response to the questions by the high- income earners in the questionnaire to the 
questions seeking their views on whether they perceived state scheme to be value for 
money. This point has already been discussed above. 
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NB Occupational in tables 6.7 and 6.8 is the pension sponsored by the employers and 
% proportion referees to the number of observations as a% of the whole sample. 
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Table 6.7: Working-class workers' average pension contributions as a percentage of 
occupational earnings incomes. 
Salary range NSSS Occupational Observations. % Proportion 
525000-$30000 3% 0 74 20.39 
S30000-S35000 3% 0 65 17.91 
$35000_S40000 3% 0 38 10.47 
S40000-S45000 3% 0 35 9.64 
$45000-$50000 3% 0 23 6.34 
S50000-S55000 2.74% 0 20 5.51 
$55000-$60000 2.5% 0 48 13.22 
$60000-$65000 2.5% 5% 18 4.96 
$60000465000 2.5% 5% 15 4.13 
$65000-570000 2.5% 6.5% 14 3.86 
S70000-S75000 1.99% 6.5% 13 3.58 
$75000-$80000 1.86 0 0 0 
The aggregate effect of the marginal reductions in pension contributions on the of the 
occupational pension schemes seem not to match the far out cry that was made by the 
various market commentators when the news of the compulsory, state scheme were 
first entering the market circles. It may be too early to make conclusive judgements 
about the relationship between the state scheme and the private occupational pension 
schemes, as the current effects are more mechanistically induced than gradual 
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philosophical apprehension. That does not how ever invalidate the point observation 
results that we make. The important contribution that ought be deduced from these 
results is the physical human response to the introduction of a third force variable to 
the life cycle retirement provision. This is as such distinguishable from a gradual 
economic response instituted by natural risk response aversion that all rational human 
beings are perceived to have. 
Table 6.8: Middle-class workers' average pension contributions as a percentage of 
occupational earnings 
Salary range NSSS Occupational Observations %Proportion 
$75000-S85000 1.8% 6.5 30 11.9 
$86000495000 1.59 6.5 25 9.92 
$960004105000 1.43 6.5 42 16.67 
$106000-$115000 1.3 7.5 39 15.48 
S1160004125000 1.2 7.5 36 14.29 
$126000-$135000 1.1 7.5 38 15.1 
$136000-S145000 1.02 8 24 9.52 
$146000-$155000 0.96 8 18 7.14 
As can be deduced from table 6.8 above the national insurance contributions as a 
percentage of salary would have increased to really insignificant levels had we 
included above average middle income earners. Not surprisingly therefore that the 
issue of national insurance in the present fonn is subject of interest to the least paid 
members of the society. 
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6.3.3.2 Reduction in benefit levels 
The occupational pension schemes that felt that they could not absorb the shock effect 
of the introduction of the compulsory state pension as already said above had to either 
cut pension benefits or reduce contribution rates by members. The reduction in 
contribution rates has already been discussed above and now our focus is on the 
benefit puzzle resulting from the imposed state scheme. Evidence at hand suggests 
that the good performing occupational pension schemes despite reducing contribution 
rates still retain the same benefit rules un- amended. That is the benefit formulae were 
maintained at the old scheme rules. The occupational schemes that how ever, felt that 
the cost of retaining the pre-NSSS benefit formulae was unsustainable amended their 
formulae. The most common amongst the final salary schemes that are becoming 
increasingly the most dominant in the market was to change the % of final salary. 
That is instead of using say 3% of final salary, trustees on the advise of scheme 
actuaries considered other percentages such as say 2.4% or 2% and so on. 
The consultation is not yet over at the time of writing of this report. There are some 
fence sitters who despite the fact that more than seven years has elapsed since the 
state scheme came into the market have not yet decided as to the course of action to 
take. The options at stake involve amongst others going back to the old benefit 
formulae that are less attractive and generous as is the final salary formulae. This 
would be of course be a negative progression in the pensions business so much that 
the perceived value of private pension wealth may be affected adversely leading to a 
perceptual decline in the demand for this branch of pension provision. 
6.3.4 Effect of state pensions on private personal pension scheme firms 
The personal pensions as said already are money purchase schemes. The concept of 
personal pension schemes is borrowed from the British market. The concept of 
personal pensions is in essence about individuals being responsible for their 
retirement plans rather than putting the burden on the employers and the government. 
It is in actual fact part of the wider pensions liberation programmes aimed at relieving 
the states of the pensions burden. The spirit behind the personal pensions is that 
members must have a greater say in the design and administration of their retirement 
plans. The present British government green paper on individual pension stake 
holders is in favour of creating an environment that allows individual policy holders 
greater say even on the investment portfolios. That is having a greater say in deciding 
were and when their portfolios are invested9. 
This niche of the pension provision is itself not fully developed and hence the 
difficulty in making a thorough and very reliable analysis. The miss selling scandal of 
personal pensions in Britain did not do any good towards the growth of this relatively 
new product in the pensions markets. In Zimbabwe in particular, the size of the 
market that can potentially benefit from the development of this new development is 
quite small and so small that that it is hardly a force in the pensions and insurance 
9 For a detailed account of government plans on individual pension stake holders see this year's British 
government green paper on pensions 
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markets. The absence of tax incentives and other obstacles we mention in chapter four 
have also hindered the growth of the personal pensions in Zimbabwe. 
The puzzle that emerges is how the emergence of the compulsory state pension 
scheme affected the demand of this otherwise troubled from- inception product. It is 
as such difficult to argue how the state scheme has affected the personal pensions 
without attracting possible criticism. Below we discuss some of the conceptual trouble 
sports that we find to be relevant in this report. 
Not withstanding what I have already said about personal pensions, I can draw certain 
or otherwise general and specific issues worth noting in so far as the demand of this 
branch of retirement provision is concerned. Unlike the state scheme and other 
company sponsored occupational pension schemes first introduced as compulsory 
institutions for specific categories of employees, the personal pension has never 
before been a compulsory saving vehicle. The absence of compulsion factor may to 
some extent, explain the lack of induced demand as is found in other compulsory 
insurance instruments as is for instance found in public liability or motor insurance 
policies. In an economy such as Zimbabwe where information asymmetry is a 
problem, the introduction of a compulsory scheme may not be of relevance in so far 
as the general populace is concerned. That is more so bearing into account the level of 
literacy and market efficiency in so far as dispersing information to the target market 
is concerned. The old economic observation that the business of oranges would not 
flourish if consumers cannot distinguish between lemons and oranges would thus 
prevail in the Zimbabwean context. We take this stance of argument for primarily that 
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we observe from our survey results that when we compound our results after having 
discarded the educational variable, the level of awareness and differences in levels of 
pension design and benefits falls to very low and rather insignificant levels. 
Related to what we have said above, the market maturity level has not advanced so 
much that it can create demand were there is no demand and induce demand were 
there is latency. The fact that despite the apparent breakdown of extended family 
systems for reasons beyond our scope of study, longevity risk is not yet a problem in 
Zimbabwe the same way it is in say the United Kingdom or France makes personal 
demand for personal pensions superfluous to the average employee. That is of course 
not withstanding the fact that the circumstances that led the London government to 
encourage the development of personal pensions do not necessarily prevail in 
Zimbabwe. As the state pensions continue to mature and the potential debt problem 
that we discussed in chapter four becomes apparent and unsustainable a need for 
personal pensions may also become very apparent and inevitable. 
We discuss the subject of personal saving in Zimbabwe in detail in the next chapter. 
We however, hope that this brief review of personal pensions will form a substantial 
part of the understanding of the individual personal saving in Zimbabwe. And most 
importantly why we do not discuss personal pensions as an important saving vehicle 
in Zimbabwe in the coming chapter. 
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6.3.5 Demand effect of the state pensions on the financial market in general 
The introduction of the NSSS to the Zimbabwean financial market appears not to 
have had any strong negative effects to the financial market as was first perceived 
when the scheme was being introduced. There were for example fears of that the 
national scheme was going to force the private firms out of business and domestic- 
over investment into certain areas. There is hardly any ample evidence to justify those 
fears or any indication that that may happen in future. These fears if ever they have 
affected the market in the negative then the market has certainly responded in the 
positive. 
The analysis of the returns from the insurance firms to the commissioner and of those 
from the company schemes to the registrar of pension and provident funds show a 
substantial increase of an average of 20% in the amount spent on advertising and 
branding of the traditional long-term insurance and pensions products. That increase 
is matched by an even higher growth in premiums collected and new business. 
We also note that coincidental the post state scheme has seen a much aggressive style 
of marketing most notably involving a new breed of graduate marketing executives 
and most conspicuous are those from the new state university, the National University 
of Science and Technology. The graduate marketing executives have undoubtedly 
brought with them a new style and flavour of marketing in the life assurance and 
pensions business. The sophistication in management brought about by these graduate 
executives has undoubtedly offset somehow the possible decline in demand of the 
traditional retirement saving instruments. There is how ever no clear or obvious knock 
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on effect to the demand of other financial instruments outside the insurance and 
pensions markets. Because of that it is thus credible to assume that the state pension 
scheme has no credible effect on the demand for other market saving instruments such 
as for example Savings Accounts, Mortgages and so on. This line of argument must 
however, not be misconstrued to imply that the state pension scheme will perpetually 
have no effect on the future demand for other financial saving instruments. 
6.4 Broader observations and wider policy issues 
While the state scheme is a force to reckon with in the Zimbabwean financial markets 
by virtue of the size of the fund and monthly contributions going to the fund, there is 
little evidence to suggest that it has monstrously affected the demand behaviour for 
the financial consumers serve for the particularly lowly paid to whom the state 
contributions and benefits there of are a considerable value. Because of that it would 
be uncalled for in this era to have a blanket policy towards the state scheme and the 
private pension schemes. The policy of pensions should instead be one that takes into 
cognisance the economic and social diversity of the needs of the recipients of the 
benefits of such a policy. There are various opportunities as are approaches upon 
which that could be achieved and many a number of opposing forces. In this section 
of our report we discuss some of the opportunities and challenges that the policy 
makers face with regard to introducing a positive demand and sustainable pensions 
policy. 
First and foremost the demand effect of the state pensions to the Zimbabwean 
pensions market must be understood from a historical perspective. That there is no 
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evidence to suggest overwhelming demand for pensions provision unmet by market 
supply prior and after the introduction of NSSS does not need further emphasis. That 
the national scheme was literally imposed to the retirement and saving plans of the 
workforce is obvious. Less so is the fact that identity and image of the state scheme 
has created a false sense of threat to the existing demand equation of the participants 
that matter most in the market. Ironically it is this false sense of threat that has in 
some cases led to the revision of corporate strategies in the pensions market leading to 
new and most efficient ways of pension provision. 
It was our observation that in light of the evidence at hand, it was a rushed decision by 
those private pension schemes who went on to reduce pension contribution rates of 
their members following the introduction of the national scheme. That blame does not 
absolve those who reduced benefit rates either. The upper cap set at $1440 has not 
changed since inception of the national scheme despite the enormity increase of 
salaries and inflation in recent years. The absolute figure of $1440 was certainly a 
significant amount as a percentage of emoluments at the time the national scheme was 
launched in 1993 but its significance as a deduction from the payroll has diminished 
severely and particularly to the middle and high- income earners. The corporate 
policy strategists of the private occupational pension schemes would as such be doing 
invaluable service to the scheme members and trustees alike if they could take 
advantage of this weakness in the state scheme. That may for instance involve the 
corporate strategists of the occupational pension schemes adopting more flexible 
contribution policy that may allow for variation in contribution rates defined as a 
function of the state scheme contribution policy. As another alternative it may be 
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worthwhile on the part of the state scheme to do away with the upper limit cap and 
instead introduce a salary or earnings linked index. Nonetheless the present low cap is 
to the advantage of the private schemes. 
The restriction variable caused by the upper limit to contribution into the national 
scheme raises the fundamental question of how secure the national scheme is. The 
state by not regularly reviewing the upper limit for the national insurance contribution 
is creating a potentially disastrous debt that is likely to cause income insecurity rather 
than security to the future pensioners. That is so, for the NSSS promises very 
generous pension payments, as is evidenced by the benefit formulae to be used in 
calculating such benefits. 
It is a general observation, that despite the increasing competition and complexity in 
the pensions market world- wide, the Zimbabwean firms that underwrite pensions and 
self- administered pension funds continue to play the traditional role that they were 
set to play many years ago. That is they continue to deal in monolithic products 
wherein the assurance firms sell life assurance related policies and pensions without 
necessarily venturing into other financial trading options. The self-administered 
schemes despite the present statutory constraints that limit their scope of manoeuvre 
in so far as what they can and can- not do is concerned show little evidence that they 
are doing enough in political lobby that may lead to loosening of strings in their 
activities. Rather than the self-administered schemes being exclusive to the 
sponsoring firm's employees, a lot in the form of economic benefit could be attained. 
Most importantly such schemes could enjoy the economies of scale never before 
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exploited. Through shrewd and optimal product mix such private schemes can 
provoke and ensure that there is a constant demand for the relevant and affordable 
pensions insurance. 
Banc-assurance is yet to form part of the Zimbabwean financial markets vocabulary. 
Unlike in the United Kingdom and those relatively advanced western European 
economies there is scarcely a bank that manages a pension fund in the Zimbabwean 
market. If the growth of the British pension funds managed by banks is anything to go 
by then certainly it is time that the financial regulators in Zimbabwe started to 
consider loosening their regulatory controls to allow a possible more dynamic and 
competitive market. 
6.5 Conclusion 
We have in this chapter discussed the various aspects of the state pensions in so far as 
the demand behaviour of the market schemes is concerned. We note that the NSSS 
has had a significant impact on the retirement plans of the general lowly paid workers 
as opposed to the relatively well earning middle class employees. The dominance of 
sixty years as the intended year of retirement by female employees and sixty-five by 
their male counter parts shows the relevance of the NSSS to this group as opposed to 
dominant spike of fifty 
-five for both male and females in the middle-income bracket. 
In this chapter we also explained why the demand for private pensions has continued 
to flourish despite the introduction of the compulsory state scheme. We have also 
discussed the importance and possible ways of adopting a dynamic corporate strategy 
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by the market schemes to ensure continued positive demand that is sustainable over a 
period of time. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
Personal saving for old age and other market findings 
The working-class 
... 
"These are `poor but honest" and family folks, the largest of all 
classes. It is composed of skilled and semi-skilled workers and small business trades 
people. Contrary to what may be expected, many of these class members make very 
good money, they simple don't use it to become "respectable" the way the middle 
class does. Working class people are oriented toward living well and enjoying life 
from day to day rather than saving for the future and being concerned about what the 
middle class think of them. They want to be modern, to keep up with the times rather 
than the Joneses ". 1 
7.1 Introduction 
We felt it necessary to conduct a market empirical study of Zimbabwe for various 
reasons. First and most importantly never before has the Zimbabwean pensions 
insurance market been subject to a rigorous test at this level. Most of the criticisms 
and counter criticisms of the NSSS and pension insurance policy developments are 
being based on theoretical or Western economies' experience. Those that are not 
based on the above school are to a large extent based on intuitive imagination of 
individual agents in the market. It was as such important that a survey be done that 
would reflect the true view of the major participants' perception of the state scheme 
and how it is impacting to their specific social and economic desires. It is only when 
the views and perceptions of the major participants in the market are understood that 
meaningful analysis and comparison with western economies' experiences can be 
made. It is not only so but also that future evolution of the market can be adjudged 
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with reasonable accuracy and future pension insurance policy founded on present 
market's rigorously tested perceptions. 
In this chapter that is to a large extent based on the survey that was carried out in 
Zimbabwe, we test some of the widely held perceptions about the mandatory state 
pensions and their relationships with other relevant economic variables. The survey 
involved the use of questionnaires as well as personal contact and desk techniques. In 
this chapter the SPSS package was used to analyse most of our data. The statistical 
analysis used in this chapter falls into two parts. That is descriptive and inferential. In 
descriptive statistics, analysis of the responses in terms of factual information, 
perception and awareness of certain important aspects of the pensions insurance is 
made. Inferential statistics was prepared to provide the basics upon which the 
conclusions generalised in this report were made. 
The views of the executives express the general perception of what they perceive 
about the state pensions and are as such very important in so far as the future 
development of social insurance and the market at large is concerned. By 
understanding the perception of the executives we can at least in theory, be in a 
position to best interpolate the future developments in the market. The word 
"executive" is in this context not monolithic but used in general to refer to any 
insurance firm top or senior representative qualified to make opinion on behalf of the 
employing firm. 2 
Loudon and Della (1993) describing the American working- class people's behaviour. 
Z Included amongst the executives are managers, brokers, directors, public relations officers and so on. 
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The influence of the ordinary workers in Zimbabwe can not be at any scale be 
overlooked as the views of this group is as important as is an other principal player in 
the pensions insurance market. After all the ordinary workers are the dominant and 
the single consumer group more sensitive to the pensions developments and changes 
in the state pensions policy than any other groups. In addition to that the working- 
class employees are a very significant if not dominant percentage of the electorate that 
can change pensions policy through the ballot box. It is in that regard that we felt it 
important that a particular section of this paper be dedicated to the labour force and its 
perception of the state pensions vis-ä-vis the general developments in this area. 
The questionnaires used to gather the relevant data for this chapter are divided into 
three distinct parts. The first part sought to gather basic statistical information about 
the respondent. The second part aimed at getting the core information of inquiry while 
the third and last part was aimed at getting general views about the pensions insurance 
market. The information that was so gathered is corroborated by that that was 
obtained by the researcher during the fieldwork were one to one interviews with some 
of the core participants in the market was done. The questionnaires used to solicit the 
information required for purposes of completing this chapter are attached in this 
document as appendix. 
The state occupational pension scheme (NSSS), to which most of the ordinary 
workers employed in the manufacturing and agricultural sectors are not entitled to, 
forms a very important aspect of households' future wealth. We have already 
provided the line of argument behind this observation in the preceding chapter. We 
have shown and explained why the lowly paid households are most likely to value the 
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state pension scheme. We also look at the various saving instruments that employees 
can use to mitigate the cost of old age and substitutability of these in favour of state 
pensions. The effect of NSSS in influencing saving behaviour of households is also 
carefully discussed within the context of this report. 
The rest of this chapter is divided as follows: In section 7.2 we discuss the old-age 
retirement saving trends, factors influencing saving and retirement behaviour. In 7.3 
we discuss the empirical results of the future of the NSSS and the pensions market by 
analysing the executives' perceptions while 7.4 considers the workers' perception of 
the different aspects of this market in light of the emergence of the NSSS. It is in 
section 7.5 that we look at the general market findings and 7.6 are the conclusions. 
7.2 Saving behaviour in the presence of state pensions 
We have explained the various concepts and schools of thought behind the theories of 
consumption and saving in chapter five. We have also explained that the conventional 
life cycle theory of saving has been used before by various scholars and in particular 
to interpolate the consumption and saving trends of different household set ups. In this 
section we look into the saving behaviour of ordinary workers and middle income 
earners separately for the reasons we discussed in chapter six. Professor Feldstein 
starting with his 1974 paper that was subsequently followed by the 1976,1979 and 
1982 papers founded the current debate on the effect of state pensions wealth on 
consumption and saving behaviour. 
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To attempt to follow the approach used by the likes of Feldstein to estimate the effect 
of the Zimbabwean state pensions on consumption and saving and retirement is not 
only wrong but also very illogical. Not only that the economies that have been subject 
of this debate are long established with well matured state pension schemes developed 
over many decades ago, the Zimbabwean scheme is founded on a different political 
spectrum and differs in many respects to many of the Western world schemes. The 
kind of data used by Feldstein to measure pension wealth is currently not available in 
Zimbabwe. Feldstein for example, used data covering the period 1930 to 1974 in his 
original work. Apart from that nobody has ever investigated how the state schemes 
wealth affected the consumption and saving trends for example in the UK or USA 
during the early years of introducing compulsory old-age state pension schemes, the 
focus of research continues to be at long time intervals. 
Hemming (1978) is one of the earliest if not the first to use strict actuarial techniques 
using British data to examine the effect of pensions wealth on saving. His time series 
has often been criticised for having been too short to provide credible conclusions. As 
we are not actuarial scientists we will not dwell much on this area. There are how 
ever many more studies that use time- series econometric models as a framework to 
investigate this complex relationship of pensions wealth and saving and in particular 
based on the USA data. See for example Darby (1979), Browning (1982) and many 
others. 3 The use of cross sectional data is also widespread. On consumption the 
general findings have been that state pensions wealth increases consumption though 
3 See Kessler, Masson and Strauss-Kahn (1981) "Social security and saving: A tentative survey" The 
Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance, 18 (January 1981) pages 3-50 
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there are some findings that have conspicuously pointed to the contrary. Leimer and 
Richardson (1992) found a replacement of around 0.6 of private wealth by social 
security wealth. Takayama (1990) using Japanese data found that social insurance 
reduces the savings ratio by more than ten percent. Using cross-sectional data the 
likes of David and Menchik (1985) found no significant relationship between 
consumption and state social security wealth. The chain of previous studies is 
inexhaustible and yet the findings are as inconclusive as they have always been. 
Trying to reconcile the various findings would be a strong basis for a separate 
independent thesis and hence our decision not to pursue the previous literature in this 
area of study. As has already been said we have no evidence of any related work that 
has been published or done with respect to Zimbabwean experience. 
7.2.1 Saving behaviour of middle income earners 
The responses to question 1 about satisfaction with 3% contribution to the national 
scheme and membership to other pension saving vehicles show a high level of 
consideration of other alternatives to the NSSS. Table 7.1 shows a high percentage of 
people with pension plans other than the state scheme. On the other hand a very lower 
percentage of people reported satisfaction with the mandatory 3% contribution to the 
state scheme, though as we said in the previous chapter, most respondents in this 
cohort hardly contribute more than 50% of the 3% required of them by the state 
scheme rules. The high percentage of respondents with alternative pension plans 
explains to a large extent the attitude exacted by the majority of people in this group 
towards the state scheme. The high percentage of dissatisfaction with the 3% 
contribution to ward the state scheme is difficult to explain as the ultimate nominal 
pay out in dollars is extremely small as a percentage of the gross salary. 
223 
Table: 7.1 Membership to other pension plans and satisfaction with 3% to the NSSS 
-Question es es- No- 
No- 
Number % Number 
Are you a member of any other 240 100 0 0 
occupational pension plan? 
_ - Are you content with a 3% NSSS premium. 22 9.16 
Do you have any other retirement pension 
plan options? 
Using the results from our survey we see little relevance of the life cycle in explaining 
the saving behaviour of Zimbabwean households. As can be seen from the results and 
contrary to the life cycle predictions, those in the fifties show as much propensity to 
save and acquire wealth, as are the younger workers in the thirties and early forties. It 
is in fact, true that those nearing retirement tend to save more, on a dollar per dollar 
comparison, than those with more years remaining on their working lifecycle. The 
professionals in the fifties while showing high propensities to save in their last years 
in active employment show how ever, little evidence that they will match their total 
wealth disposal with the expected number of years before they die in fulfilment of one 
of the core principles of the life cycle. 
Rather than dismissing the life cycle as irrelevant in so far as the consumption and 
saving trends are concerned in Zimbabwe, it may be worthwhile pursuing other 
avenues of debate. Most relevantly would be the historical and economic/social 
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background of the working population in Zimbabwe. Notably the people approaching 
their retirement ages or now retired were once deprived access to conventional saving 
markets such as membership to mutual societies, building societies and so on. As if 
that is not enough, they were once denied progression to positions and professions 
that would have seen them earning as much as they do today and thus saving at the 
rates they are doing. On a more speculative analysis one would not be wrong to 
suggest that the high propensity to save by the professionals nearing retirement is a 
result of a psychological drive to make up for the lost years during apartheid 
Rhodesia. On the other hand that background could explain why we do not observe 
the expected behaviour as projected by a conventional life cycle theory of saving that 
we need not emphasise that it was developed primarily with western economies in 
mind. Thus the relevance of the lifecycle theory of saving may be brought to question 
when the spectrum of analysis is limited to a certain cohort whose economic and 
social progression has been fundamentally different from the western experiences. 
We note that most of the professional employees, according to our survey, have a 
strong cautious approach about their retirement plans. A large percentage of 
employees despite being content with the retirement plans they have in place want to 
continue in some form of employment ranging from running own companies to small 
consultants. Table 7.2 shows the responses to question 9 of the questionnaire that 
sought the views of the employees about their expected retirement ages and plans 
after statutory retirement age. At least 20% of the professionals report that they will 
certainly continue to be active participants in the economy through self-employment. 
Strange though is that the same workers who intend to have partial retirement save on 
average 10%-15% more than those intending to retire fully. This is somehow 
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puzzling, as one would have expected those with ambitions to venture in new 
economic challenges to save less during the normal working age and those with 
shorter working spans to save more. The reasons or logic behind this may not be 
economic as such and may call for other disciplines to explain, such as is the 
psychological interpretations. 
Table 7.2 Retirement plans of the middle- income earners 
Responses 
-Question Statement es No Don't know 
Would you continue in active 
employment after retirement age? 
700 o 10% 
We note that a significant percentage of the workers, in the range about to retire, 
report that they do not know how they intend to spend their post employment life. 
There is little evidence of abnormality in saving for retirement by the "don't know" 
cohort. In figure 7.1 we show the distribution of the retirement plans by the middle- 
income professionals aged fifty years and above. 
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The paradox frorn the analysis of the results is that the younger professionals far from 
attaining retirement age NA'ant a Pennanent job exit before the state pension age. A 
very insignificant percentage of less than 2%, report that they would want to see their 
contracts of employment running to retirement age. At least 65% of this coliort reports 
that they Nvant to retire earlier than the expected retirement age. Because of a shorter 
anticipated Nvorking life span that would be followed by a more than normal post 
retirement life, these people in this group will tend to save at abnormal rates tor 
retirement. As circumstances and attItUdes are bound to change as years go by, tcwcr 
than those that say they will opt for an early exit from the job market if retirenicnt 
packages at hand are improved or remain as they are will in fact retire as they claini in 
the responses to the quest I onnaire. As a result of that more people than we may be 
made to believe Nvill still be in active employment as their retirement ages approach. 
In consequence a disproportionate saving pattern may result leading to massive 
aggregate saving by individual households. That is despite the presence of the 
national scheme with its generous benefit provisions. This is even more relevant 
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taking into account that we note from our results that very few people seem to be 
aware how generous the national scheme is in terms of benefit out lay. Because of this 
partial information asymmetry people will save more than they otherwise have to. 
The preference saving distribution results, derived from question 12, by this cohort 
suggests that the national pension scheme has not affected their consumption and 
saving behaviour. There is neither evidence nor any comments from the 
questionnaires to suggest that professional employees have had their retirement plans 
influenced by the emergence of the national scheme. Table 7.3 below shows the 
different point preferences made by various people with regard to choice in saving 
instruments. In question 4(b) the respondents were asked to put in order of choice, 
starting with the most appropriate retirement saving option, five different old-age 
saving vehicles. 
Table 7.3 Preferences in saving instruments by middle-income earners 
Type of saving 
- 
-CF I"' o-ice 2"" Choice 3' Choice 4.. Choice 
OccupationaT 
pension scheme 




9% 12% 30% 45% 





40% 5% 3% 
Others wo 8% 100/0 2% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 
228 
A large percentage of the people report that they would prefer to save with company- 
sponsored retirement plans to any of the other retirement option plans. The high level 
of confidence in the private provision of retirement further corroborates our above 
assertion that the NSSS has not had any significant influence to saving trends. The 
housing option as an investment plan is perceived to be a better option by more 
people than we had first anticipated when we decided to include it amongst the 
retirement plan vehicles. The national scheme is least popular as a saving vehicle for 
retirement despite it being very generous in its pension benefits. The state scheme 
while it is not so popular amongst the professionals, it is how ever, regarded by many 
as a necessary integral part of the retirement saving equation. This is evidenced by 
the absence of total disregard in tenns of points scored in respect of the national 
scheme in our survey. 
The aggregate saving behaviour is indifferent between the married or those with 
dependents and those single or without dependents. Contrary to our expectations that 
the umnarried and those without dependents would show lower propensity to save, 
there is minimal evidence to suggest so. In fact when the confidence level is reduced 
to 98% from 95% we find that the unmarried and those without dependents save 
slightly more than those with dependents. The incidence and relevance of this part of 
investigation goes to the heart of the question of why some households are thrift and 
others are not. The most obvious logic would be to assume that those with families or 
dependents or have benefited before in their lives from bequeathal gifts would be 
ahead in terms of thrift. But real life experiences are more complex than that. The 
complexity of saving is best explained in fact, by a cocktail combination of economic, 
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psychological, sociological and other political determinants whose precise role in 
determining saving behaviour may never have been investigated before. 
When the results to question 12 are analysed within the domains of male and female, 
an inexplicable pattern of attitude emerges. The professional females are more attuned 
to spend more on a dollar per dollar comparison on precautionary saving. The overall 
picture is that the females are more aware and wary of the longevity risk. The NSSS 
though not a significant variable in detennining the saving patterns does have a 
significant shadowy influence in the minds of the professional females. This shadowy 
effect is characterised by the inclusion of relatively statistical significant sums of 
voluntary expenditure to the national scheme. The results of the scores affirm this 
prognosis of the behaviour of the female professionals. On the other hand males seem 
to be little moved in their saving lines by the emergence of the NSSS. This is more so 
taking into account that the females despite showing higher desire to spend on a per 
dollar unit than men towards their retirement provision, are prepared to spread the risk 
of their old-age income across the board. Males are prepared to invest very 
insignificant amounts to the NSSS. Yet women in aggregate are prepared to spend 
13% more than their male counterparts on state schemes. Table 7.4 shows the 
comparison between the amounts that males and females are prepared to spend in 
dollar terms. The respondents were asked to split various amounts presented in 
multiples of thousand, into what they would be prepared to spend on NSSS, 
employer-sponsored occupational pension scheme, private pension scheme and any 
other retirement options they might have had in mind. In table 7.4 we however, only 
show the comparison between the state and the company-sponsored scheme. It must 
also be noted that the total in the pool refers to the total to be spent on retirement 
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provision only not the total household budget. The figures are the average reported 
and rounded off to the nearest whole numbers for both the NSSS and company- 
sponsored schemes. The results of the rest of the options are available as appendix to 
this report. 
There is, as we have already said, no obvious explanation of this apparent anomaly 
between male and female workers. The most credible explanation would probably lie 
in the confidence that males have on the government scheme vis-a-vis the private 
schemes and the female population's perceived confidence in the two schemes. 
Pursuing the reasons of this anomaly may lead to the emergence of complex 
sociological and psychological questions that we may find difficult to answer within 
the scope of this report. We in the circumstance not discuss the subject further. 
Table 7A Voluntary budgetary contributions expected from men and females 
Females Males 
Total in pool 
to spend in $ NSSS 
- - 
Co. Pen Scheme 
NSSS 
Co. Pen Scheme 
1000 ZT 
- 





1310 36 1170 
-3UUU 69 
- - 





2130 ý/ 1926 
-5UUT TT-T 
- 





3280 101 2952 
-MUU 756 3510 136 3160 
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From what we have discussed above it is evident that there is no case per ser that the 
saving behaviour of both men and women professionals has been significantly 
affected by the introduction of the compulsory national pension scheme. The evidence 
of this insignificant influence is evident in both the amount that individuals are 
prepared to spend on the NSSS or are already spending on it. This observation of 
course is not reflective of the entire attitude of all the working professionals. As 
history has shown in the past, other features that we may have overlooked or took for 
granted may lead to different outcome if taken into account. Most notably is the 
geographical and political environment under which our respondents made their 
expectations. We would possibly get a different picture if we say carried our survey 
and other investigations in say two of the smallest towns of Zimbabwe. 
7.2.2 The saving behaviour of the working-class workers 
We note some interesting and scintillating similarities and contrasting differences 
between this sub cohort and the middle-class employees already discussed. Whereas it 
was some how expected that the NSSS would create a greater interest and immediate 
shock interest in this group, there is very minimal statistical significance to suggest 
that the saving behaviour has been pennanently altered as a result of the introduction 
of the national scheme. The introduction of the national scheme, if ever it has any 
effect that is likely to be a permanent feature, is in fact that of positive expectancy of 
the "unknown benefit. " The average unskilled workers, despite the fact that most are 
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not willing to contribute towards the national pot of saving for retirement, are more 
than willing to be beneficiaries to the national pot out put. 
Most people generally have this tendency to view the working class people as victims 
of social injustices, particularly perpetrated by the capitalists and middle-class people. 
They are seen as the biggest bearers of economic hardships together with the low 
salaried. They portray themselves as modest eamers and what ever little they eam 
goes towards meeting the more fundamental basic needs of survival such as good 
food, shelter and so on. In the circumstances, engaging and concerning themselves 
with the cost of looking after one self in post retirement life becomes secondary and 
hence outside the scope of immediate needs. This view is flawed and in fact 
encourages the culture of perpetual under saving by this social class. The 
Zimbabwean working class is no exception of this syndrome. As we said on the 
limitations of the survey that was done as part of this study, there were genuine 
economic hardships that the average populace was facing at the time that could have 
potentially influenced the risk perception and in particular long-tenn risks such as that 
of longevity insurance. 
The above observation is in line with the observations made in the previous chapter 
and that pattern is even clearer when the results in table 7.5 are taken into account. 
Table 7.5 in fact confirms our earlier assertion that ordinary workers have a higher 
regard of state pensions than the professional employees. That is despite the fact that 
the unskilled workers have a very low propensity to save for long-term needs and in 
particular old age. The general consensus among this group is that they would be 
happier if the state pension benefits were commutable at much earlier dates during 
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their working lives. The absurd proposis is therefore that the ordinary workers 
expect a better life after retirement even without saving for it. There is how ever some 
logical explanation to this other wise abnormal behaviour in that most if not all retired 
ordinary employees retire in the rural country side were they scarcely pay a fifth of 
the money they would require to survive marginally in an urban set up. We look into 
some of the wider personal saving issues later in the report. The rest of this sub- 
section is about individual saving characteristics of the ordinary employees in light of 
the presence of the compulsory state pensions insurance. 
Table 7.5: Workers' saving vehicle preferences 
Type of saving scheme F" Choice 2"u Choice 3'" Choice 4... Choice 
Employers' occupat 
pension 
45% 33 5 
State scheme 
- 
21 27 12 14 
Private pension scheFe 12 10 45 
Estate and Housing 18 27 18 
-Others 4 18 18 
-Total 100% 100% 100% 
In question I of part two of the survey the respondents were asked about their reaction 
to the introduction of the NSSS and whether the 3% contribution was a fair premium 
together with their pension memberships. Tables 7.6 and 7.7 show a summary of the 
responses. 
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Table 7.6: Responses to satisfaction with a 3% contribution to the NSSS 













Women 65 80 77 30 8.2 
Men 77 72 19.8 39 10.7 
-Totals 142 39.12 1 -152 41.87 19 
Table 7.7: Membership to other occupational pension schemes 










- - Women 21 5. s 71 4 
- Men 39 10.7 7T 
- - - Totals 60 16.5 303 83 
.5 
The results of our survey show that the unskilled workers while having a positive 
awareness about the need to save for one's retirement are generally not active 
participants of the private pensions market. The percentage of workers reporting 
having a private financial retirement plan other than employer- backed, from the 
pensions market is very small, and not worth the "media frenzy, " created by the 
financial commentators when the NSSS was first introduced into the market. The 
effect of the state pensions to the private retirement plans purchasing is in that regard 
minimal. This is not strange or peculiar to Zimbabwean experience as reports on some 
of the most liberal economies show overwhelming evidence that the average working 
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class household continues to depend on public provision for such necessities as 
health, old-age pension and so forth. In the USA there were for instance about 2% of 
pensioners with old-age insurance annuities according to Friedman and Sjorgen 
(1980). 
Notwithstanding the fact that there is a generally very low propensity to save 
privately by both skilled and the generally unskilled employees of the working class, 
the apparent number of times that the issue of policy change was raised, shows the 
extent of insecurity perceived in general in this cohort. The significance and effect of 
this apparent wary is that despite other economic and social constraints to saving by 
this class, the political risk, that pension scheme rules may be reshuffled or changed to 
suit the politically advantageous electorate target group is an embedded element of the 
saving risk considerations. In Zimbabwe the element of political risk could not have 
been more apparent than at the time when our field surveys were being carried out. 
And indeed that aspect of saving for one's retirement through compulsory state 
mechanisms raises the question of "how secure the state pensions are? " However, as a 
fundamental point of importance it is imperative that we mention that the policy risk 
erodes the confidence to the national scheme and so deeply that it is more than a 
problem of political persuasion but one that should be researched into using modem 
social scientific techniques. In theory of course the uncertainty about the benefit to be 
derived from a national scheme will lead to over saving by the individually risk averse 
households. 
Our argument about the working-class workers having low propensity to save should 
not be taken out of context. And in fact, it is expected in many societies that this class 
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of people will not have as much propensity to save as their middle-class counter parts. 
The trend, world- wide shows that most of the average of the skilled and unskilled 
working-class workers rely on state social security for their post retirement income. 
The British as are the Americans and the Western countries are no exception. Some 
respected scholars, for example professors David L Loudon and Albert J Della of 
USA, believe strongly that the working-class folks make more money than otherwise 
its always been deemed and simply do not want to save it. In fact the two scholars 
make a fitting summary of this social class when they say: 
"The working-class family's world view is one of great anxiety. They value the 
present, the known and the personal while avoiding the competitive, the 
impersonal and the uncertain. They indulge rather than invest. " 
The far outcry that was more than publicised in the run up to the establishment of the 
national scheme was, in the light of this evidence, certainly an exaggeration by the 
private market commentators. That the private pensions sector continues to grow 
despite the presence of the NSSS and other economic adversaries currently evident 
affirms that view. 
These observations that we have endeavoured to explain and those that we have 
merely referred to, are clear evidence that there is lot that can be learned from 
personal saving trends. In the next section below we look into some of those crucial 
issues that we feel this report would not have been complete without their inclusion. 
7.2.3 Personal saving issues worth noting 
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There are several economic and social issues that we find interesting and worth 
discussing but by virtue of the scope and size of this report we limit ourselves to the 
very few that are close to the objects of this report. The economy, culture and political 
considerations are important in this part of our report. Here we highlight not only the 
importance of these factors, but we also explain the complexity of the interaction of 
these factors in shaping decision making in the provision of old-age saving. 
First there is the fundamental issue of the State of the economy. Magnussen (1994) 
says private saving is an important economic factor in that in the short run oscillations 
in the savings ratio are a major determinant of business cycles, while over a longer 
horizon saving can stimulate economic growth by giving room for investment. The 
same observation cannot be less true for the case of Zimbabwe. 
At the time we were gathering data for purposes of this research, we were amazed at 
the number of individuals and business syndicates in the foreign currency business. 
The apparent collapse in the confidence in the local currency, speculative or otherwise 
partly explains why every average citizen was seen to be chasing the American dollar 
or British pound in every sector, informal or formal. The intriguing economic 
question that arises from such a scenario is, "what effect does this have on the formal 
saving markets? " The precise answer may require the use of empirical data and 
complex econometric specifications that are certainly beyond the scope of this report. 
However, from a qualitative analysis point of view we have no doubt whatsoever that 
the ultimate damage both in the short and long run is ruinous in terms of volume of 
cash available to the established institutions to invest or finance other business 
ventures so crucial for economic growth. More crucially, the instability of the local 
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currency unit the prime unit of pricing the pensions products, implies that the 
voluntary markets are for that period of instability unviable as the risk of buying a 
security quoted in local currency is perceived to be "unworthy taking. " 
That short-tenn lending rates are presently prohibitively high and inflation equally 
unsustainable, investing in long-term securities is economically not viable both in the 
eyes of corporate bodies and individual household savers. The ultimate argument is 
precisely why invest in twenty year securities when a similar fortune can be made in 
sixty day securities with lending risk remaining unchanged? There is certainly no 
need for a rational individual to do so. 
Lastly we note the fact that when the economy is generally failing to deliver to meet 
the economic expectations, the difference between the middle and the working class 
becomes very thin. And so much that the workers on middle class cease to be 
concerned with issues of long-term saving, of which saving is a traditional 
characteristic of this group of people. On the other hand, the working-class whose life 
tends to centre on matters of day upon day survival rather than futuristic uncertainties 
become even more difficult to convince on matters of saving for their future. It is 
precisely with that in mind that we feel compelled to acknowledge that the perception 
of the people we engaged in our investigation may have been influenced by the state 
of the economy to such certain levels that the picture of this report would have been 
different in the presence of a fully functioning economy. There are other economic 
considerations that are interesting in their own right but are trivial in the context of 
this report that we felt it unnecessary to discuss them in this report. 
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Culture is the second biggest relevant consideration that has an important relevance to 
individual and group household saving behaviour. The general view expressed by the 
authorities suggests that saving has no culture though the various social cultures do 
influence the way different ethnics save. It is itself interesting to note that societies 
very conservative such as Japan have been found to have similar aggregate saving 
trends, as are the British and American societies with very diverse cultural and ethnic 
combinations. That cultures are similar but different is common knowledge in 
anthropology but that these diverse norms are a good starting point in financial 
markets segmentation has often been less emphasised, and more so for reasons 
beyond the scope of this report. ' 
Despite that we had to change our original questionnaire so as to exclude amongst 
other things the respondent's ethnicity, we find interesting patterns that are evidently 
a function of one's region. That is for example, the Asians, Africans and White people 
from the Eastern part of Zimbabwe display certain characteristics uniquely different 
from the same social groups that dwell in another part of the country such as Western 
Zimbabwe. There is in the case of the people from the Western regions having an 
above the average percentage of people who desire to retire into the rural or farming 
communities. And the relation between retiring into the rural or faming community 
and poor propensity to save for one's retirement is statistically unquestionable. The 
government agencies providing pensions and the private pension providers alike 
should as such thrive to take such anthropological differences into account when 
formulating household saving policies. 
4 See for example Loudon and Della (1993) Consumer Behaviour McGraw-Hill Book Company 
Singapore 
240 
We also note that irrespective of region of origin, people bom of generally poor 
background and never before been bequeathed any property of pecuniary value are 
prone to resist measures of lifetime saving for their retirement. That is the very lower 
of the lower working class families are most likely to have bad perception of 
conventional saving methods inclusive of the state pension scheme though interesting 
enough they welcome the notion that the state must provide them with these social 
security benefits. The trend is not different from the experiences in the United 
Kingdom and the United States of America where you find the unemployed "junks" 
being the most vociferous when it comes to issues of social security benefits and 
ironically in most cases do not work or contribute to the national insurance funds. The 
social scientists do not tell us much about this culture of resistance and defiance of 
logic that is also observable in other branches of insurance markets such as motor 
insurance where drivers of "rag tag" cars are in some cases twice as much in 
Zimbabwe to be driving cars without third party insurance cover. The irony of whole 
of it is that it is those in most need of insurance that in most cases avoid having such 
policies. 
Political considerations have been found to be very crucial in the consumer behaviour 
by other learned researchers. We would have included this part under the banner of 
culture for culture is wide enough to include political beliefs and associations thereof 
but that the political climate at the time the research into this report was being carried 
was such fascinating explains why we have had political considerations as a 
5 Statistics based on DavcI et al (1995) Cost of uninsured and inadequate motor insurance to the Willis 
Faber Motor Schemes Willis Faber Claims division Bulawayo Zimbabwe. 
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subsection by itself The political perception in a market, not withstanding the fact 
that politics and economics counteract so dependently, is one aspect that may have 
played a substantial role in influencing the overall perception of the state pension 
scheme. At the time of data gathering and writing of this report the political 
uncertainty and future of the government that has ruled Zimbabwe since 1980 has 
been deepening day in day out. Without indulging into the subject of depth political 
activities taking place everyday in Zimbabwe, we need not emphasise that the current 
government has lost not only the trust but also the mandate of the urban working and 
upper classes. And what does that mean to the establishment of a massive compulsory 
occupational scheme? Below we discuss some of the possible explanations to this 
puzzle. 
Firstly, some people may see the opposing of a massive project such as is the NSSS as 
a symbol of resistance to the continued rule by the present govenu-nent. That is by 
pulling together all forces of resistance against the present regime, political goals may 
in the process be misconstrued for genuine economic goals aimed at bettering the 
lives of the ordinary poor or society at large. Secondly, there are those forces that will 
promote a policy of opposing any initiatives by a government they perceive not to be 
worth supporting irrespective of legitimate goals that the government in sitting may 
have. Thirdly, political distrust in a government is complemented by lack of economic 
confidence in the administration by those opposed to it. That situation cannot be 
worse than in Zimbabwe where the entire urban populations have virtually declared a 
vote of no confidence in the present regime. And ironically the urbanites are the 
economic active and target market in the pensions industry and targeted equally as a 
market by the NSSS. Lastly, there are those other dormant political forces that work 
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invisible to undennine or influence the ordinary people's perception about the 
government's management and economic agenda. 
7.3 Shaping the pensions market: The perception of the executives 
We have in the preceding section looked at the specific issues of personal retirement 
saving behaviour and the role of the NSSS. In this part of the report we examine the 
views of the major influential participants in the pensions market. That is the 
producers and regulators of the market. To accomplish that task we use information 
gathered from our survey questionnaire, appendix C in this report. The term 
66executive" is in this context not used monolithically, but is used to embrace the 
coalition of all the influential participants in the market, inclusive of directors, 
managers, pension scheme regulators and some legislators 6. 
7.3.1 Regulators and legislators' views on the pensions market: 
our major perception propositions of this cohort were as follows: 
> The regulators and legislators have a biased positive attitude towards the 
NSSS and its effect on the pensions market. 
> There are many policy and management issues in the NSSS that need 
collective effort of regulators and legislators. 
> For a strong pensions market the private and public servants have to 
complement each other's objectives. 
The first two propositions were addressed using responses to statements 1.1 to 1.5. 
These statements were primarily designed to seek opinions from the legislators and 
243 
regulators alike. The last proposition was satisfied by the responses to statements 1.6 
and 1.7 and I (b) that complemented the factual issues. A total of ninety people in this 
group responded to our survey questionnaires. The respondents who answered "I 
doWt know" are excluded from table 7.8 below. 
Table 7.8: Question 1 responses (Chi- squares). 
-No Statement -Chi--- Contidence 
Square Level % 
1.1 T he NSSS has not shaken the pensions market. 127.213 95.000 
_FT_ The government has been considerate and 73.125 95.000 
consistent in its conduct of NSSS issues. 
- - 77- t The NSSS has a sustainable futurCin the marFe 68.038 95.009 
_1_T_ There is need to constantly review the NSSS rules 134.645 95.000 
and its management strategy 
- - - ITTe My organisation/department is happy with 62.818 95. OOU 
direction of development of the NSSS. 
-- 76- in The NSSS has increased operational efficienEy 164.353 95.0( 
the pensions market. 
-- 1.7 My organisation is involved and in regular 176.806 95.000 
consultation with private pension scheme 
executives 
6 Though we had a good response from the MPs in theý last parliament before the 2000 elections, at 
least 47 percent of the ruling party legislators lost their constituents to the new opposition MDC 
including all urban seats. 
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The results show high levels of agreement with statements 1.1 to 1.5. The level of 
agreement with statements 1.6 and 1.7 is slightly lower though certainly big enough to 
show an overwhelming support of the propositions. From this statistics it is clear that 
there is an undisputable evidence to support our propositions. The legislators and 
regulators have shown a big positive response and attitude towards the NSSS. The 
effect and impact of the state scheme is held with same attitude. The mismatch in the 
administration and policing of the pensions market is evidenced by the high level of 
agreement with the last statement that contradicts with the views expressed by the 
private pensions executives. 
To complement the above views of this cohort, the results to question l(b) are taken 
into context. The results in table 7.9 below confirm that there is a small contingent 
that believes that the national scheme will lead to a stunted growth of the pensions 
market. Few of the policy makers and enforcers believe that the NSSS does not have 
any impact to the development of the pensions markets. Ten percent of the 
legislatures and regulators believe it is too early to have meaningful opinion and let 
alone make a judgement. These are difficult people. We would not know the way they 
would exact their pressure in terms of the pensions policy and development of the 
pensions markets. 
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Table 7.9: Perceived impact of the NSSS to the pensions market. 
Etlect of the NSSS to pensions market Number Percentage ot sample 
Positive and good for the market 55 61.11 
Negative and detrimental to the -ma-FFE-t 6 6.67 
Premature to judge 9 10 
No impact 12 13.33 
No opinion 8 8.89 
In question 6 we asked the legislators and regulators' opinions on perceived obstacles 
to the co-existence of the national scheme and the private pension schemes. As the 
results in table 7.10 below confirm, the conservatism of the private pension market 
are seen by the regulators and legislatures, alike as the major obstacle to the co- 
existence of the national scheme and others. The figure 45% shows the extent to 
which this view is upheld by the regulators. The history of the market may to some 
extent explain the logic of the concerns about resistance to change. Most if not all of 
the regulators and members of the legislature are black whereas the private pension 
markets are run by and large white executives and managers. The social conflicts 
-"-out the colour of who is who and were may blur the otherwise pivotal debate about "U 
the imposition of the state scheme to the pensions markets. 
There are as many as twenty percent of people in this category who have a conviction 
that the negative press coverage of the NSSS is major cause for concern in so far as 
integrating the national scheme into the pensions market is concerned. These are the 
people who believe that the hyping and sensational coverage of issues pertaining to 
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the objects and functioning of the state scheme is the major cause of "bells of alarm" 
ýU 
. bout the monstrous intents of the state occupational scheme. There is some grain of 
truth in such a perception in that strictly speaking, we have not had before in 
Zimbabwe an independent study of some of these pertinent issues by commissions or 
other groups comprising all the concerned stakeholders. 
Poor marketing strategy of the national scheme by the government is seen by at least 
fifteen percent of this sample as the dominant single factor explaining the difficulty of 
acceptance of the NSSS in the market. These are people who believe that had the 
government done a thorough anthropological investigation of the various segments 
that make up the entire pensions market, the resulting imposition or marketing 
strategy of the state scheme would have curtailed some of these problems. The 
government, at least in the views of this segment, has a challenge to redesign its 
marketing strategy and forge a new harmonious relationship between the state scheme 
and its private rivals. It may not be easy to reverse damage done so far but would 
certainly be worth pursuing in view of the long-tenn relationship that is there. 
There are as many as thirteen percent of this sample population that believes that the 
general negative perception and resistance to accept the national scheme as a 
necessary player in the market is a political vendetta. While there is no unanimous 
pattern in terms of comments made in this sub-cohort, there is however, a general 
feeling that the position of the NSSS and its acceptance needs a political solution 
rather than economic considerations. 
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Table 7.10: Obstacles to co-existence of the NSSS and the private schemes 




Political Market failure 
& others 
% Responie- 45 20 15 13 
In question 7 the legislators and the regulators were asked about their expectations 
from the private pension firms following the imposition of the NSSS. It is not 
amazing that we expected the regulators to have expected massive resistance to the 
introduction of the compulsory state occupational pension scheme from the old 
players in the market. The figures below show a staggering sixty percent of the 
sample population to have expected resistance from the old guards in the market. 
Well, it is however strange that there is no uniformity to the comments made about 
the resistance that was expected from the market's old guards. What is nonetheless 
clear is that the team on the government's side entered the market expecting the least 
favourable response, a factor that may explain the attitude of both the private and 
public scheme forces to each other. 
There is as much as twenty-two percent of the respondents here who say they 
expected the private markets to respond in panic and cause structural shake-ups. The 
panic and structural shake-ups are probably one of the inevitable developments to a 
development such as the coming of the NSSS to the Zimbabwean market. That the 
market managed to sustain the shock wave caused by the imposition of a compulsory 
scheme is certainly something worth applause. 
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At least eleven percent of this class expected the private market to respond by 
introducing technically SLIperior and less costly pension products. The strategy of 
using innovation as a counter strategy to the Government's introduction of the NSSS 
into the market, at least as of now, is not yet clear or supportable by prevailing 
evidence. The overall impact of the NSSS to the market may to some extent explain 
the apparent lack of the need to react by engaging in expensive research and 
development projects by the private markets. 
Figure 7.2 
Question 8 sought the views about the projected life span of the NSSS. There was as 
much as ten percent of the respondents who thought that the NSSS would not survive 
beyond fifteen years from its inception. At least as much as twenty-four percent of the 
respondents in this class did not see the NSSS surviving beyond the thirty- year mark, 
while as many as t,, venty six percent of the sample population believe It would be 
dissolved before its forty-fifth anniversary. There are as many as thirty-eight percent 
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of this class who believe that the NSSS will be in the market for more than forty-five 
years. There are 2'/, ý of this class who do not have an opinion on the most likely 
lifespan of the national scheme. Figure 7.3 shows the distribution of these results. 
Peceived life span of the NSSS 
26% 
13Less than 15 years 
MMore than 15 but less than 30 years 
13Abow, 30 years but less than 45 years 
13 No opinion 
EMore than 45 yexs 
Figure 7.3 
There are many comments that were made with regard to the perceived future of the 
national scheme in tile market and we cannot discuss all of thern. However, we felt it 
imperative that we discuss two of the most pertment views that were gencrally 
common to all the views expressed by this sample population. First and niost 
importantly, there is a general view shared by almost all the respondents here that 
there is more than a realistic chance that in the decades to corne the NSSS would be 
subject of privatisation prograrnme. The feeling is that as the scherne grows bigger 
and bigger, the more complex and costly it would be to manage. And as diseconornies 
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of scale become virtually unsustainable without the inevitable political risks, the more 
apparent it becomes that the national scheme would one day be subject of going to the 
hands of the private firms. If the experience with the government and other quasi 
government corporations is anything to goby, then certainly this view ought be taken 
not slightly. 
The other issue of interest that is mentioned more often than not by the respondents is 
that the national scheme can potential grow to such extents that its market presence 
will simply be ruinous to the competing rival private schemes. In essence what that 
implies is that the capital base of the national scheme would be so large as to render 
competing for business with the smaller private schemes not only unfair but unviable 
as well. That can of course happen, only if the state scheme does not fall victim to the 
same syndrome of inefficiency, corruption and incompetence that seems to be so 
synonymous with most public institutions in Zimbabwe. These are merely speculative 
opinions based on individuals' perception of the NSSS and the pensions market at 
large. The influential vintage position that these people occupy in the market explains 
the importance why these views cannot go without noting with enthusiasm. They in 
fact, would be subject of quoting in the future as the anticipated complications in the 
progression of the market take place. 
We have now discussed the views and opinions of the market forces largely on the 
side of the government that established the NSSS and is responsible for its promotion 
and running. The important aspects worth noting have been carefully noted. We 
discuss the views of the private scheme directors and managers alike in the next 
section of this report. 
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7.3.2 Directors and managers' views 
The techniques used to get the views of the public servants executives were also 
applied to this sample. There was a slight modification of the questionnaire sent to 
this cohort to reflect the spirit of the investigations and our propositions. The areas 
covered were basically the same in many respects to those discussed in the preceding 
section. The ultimate reflection of the entire picture of the perception of the private 
market executives in the Zimbabwean pensions market is one of sharp contrast to the 
picture one gets from the legislators and regulators' perception of the market. Our 
propositions in this section were as follows: 
> The private pension scheme executives have a negative bias against the NSSS. 
> There is a general uncertainty about the course of the pensions development 
following the introduction of the national scheme. 
> The NSSS and the private pensions would benefit greatly when all the 
executive stakeholders participated actively with each other in developing and 
managing the interests of the pensions market. 
> Strong market efficiency can be enhanced when there is a two- way evaluation 
process involving senior corporate management. 
The general propositions advanced from the first two propositions can best be 
explained by the results to the statementsl. l. to 1.4 of appendix Cl. The rest of the 
propositions are supported by results from the rest of the questionnaire that sought to 
address factual issues as opposed to collective perceptions and opinions of the private 
market executives. The general observations that form a foundation of the report also 
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draws a lot from some of the open ended questions that were brought to the attention 
of the respondents. 
The results in table 7.11 are quite self- explanatory. The high responses that agree 
with the first four statements suggest that our propositions are true. The uncertainty 
about the government's next action or directive in the market is explained by the 
massive percentage of respondents who either strongly agreed or agreed with 
statement 1.4. One market manager during an interview with him, remarked, "the best 
way to deal with the NSSS is to assume it does not exist. " All that we can deduce 
from such comments and opinions is that the private market has not come to the point 
where it can, with utmost certainty, list the shortcomings or strengths that have come 
about in the market as a result of the introduction of the NSSS into the market. 
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Table7.1 1: Responses to statements 1.1 to 1.6 
Number - Statement SA A DA SDA I D 
1.1 The NSSS has disrupted t -68770- 18% 9% 3% 2% 
evolution and operations of the 
- 
pension schemes in Zimbabwe. 
77 The government has done little to 
consider the market interests of the 
- - 
private pension schemes. 
FT There is need to amend the NSSA 7276- 2376 -Wo -474- 376- 
Act and NSSS rules to reflect the 
interests of all stakeholders. 
- - 
The direction of the NSSS is obscure 8% 
F5 My organisation has not been in 13% 
regular consultation with the state 
operatives in shaping the direction of 
- - 
the pensions development. 
7 - - TT My organisation is seeking ways to 3317o- '57o -rWo 13"07o -F/o 
improve efficiency in the wake of 
the emergence of the NSSS. 
To cement the views expressed justifying our propositions one has to look at the 
results to question l(b). There is an insignificant figure of respondents who say the 
NSSS has had a good and positive effect to the pensions market. At the same time 
there is contrastingly large percentage of people who thought the state scheme had a 
negative and detrimental effect to the market. The percentage that thought that it was 
254 
still too early to judge is slightly lower than that reported by the legislators and 
regulators. There was substantial percentage of respondents who felt that the NSSS 
had had no impact on the pensions market. 
Table 7.12: The impact of the NSSS to the pensions market. 
Effect of the NSSS to the pensions Market Number Percentage 
Positive and good fbr the market 3 2.73 
Negative and detrimental to the market 57.27 




No opinion 72 10.91 
The issue of obstacles to mutual co-existence of the state scheme and private pensions 
was brought up in question 6 of the questionnaire. There are some pertinent obstacles 
that this cohort believes are a hindrance to the establishment of harmonious 
environment in the market to allow the state scheme as are the private pension 
schemes to flourish. We discuss in this section the most crucial and less obvious. 
Those obstacles that are otherwise in the generality are discussed under section 7.5. 
First and foremost, there is an apparent disgust amongst most of the private pension 
schemes executives about the government's failure to engage and involve the private 
markets in the formulation and implementation of these very important developments 
in the market. The diversity in opinions explains to some extent the level of 
understanding and appreciation of the emergence of the state scheme. 
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In question 5 respondents where asked if they felt there were any obstacles to the co- 
existence of the NSSS and the private pensions schemes. The results were 
resoundingly significant in the positive. 95% of the respondents thought there were 
some obstacles that hindered a mutual existence of the state and private schemes. 
Question 6 was used as a follow up to question 5 and produced results that suggest the 
obstacles perceived by these executives are diverse. All of the factors that were 
presented for consideration scored significant marks in terms of over all weighting. 
The results in table 7.13 show the distribution of the weighting scored by each of the 
factors. The answers are a score of hundred percent because of single responses per 
factor by individual respondents. Judging by the cumulative scores, it is clear that 
market failure and political reasons are perceived as the most dominant factors that 
are thought to be the biggest detrimental forces in the market. 
Table 7.13: The obstacles to mutual existence of the NSSS and other schemes. 
Number ot- people in terms ot-pret-erence 
Factors 
- - 
Score of 5 Score of 4 Score of 3 Score of 2 core of 1- 
Conservati s m 
- 
15 17 22 30 
Negative Fr ess- 
- 
9 10 16 38 
Marketiný 13 16 31 45 34 
Market failure 41 39 21 9 -T- 
Political 
- 
32 28 20 10 2 
- Totals 110 110 110 110 -MF - 
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From the results above it is imperative that further research be done to determine 
amongst other things, how to harmonise these factors in the interest of the 
development of the pensions market in Zimbabwe. It is also important that effort is 
made to understand the large variance in opinion between the respondents in this 
group and those in the legislators and regulators cohort. 
In question 8 the respondents were asked about their perceived life spans of the 
national scheme. The results in table 7.14 show a skewed distribution towards a 
shorter life span in that more fifty percent of the respondents believed that the lifespan 
of the state scheme would not exceed thirty years. There is, also a disturbingly large 
percentage of respondents who offered no opinion at all. Avery small percentage in 
this cohort thought the NSSS would survive beyond fifty years. In a way what the 
results suggest is that there is a great sense of pessimism in this group of people. More 
crucially, it is very clear that the direction of development has not been fully 
appreciated by everybody on a general universal scale. 
Table 7.14: The projected life span of the NSSS. 
Question 8 Number Percentage of sample 
X< 15 years 8 7.27u/o 
15 years<X<30 years 
- 
51 51% 
3 Oyears< X< 45 yeaE7 22 20% 
X> 45 years 9.09% 
Don't know 19 17.27% 
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The most common general comment mentioned by most of the respondents to 
question 8(l) was that the state scheme was most likely to be subject of privatisation 
in the foreseeable future in line with the privatisation programme of state utilities. 
This line of opinion was raised by more than 35% of the respondents. Another 
common comment was that reiterated by 24% of the respondents who stated that the 
NSSS was most likely to under perform leading to increased direct costs to the private 
sector in the form of cost subsidies. 
In question 9 the respondents were asked about the changes that they would like to 
see introduced to the national scheme. The investment of the NSSS funds is seen by 
many as the area with most pressing need for involvement of the private firms' 
expertise. It is no coincidence that the private schemes' executives are of the opinion 
that the investment portfolio of NSSS ought be subcontracted to private markets 
specialists that the same class has expressed concem about the cost of possible 
investment flops being passed on to private markets. 
There is substantial percentage of executives that see the inclusion of all stakeholders 
in the funding of the national scheme, as one of the central issues that need to be 
introduced. The feeling amongst this group is that the funding of the national scheme 
must be a tripartite arrangement involving employees, employers and the government. 
Such concerns are justified for when we look at other established schemes in other 
countries like France, Gennany, Great Britain and so forth, the government 
employees do contribute towards national insurance. 
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The Zimbabwean scheme, that is a funded pension fund, raises concerns not by failure 
of the government to include its employees in this massive national programme, but 
more crucially by specifically exempting certain big employers, and more 
conspicuously the National Railways, from contributing to the national scheme. The 
executives who have raised concem about this issue believe that the membership of 
the national scheme should not be "on a- choose and mix" basis as one executive said. 
There is, a significant percentage of people amongst the executives who believe that 
the introduction of an opt-out clause in the national insurance scheme is crucial for the 
establishment of fairer pensions system in the country. The present set-up where 
employees and employers with the most superior and cost effective occupational 
pension scheme are required to join the national scheme is seen by at least fourteen 
percent of this class as the most urgent reform that must be done to redress that 
anomaly. 
7.3.3 Lessons learnt from the executives' perception of the market 
The first and most crucial point that can be deduced from the various perspectives and 
perceptions of the market executives is that the Zimbabwean pensions market is a 
market "with other markets" in itself The different market segments that form the 
Zimbabwean pensions market are distinct but dependent on each other. It is failure to 
distinguish between these markets that can cause and in fact, caused the 
pandemonium panic when the national scheme was first introduced into the market. 
To purport or believe that the NSSS will have a common impact on the various 
markets that make up the Zimbabwean pensions market is wrong. 
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The views and positions of the market executives confirm without any doubt that the 
Zimbabwean national occupational pension scheme is a strong force in the market that 
cannot be ignored despite having little impact as a retrogressive factor in so far as the 
current saving trends for old-age are concerned. What the market executives confirm 
is that far from being a disastrous monster, the NSSS, at the current rates has not had 
any significant inroads to the conventional market strongholds that the private 
schemes ought to direct their focuses. And in particular the highly paid private sector 
employees who make up a significant market segment in so far as the private pension 
markets are concemed. 
What we can also learn from the market executives is clearly that there is no 
consensus between the private pension schemes and the government as to the running 
of the national scheme. The former show a conviction that it is getting a raw deal 
from the latter by not being included in the running of scheme. There is, in fact, 
apparent bias by both the private and public executives against or for the policies and 
implementation of the NSSS. The private pensions are determined to protect their 
interests that may be threatened by the NSSS particularly in the long run. Apart from 
the issue of interests, there is the practical reality that the private markets will come 
with them to the national scheme with knowledge and expertise. 
It is almost certain that the uncertainty currently engulfing the market as a whole is 
likely to be an ongoing experience for some time or such a time that the NSSS and the 
private schemes spell out their grounds properly and engage each other more than is 
currently happening. It may not be now or sooner that the exact precise extent of 
effect that the NSSS has on the private schemes is known. What however is 
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indisputable is that there is an apparent distrust between the national scheme and the 
private schemes. 
7.3.4 Way forward 
Having examined the various sentiments and opinions expressed by the executives of 
the pensions market, we are left with no doubt that the future of the private schemes is 
not in anyway, threatened by the emergence of the national occupational pension 
scheme. The private schemes must devise strategies that can help mitigate the short- 
term shock waves caused by certain uncertainties that may arise from the 
implementation of the national scheme. The political strategy to lobby for the 
minimisation of these uncertainties may be worthwhile. Above all an embracive 
strategy to shield the likely unforeseen increase in trading costs is necessary if the 
private markets are to maintain the perceived competitive advantage that they seem to 
enjoy over the newly established NSSS. 
7.4 The perception of the ordinary workers 
This part of our report is crucial in that the salient characteristic features of the 
Zimbabwean pensions market are brought to light within the scope of statistical 
examination. It is in doing so that future developments, central to the development of 
any market and in particular the Zimbabwean market, can be predicted with 
reasonable accuracy. And lastly, it is this group that has the electoral muscle to 
influence the legislative direction in future pensions (inclusive of state pensions) 
policy developments. The order by which we discuss these issues does not necessarily 
reflect any order of preference or importance. 
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7.4.1 Familiarity with the Act and NSSS rules 
The results were largely generated from responses to questions fourteen of our survey 
questionnaire and interpreted within the context of the over all statistical pattern, 
generated from other ancillary questions. The respondents were asked how conversant 
they were with the national insurance governing Act and other pension rules. As the 
results in table 7.15 show, there is, a large percentage of people ignorant of the Act of 
parliament giving them rights under a national social insurance scheme and the rules 
alike. There were a lot of people reporting ignorance about refunding of contributions. 
Table 7.15: Workers' conversancy on the NS SA Act and other rules 
- 
Responses in % 
Question F4 Not at a-Ir- Average Very good Excellent 
P'emales 33.167% 5.804% 3.317% 2.488% 
Males 31.509% 8.478% 9.121% 5.970% 
Total 64.676% 14.282% 12.438% 8.458% 
When questions 14(c) and 14(d) are analysed within the context of age groups, a clear 
pattern emerges that justifies the younger employees, far from retirement or in the 
middle of their employment careers are more informed about the scheme rules than 
the much older about to retire. We would like to believe that the younger employees 
though not in the "born free', 7 category had received more fon-nal education than their 
older colleagues. 
7 The "born free" is a term used in Zimbabwe to refer all those people born after independence of 
Zimbabwe from Britain in 1980. 
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Table 7.16: Age breakdown to workers' understanding of rules 
Age - 17-30 31-40 0 51+ 
Question F4Tc-T- Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No 
20.6% . -Y. 37o- -T4-. T7o- -37,76- -6-1767 15.6% 5% 24. Mo 
Question 14(d) 14.9 10.8% 
% Of total 
sample 
--2E'7o--- --3DTo- 22.2 19.1 
Because of the mere size of the people that fall within the category that is not 
confident with the pension rules, it is more than inevitable that it is a requirement that 
the government adopts a positive policy towards disseminating information that 
promotes more than awareness of the various scheme rules. 
7.4.2 Desired NSSS reforms 
In questions 17 and 18 the respondents were asked open questions about desired 
reforms and impact of the NSSS to the pensions market. The factors scoring more 
than 5% of mention are discussed individually, while the rest fall under the "others" 
category. A summary of the relevant statistics is shown in figure 7.4 below. 
More than thirty-nine percent of the respondents felt strongly that the present 
financing of the scheme is flawed in that the actual pecuniary contribution of the 
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government to the scheme was unclear. They are right for evidence at hand is clear 
that the government does not contribute to the pension stakes of individuals just as 
does the employees and the employers. The general opinion is clear that the average 
employee would have liked a scenario where the treasury contributed a certain 
percentage of each employee's earnings. That is to say, for instance for every dollar 
contributed by the employee, let the government through treasury or other forms of 
some credits match that contribution by say one and half times or what ever matching 
percentage that could be agreed upon. 
The second most cited issue of interest that is evident from the workers' concerns is 
that of personal records kept by the national scheme. We acknowledge the difficulty 
that individuals face in keeping record of their individual contributions to the national 
schcme. The NSSS as a good gesturc and part of good govcmancc with transparcnt 
record keeping should seriously consider issuing out to individual members annually 
updated certificates detailing out the national insurance contributions paid to any one 
date. Or as an altemative the goverriment should make it compulsory that employers 
through pay slips keep individual employees posted about their contributions to the 
national scheme. It could also prove very helpful to the employees if the authorities 
were to consider making it a compulsory act to transfer national pension records from 
a previous employer to the most current. 
We recognise some of the potential problems that may be faced as a result of some of 
these recommendations we are making here. Most notable is the crisis that may arise 
in the eventuality of a company going bust and more so when it crushes like a bomb 
without prior warning to all the interested stakeholders. Other logistical problems lie 
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,. vith the NSSS itself as an organisation. For example there is a quite sizeable number 
of people reporting having erroneously been issued with two or more social security 
minibers. 
The goveniment's self- given prerogative to choose who amongst the workers must or 
must not contributes to the compulsory scheme is an issue raised by many workers. 
That the goverriment and certain quasi goverriment employees are excluded from the 
list of employees compulsorily required to be members of the national scheme raises 
shreds of suspicion to the effect that national insurance contributions are just another 
f6mi of stealth taxes. It is evident that this exclusion of certain worker categories from 
membership into the NSSS is not popular and is viewed with UtIIIOSt Suspicion. 
The workers' most sought reforms of the NSSS 
0 NI Rew(dS 
MNSSS Board 
13Fund guarantee 
ru; rusion of all workers 
14 Mou-S 
13G- cont,, butio. 
7", 
4 
Fi, "Lirc 7.4 
8 See the government's statutory instrument number 393 of 1993 for the full list oforganisations with 
employees exempt from contributing into the NSSS. 
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Many respondents cited the Board responsible for the running of the national scheme 
as a factor needing urgent reform to boost the performance of the pensions market. 
While we could not establish the reasons behind having the government having the 
exclusive monopoly and sole responsibility for the formation, operation and 
regulating the NSSS, we find a clear cut per se concern by the workers for the present 
arrangement that clearly does not involve them in the running of the national scheme. 
As a funded scheme, the NSSS ought have an independent board of directors that 
would represent the interests of the employers, employees and the government alike. 
An independent Board would ensure that the interests of all the stakeholders are not 
compromised for the benefit of short-term political goals. 
Lastly, though not least by any standards whatsoever, the involvement of all the 
stakeholders in the policy formulation and administration of the NSSS would act as a 
counter- check mechanism on those organs that can potentially abuse the public plat 
foam to further personal or political gains at the expense of the intended beneficiaries 
to the national scheme. And we need not emphasise that naturally people and 
institutions would have more confidence in organisations run with open transparency. 
The last major issue worth discussing that is mentioned by many respondents relates 
to the fund guarantee and what would happen to the beneficiaries and contributing 
members alike in the event of the NSSS becoming insolvent and impractical to 
subsidise through taxes or other treasury means. While chances of a government 
becoming insolvent are quite remote in the normal circumstances, it is quite 
interesting by virtue of the number of times that this issue comes up from the people, 
there is a realistic chance that the NSSS may find itself unable to meet its financial 
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obligations. Without emphasising the economic disparity at the time the survey was 
done, there is a potential actuarial debt that can blossom into unsustainable 
magnitudes thereby leaving members and beneficiaries exposed to the same risks that 
they would have done so much sacrifice of their hard-earned cash. As we said in 
chapter four, the present statutory provisions are silent on how this potential debt 
would be financed in the eventuality of that happening. There is no scientific 
estimation that has been done on the potential debt of the national fund or when it is 
likely to start manifesting itself The debt concerns make a sound qualitative debate 
that can have equally scintillating theoretical projections. 
7.4.3 Retirement scheme satisfaction 
In question 8 the respondents were asked to rate satisfaction perceived from pension 
insurance cover provided by the state, employers and those that could be privately 
purchased. The rating scores were in terrns of security and value for money. The 
employees were asked to rate in terms of approval the different pension plans, by 
giving score marks between zero and four, where the latter score signalled excellent 
satisfaction. The former score, of zero, marked a very poor satisfaction. The 
employees were encouraged to make their utmost intuitive evaluations. The results are 
provided in table 7.17. 
Views with regard to the confidence in the NSSS are diverse and interesting. First and 
foremost we note that on relative figures it is those members of the sample who 
neither belong to an occupational pension scheme nor have other retirement 
provisions in place, that report certainly more than marginal satisfaction with the 
national scheme. On the other hand, those members of the sample who have either 
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other retirement provisions in place or belong to company- sponsored occupational 
schemes have put relatively very low scores to the national scheme. The most likely 
reasonable explanation to this variance of opinion is that those people who have other 
retirement provisions in place have become so much ingrained into those other 
provisions that introducing another vehicle into their retirement equations would 
certainly be met with some resistance. More over the loyalty that people have in 
certain institutions tend to obscure their rational judgements towards other institutions 
that they may perceive as rivalling the older established ones. 
The state scheme scored poorly both in terms of satisfaction and value for money. The 
fact that there was no total disregard for the state scheme shows that it is a relevant 
pillar of retirement provision in some segments of the market. The high regard for the 
employer- provided pension cover explains the confidence that has been acquired by a 
large percentage of the population. 
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Table 7.17: Saving instruments evaluations in terms of security and value for money 
Degree of satisfaction with a particular scheme Total 
Type of scheme Excellent Very Good Average Poor Very 
poor 
_ - NSSS Security 3% 13% 47% 31% 6% M70 
Value for 
money 
18% 26% 40% 12% 4% _M70- 
ESOPS Security 56% 31% 11% 2% 0% -TUG70- 
Value for 
money 
63% 27% 10% 0% 0% -rU070- 
PAPPS Security 30% 26% 30% 11% 3% -TUG70- 
Value for 
money 
30% 26% 34% 8% 2% -MO70- 
Note: The ESOPS is the employer-sponsored occupational pension scheme and the 
PAPPS are the private arranged personal pension schemes. 
7.4.4 Effects of the NSSS on the workers' welfare 
To simplify our approach to this issue we had to use a "no or yes or do not know" 
approach in soliciting infonnation pertaining to perceived welfare gains as a result of 
the introduction of the NSSS. Unsurprising to us, the results computed mainly from 
question eighteen of our survey questionnaire show a very big consistence with the 
other results and observations that we have already made. 
We note that despite all the brilliant graphical demonstrations that can be made to 
explain the economics of welfare gains and losses, individuals have justifiable 
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difficulty in quantifying or putting to scale the levels of welfare gains/losses 
emanating from the introduction of an economic or social variable such as is the case 
with the NSSS. In table 7.18 below we show a simple summary of the results as 
reported by the people. The results may not be a true reflection of the actual 
gains/losses that the national scheme has brought upon the people of Zimbabwe, as to 
start with, we had difficulty ourselves with coming up with appropriate native terms 
to describe what we meant by welfare gains/losses. 
Table 7.18: Does the NSSS bring welfare gains to the workers? 
Age groups Positive gains Negative gains Don't know Sample % 
(Years) Men Women Men Women Men Women Men Women 
17-30 30% 11% 11% 11% 11% 10% 14.26% 14.42% 
3140 33% 37% 55% 51% 12% 13% 14.43% 15.5901/o 











11% 11.77% 5.31% 
61 and above. 437o 467o 737o 447o MU/I-o -T(Mo -MD7o - --U- 
From the table results above it is clear that it is those employees in higher ages that 
report higher welfare gains emanating from the introduction of the national scheme. It 
is those people who are well into their working lives and with neither a company 
sponsored scheme or any other sizeable retirement plan options that report that they 
perceive big welfare gains from the NSSS. On the other hand, we note that there is a 
significant percentage that said they do "not know" in their responses. Very few 
people were being elaborate on questions in this section and we believe that the 
complexity and lack of a depth understanding of the concepts of welfare gains goes a 
long way in explaining the pattern of responses to this section. Not withstanding what 
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we have said so far about the welfare gains/losses perceived by the people, the only 
picture that emerges and is indisputable is that it is still too early to make true 
reflective judgements about welfare gains/losses resulting from the introduction of the 
NSSS into the Zimbabwean economy. 
7.4.5 Effect of the NSSS on worker mobility 
The workers were asked to file six labour factors in order of the most likely to 
influence their move from one job to the other. In addition to the six factors suggested 
in the questionnaire, they were also given the option to add their own factors. The 
inclusion of this part of the survey questionnaire was in line with the indisputable 
consensus amongst the various institutions with interest in the workers including of 
course the International Labour Organisation (ILO) that putting retirement plans in 
place for every worker is a positive development. Apart from security that is 
guaranteed by membership to a public pension scheme, the issue of worker 
independency that encompasses mobility freedom is an important object of a national 
scheme. The puzzling challenge and question is whether or not that the national 
schemes do give the workers that freedom of mobility that includes amongst other 
things the right to change employments and or sectors of employment. In theory at 
least, in efficient markets, retirement plan provisions must be one of the major 
variables in determining labour mobility. 
As is clear from the tabulated results in table 7.19 the issue of pensions as a factor in 
determining labour mobility, scores relatively poor, compared to other factors. That is 
true for both state and private pensions. It is amazing that employers more often than 
not splash eye catching job advertisements sighting "attractive and generous pension 
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benefits" as the reason why their potential employees must consider the option of 
joining their firms, yet we seem not to find compelling evidence that pension benefits 
are a strong recruitment bait, particularly in Zimbabwe and specifically in the low 
income earners. The state pensions alone, is poorly perceived as an irrelevancy in 
short-term employment mobility and more evidently by the young class. 
It is mostly employees that are above the age of forty years that choose pension 
benefits as the first choice factor that is most likely to influence their decision to move 
from one employer to the other. On the other hand, the younger people are more 
concerned with salaries followed by job security. There is no obvious explanation to 
this variance in preferences. But it is very clear that the position in one's life cycle is 
an important variable in determining the labour factors that individuals perceive to be 
instrumental in determining their employment destines. The nearness to one's 
retirement "post" probably stimulates one's awareness to the risk of income loss due 
to old-agc and hence the reason why the older generations are most likely to choose 
retirement benefits as the first preference in making job mobility decisions. 
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Table 7.19: The rating of the NSSS as a factor in the labour mobility 
- 
Labour factors % 









LF ýi-l, LI SI, LI SI, LI SI, LI, ST LI, SI 
First c oice 24 14 3 1 6 2 15 6 19 9 3 0 4 
2 zrChoice 20 9 2 2 8 3 16 7 22 9 1 0 1 
-YI Choice 13 6 2 11 6 24 12 11 7 1 0 0 
Choice 4 1 11 6 23 14 17 9 6 3 5 2 0 
5 Choice 
- 
0 2 18 9 14 16 12 10 2 3 8 4 0 
601 Choice 2 15 19 11 14 10 7 0 0 19 3 0 
N. B In table 7.7 LT and LS are the long-term and short-term considerations. The 
percentages in each box represent the proportion of the sample choosing that factor. 
There are more females than men who perceive pension rights as a first fundamental 
consideration before moving from one employment to the other. The relevance of the 
national occupational pension scheme to the decision making in terms of job mobility 
is ironically very insignificant with less than ten percent of people of all sexes putting 
down NSSS in the first three preferences in our survey. The NSSS as has been said 
before, is by and large very generous in terms of benefits formulae to be used in 
calculating benefits receivable compared to other schemes offered in the market. It is 
thus very strange to some extent that despite the NSSS being less costly in terms of 
premium paid directly by the employee, it does not pull so much economic influence 
in the decision- making within the labour market mobility. 
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7.4.6 Tax and other factors 
Here we look into the vital variable factor of taxation and other ancillary factors that 
are crucial to creating a people friendly retirement plan policy. There was substantial 
number of people who felt strongly that there is a need to revisit the tax status of the 
National Insurance contributions. Whereas those people with life assurance policies 
do not pay tax on the premiums the state pension contributions are not a tax 
deductible. That at least sixty percent of people would perceive the national insurance 
scheme differently if the national insurance contributions were a tax-deductible is 
evidence enough to suggest that part of why the NSSS is viewed gloomily is precisely 
part function of this perception of state pension contributions being compulsory taxes. 
It is amazing that people would still resist paying taxes even if those taxes are meant 
to benefit them directly and given a chance would avoid them. 
We also note that it is those people on relatively very low salaries that feel strongly 
that national insurance contributions must be a tax-deductible. It is not clear if marital 
status has any effect on the views with regard to national insurance contributions. At 
least in theory we would have expected married households to express more concern 
with tax deductibility of N. I contributions for on average a married couple pay a 
potential six percent of the households' gross incomes to the NSSS. 
That the statutes are silent on whether the benefits payable under the NSSSS are 
subject to tax makes an interesting observation in view of the concerns expressed by 
many people. While an insignificant percentage of people specifically expressed their 
concerns about the possibility of being taxed twice, there is no implication that the 
double taxation is a general issue of concern to many. As people become more 
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informed, it will undoubtedly become a cause for concern. It is thus imperative that as 
part of developing a pensions market, the authorities must come out with explicit 
policies that do not leave the recipients with questions hanging over their minds about 
certain vital variables of the market. 
We also note that the treatment of national insurance contributions is not different 
from that of any of the retirement premiums paid by people with private retirement 
plans. There is in our opinion a strong case for political lobby to change the treatment 
of NI contributions if the national scheme is to benefit in terms of positive image. 
7.5 Broader general market observations 
The Zimbabwean market is a relatively new and developing market whose full 
potential is yet to be fully realised. It is on comparison terms to the British and other 
western markets standards, an incomplete market. The pensions wealth despite its 
relevancy in so far as individual household wealth is concerned is not held with such 
high- esteem, as is the case with both public and private pensions in say Britain or 
USA. There are various economic, social, political and anthropological explanations 
to the Zimbabwean experience, which are themselves, fundamentally different from 
the experiences that the United Kingdom has gone through in its history. 
It is interesting to note that it has taken the British market and in particular the 
London pensions market some generations to progress to the level where it is today, 
yet it is still undergoing some transformations and ambiguities on certain issues 
continue to date to concern the financial services regulators and investors alike. It is in 
trying to get were the London pensions market is today overnight that may undo the 
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Zimbabwean pensions market development rather than the coming to the market of 
the state pension scheme. The London market has been co- existing with the PAYG 
national insurance scheme for more than fifty years now and yet it has continued to 
develop and grow into the biggest financial centre in Europe. The Zimbabwean 
pensions market can as such forge a successful development and grow to become a 
financial model in Africa despite the emergence of the NSSS. 
The private pensions markets and the government alike have a mammoth obligation 
that is both moral and economic in helping develop, promote and facilitate in the 
education of people on the need to save both in the short and long term. There is need 
to develop a culture of saving and in particular precautionary saving in view of the 
increasing breakdown of the extended family systems. The government and the 
private sector should, in the circumstances, develop and fund joint or closely co- 
ordinated strategies aimed at boosting low-scale household saving with guarantees of 
minimum returns and other incentives. Unless there is a general culture of saving in 
the population, the local savings markets will continue to be thin and squeezed for the 
naturally available business. In a way there is need for an induced demand for saving 
and that can only be achieved if people understand the need for such saving and the 
national government supports the need for such a cause. 
Turning back to theoretical considerations of this report, and in particular the political 
theories considered in chapter three, the present scenario wherein the middle class 
workers contribute barely a percent of their occupational earnings to the NSSS when 
9 Like for example the British National Savings Scheme that gives lottery style monthly cash backs to 
randomly picked savers. 
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on the other hand the working-class pay almost if not the full three percent of their 
earnings to the national scheme defeats the distributive motive so often more than not 
used to justify the existence of such public enterprises as the NSSS. Instead of the 
socially well-off paying more in terms of NSSS contributions as a percentage of 
earnings, so as to realise that distributive effect, the present set up does not provide 
the required framework for the resources to be channelled from the relatively rich to 
the poor. 
The workers' consolidation and solidarity is failed by the NSSS' exclusion of a large 
spectrum of employees from participating in the state pensions programme. The 
NSSS should not have a discretionary membership if the solidarity of workers that the 
trade unions so much acclaimer for. 
There is also an urgent need to improve literacy and understanding of the operations, 
rights and obligations that employees have as a result of the emergence of the state 
scheme. The national scheme must in so doing endeavour to produce a simplified 
versions of the Act and rules of the NSSS. It could also benefit many employees if the 
English versions of the Act and rules were translated into local languages best 
understood by the ordinary employees that constitute a bulk of workforce. 
7.6 Conclusion 
We have in this chapter discussed the various factors that explain the observed saving 
behaviour of both the working and middlc-incomc workers in Zimbabwe. We have 
argued that despite a relative positive appreciation by the lowly paid workers, the 
NSSS has not had the striking negative impact to the saving trends by individuals. 
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The effect of the NSSS to the retirement plans of the middle-income earners is 
insignificant and statistically irrelevant. We have also demonstrated beyond any 
reasonable doubt that there are various economic, social and political factors that 
explain the individual saving trends and perception to the establishment of the NSSS. 
The inherent flaws in the structure and running of the national scheme as perceived by 
various social groups that matter in the Zimbabwean market have been carefully noted 
and discussed. Market issues peculiar to Zimbabwe have been noted with interest. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
Suggestions to improve NSSS, conclusions, limitations and further research 
This chapter is a web of all the different subjects and issues that have been raised, 
noted and discussed through Out this thesis. It draws together all tile essential 
paradigms that have been learned while pursuing this research. It is an attempt to 
bring together, in a nutshell, all the various components material to this report so that 
this thesis can be visualised as a neat coherent study of a complex subject that 
borrows many a times from different aspects of economics, academia, political, and 
other schools of inclination as , ve have shown through out this study. More 
importantly this chapter seeks to make recommendations on how the state scheme can 
be improved for the benefit of the development of the pensions market. 
8.1 Suggested refonns to the NSSS 
There are many aspects of the national scheme that we felt important that they be 
reformed. First and most crucially, the state scheme must be revolutionised from its 
foundation perspective as to reflective its overall social and economic goals. As things 
stand at the moment, it is very vague as to how the NSSS intends to meet its social 
justice goals in pursuanci of the ultimate government of redressing social injustice 
largely blamed on colonialism and repressive white minority rule that ended in 1980. 
The economic goals have to be taken in the context and pursuance of the 
government's economic policy. The investment of the funds of the national scheme 
contradicts to a large extent with the spirit of privatisation and financial freedom in 
the allocation of financial resources. The fact that the govenunent already enjoys 20% 
investment leverage from private pension scheme must be a cause for concern given 
the magnitude of the funds that the state has control of in the form of the NSSS 
premiums. it would make more financial responsibility if the government were to 
consider reducing the si/e of investment porit"blio under its control. 
The other issue that needs urgent limition is policy awareness of the state sclicnic. As 
we said in our report, there are many people that are not %vell inforincd about how tile 
NSSS was fornied, its obligations and their rights as the assured public. The 
government needs to adopt a strategy that will help educate and disseminate 
inforniation about the state scheme. There is also a need to simplifY the available 
literature about the state schenic and its rules. A %, cry high percentage of people -would 
stniggle to work out their pension beriefits or other crititicnients from the NSSS. That 
being the case, it is important that the state scheme must develop and distribute 
literature explaining how NSSS benefits are worked out, using given forniulac. It 
would also make a difference if the published literature could be translated into local 
languages that are understood by the majority of the workers. 
There is a massive need to improve the image of the state scheme and make it the 
pride and comer stone of the assured public's social security. To achieve that, it may 
be necessary to reform the composition of the board and culture of management in the 
state scheme. The government could for instance, invite representatives of the 
employers' federation and workers' unions to sit on the board nmning the state 
scheme. In that way, both the workers and employers' councils would feel involved 
and that would go a long way in promoting the image of the NSSS. Apart from the 
image promotion, such a move would help build conrtdcncc in the state scheme. As 
we said in the report, there are many people whose confidence in the state scheme is 
very low. 
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With regard to pension contributions, there is a need to constantly review contribution 
levels to reflect the Financial soundness of the state scheme. It would be a courageous 
and reasonable thing to do if the NSSS could do away with maximum contribution 
capping. In that Nvay the contribution levels would be reflective of salary increases at 
the same time accounting for the income redistribution between the high earners and 
low earners. The latter would be in line with the government's social justice objective. 
The contribution records of employees are not communicated to the assured public in 
clear channel. It would as such be a good thing to do, to keep the individual assured 
members infon-ned of their total contributions up to a particular date. In that way the 
employees would be in a position to make informed choices about value for money 
defived from the state scheme. 
8.2 Conclusions 
The various schools of thought that seek to address the issue of social justice and their 
priorities were carefully noted after a careful discussion and examination of their 
relevance in so far as the Zimbabwean scenario is concerned. The abstract theories, 
developed mainly by the Western academics to explain the origins and philosophies 
behind the various approaches to social security have been explained and their 
applicability to Zimbabwe carefully scrutinised. 
We have shown not only in chapter three but through out the thesis also that the 
Zimbabwean pensions markets and in particular the NSSS has been shaped by an 
interface metamorphosis of politics and economics that reflect both the colonial 
legacy and present government's dilemma in redressing social injustice that has 
accrued over many generations. The theoretical conccnis of adopting a national 
occupational pension scheme as moddled in the NSSS Ime been III gill I ý, htcd. The 
weaknesscs hillerent ill the design of the NSSS and in particular the flawed 
contrIbUtion and scheme membership requirements have beell discussed exhaustively. 
We have no doubt. as Nve nici-itioned in chaptcrs four and five, that the ambitious 
bencfit plan that is offered by the NSSS will present the national scheme with 
dramatic finaticial problems as the scheme dc%-clops to maturity unless the funding of 
the sclicnic and its ctitirc financing policy arc changed before it is too late. 
The Zimbabwean pensions policy, inclusive of the mandatory occupational state 
pensions scheme, is bonic of a complex combination of political, economic, 
an thropo logical, and legal forces. The economic and political forces have played a 
greater role than other considerations in shaping the dc%, clopmcnts that have taken 
place in the Zimbabwean pensions markets. While it is difficult to make a precise 
account of the exact percentage rolcs in this respect, what is beyond dispute is that the 
political interests disguised under the different political philosophies have had a 
geater influence in so far as the events and developments that have taken place in 
Zimbabwe are concerned. We have also argued in this report that the group of 
recipients that the government has targeted in its so-called first phase programme of 
the scheme is grossly unjust, ill conceived, unnecessary and does little if ever 
something at all, in meeting the government's social and economic programme that it 
launchedinl999. 
The importance of the relevancy and legacy of the British influence in the 
Zimbabwean market, hence inter alia our inclusion of a detailed account of the 
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development of the British old-age social security system in chapter three, has been 
carefully emphasised in this report. It has been shown that despite many calls, 
particularly from the old remnants of the society that believe in tile "British way of 
doing things" for the NSSS to be modelled along the British experiences, there is a 
clear difference in the circumstances that led to the formation of tile BSSS' from the 
Zimbabwean encounters. We have dismissed the popular notion in Zimbabwe, and to 
be precise, that of using the British as both the yardstick of measure and reference 
point as an irrelevance. 
However, the compromise that has led to a spurious blend of Marxist and liberals' 
principles has also been noted with interest. It is in fact, this "unholy" blend that has 
been used by some unprofessional hands in the running of the national scheme to 
further individuals' political agendas. We argue and in particular in chapter four and 
generally through out the thesis that the NSSS has been imposed to everybody in 
Zimbabwe so much that it is misunderstood by many and disproportionately 
unappreciated by the middle-class in particular. It is this imposition that in addition to 
other government mishaps in forming and subsequent running of the national scheme 
that has at times obscured the general good intents of according a descent retirement 
for everybody, a position that everybody in Zimbabwe so wishes and cherishes. 
It was no sooner than later that the government intentions of establishing the NSSS 
were announced that the uncertainties that would be caused by the NSSS not only to 
the private markets but also to the individuals' saving patterns started dominating the 
debates about the subsequent launch of the national scheme. The ultimate effect of the 
1 British Social Security System that includes state pensions 
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NSSS to the institutions and individuals, core to tile pensions markets is a subject that 
we have reviewed %vall vigour. flus report has shown througli the various chapters 
that tile NSSS has so far not presented any rultious effects to tile established pension 
schemes. 
This thesis has and in particular chapter five demonstrated convincingly that the 
NSSS has some technical flaws in its design and structure that at least in tilcory, will 
lead to employees not realising a true potential of their savings. We have argued that 111ý Z) _n 
the early beneficiaries as tile scheme matures will most likely get more than gcnerous 
retunis on their savings. But with scheme approaching its peak in maturity, the cost of 
financing the promised benefits will spiral to unprecedented levels thereby hitting 
hard those oil low and moderate income. That surge in cost of funding has been 
explained in tenns of an implicit long- terni debt that the government's incfficient 
resource allocation of the NSSS' funds is causing. The qualitative assessment of the 
NSSS leaves us in no doubt that the compulsory scheme is a financial time bomb 
whose explosion will be hard hitting not only to the present employees but to the 
future employees as well, causing a credibility blow of the national scheme whose 
prime object is to help the workers of Zimbabwe. 
The results of our fieldwork in Zimbabwe, and in particular the survey results, 
confirm what we had not suspected at the beginning of this research, that the NSSS 
has not had the devastating effect on both the demand for private saving and actual 
saving behaviour of the middle and work-ing-cl asses. Our results show that the impact 
of the NSSS to the middle-class employees is very low and in some instances very 
insignificant. It is however relatively significant to the working-class that has 
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expressed some positive appreciation of the national scheme. Tile working-class for 
whatever reason, show a disappointingly low propensity to save. Because the national 
insurance contributions as a percentage of an average middle-incorne camer's salary 
is about 0.9%, it is found to be very insignificant as an expenditure factor and more so 
when directly computed against other expenses such as mortgage, life assurance 
policies and so forth. It is precisely for such reasons that we fail to find compelling 
statistical evidence from our selected samples to justiCy the hypothesis that state 
pensions depress the demand for conventional saving instruments provided by the 
private pensions markets. We have in fact, found that the immediate period following 
the introduction of the NSSS had one of the most positive demands for private 
pensions, with the already insured revising the extent of cover. I 
We have also failed to find any significant threats to the actual and potential saving or 
reduction in the private markets as a result of the introduction of the NSSS. Tile 
national scheme has not been fully endorsed by the general public as a credible 
alternative investment vehicle that can substitute for the conventional approaches 
provided by the private markets. The level of that rejection is more clearer in the 
middle-income workers whose anthropological past and present explains to some 
extent the perceived attitude towards the national scheme that judged by its benefit 
proposals is indeed generous by Zimbabwean standard. 
In this report we have illustrated how the political, social and economic forces have 
interplayed on each other as if in a cobweb to produce the present state of the 
Zimbabwean pensions market. The uncertainty about the future and direction of 
development of the NSSS has not been emphasised, less in this report. The theoretical 
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perspectives, discussed particularly in chapter three show little absolute relevance in 
explaining the social insurancc dex, clopmcnts in Zimbabwe. Where however that 
happens, there is a risk that it nlay have bcen a coincidence of macro-political 
collinearity than a , %, cil planned and executed policy of liltent. That position has not 
been made any better by the government's unstable -choose and filix" economic and 
political ideology. It) 
Despite all what we have said so far in tills chapter, this research did not progress to 
this Icvcl without encountering difficulties that at times meant that we had to change I 
our methodologies to suit certain circumstances. The lack of previously published I 
secondary data nicant that we had to dig into the historical archives and cross- 
reference with other disciplines in order to conic up with a suitable framework- upon 
which to understand the Zimbabwean pensions market in general and the NSSS in 
particular. The scepticism and lack of co-operation by some government officials 
meant that at times we had to do with half-truths and speculative judgements. As if 
that was not enough, we found some goi, cmment reports that were incomplete and at 
times fraught with errors of principles that forced us to engage in bureaucratic 
correspondences with the sources of documents so that certain crucial issues could be 
clarified and official positions established. 
The lack of reliable primary statistical data forced us to resort to carrying out surveys 
ourselves to obtain certain essential population characteristics. Unlike most of the 
previous related researches of this kind in other countries that use data previously 
collected and collated by other researchers outside this area of study, our data may be 
biased to some extent in that our questionnaire was drawn up specifically with this 
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and only this research in mind. We also need not emphasisc that OUr data and lience 
our results reflect the present and perceived future not necessarily what will happen as 
a niattcr of established fact. 
This report will act as both a good guidance and foundation for future researches in 
tile area of state pensions insurance and the private pensions insurance in Zinlbabwe. 
It will in our view stimulate further debate and interest in the subject of the NSSS and 
tile pensions provision at large. It is a good reading for both academic and business 
readers trying to get an insight into the Zimbabwe pensions market following the 
introduction of the compulsory state scheme. 
It would be interesting to make a follow up research using different data and approach 
in a few years time and see whether our observations will still be holding true. It 
would be equally interesting to institute further research in this area of state pensions 
and saving in private markets from a different perspective. Approaching this research 
from a pure actuarial principles perspective may give a different or a clearer picture of 
the Zimbabwean private pensions markets and the NSSS. 
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Appendix A: Incidental facts about Zimbabwe 
Appendix Al: Population distribution in Zinibabwe 




Communal lands 32.4 19.92 
Large scale commercial fanning 6 i: 5.7 
1 Small scale commercial farming 0.7 1 
Resettlement areas 2 1.9 
State Land 0.25 0.23 
Urban Areas 14 16 
Total 55.35 44.65 
Source: Various sources and Central Statistical Office 
Appendix Al Workforce, sectors, and pension cover 




Mining 231.4 12 100 2 
Agricultural 345.6 0 9 0 
Manufacturing 186.3 10 21 3 
Service sector 123.2 90 94 8 
Informal sector 211.3 4 N/a, 7 
Source: Various 
Note that the employment figures include contract and casual employees who are not 
obliged to contribute to the NSSS. 
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APPENDIX B 
This survey is purely ail academic exercise, aimed at soliciting information that will 
enable us to disentangle and document the complex process and factors of the NSSS Z7 
that impinge directly to you, or your family and the society at large. I/We would 
appreciate all the assistance that you can offer by sparing a few minutes of your time 
answering the following questions. 
Survey Number 
................... 






PART ONE: BASIC INFORMATION 
We would like to ask you a few questions about yourself and personal background. 








4. Period in this employment 
.......................... 
5 Do you have more than one job? Yes/ No 
(a) 2 nd Job 
---------------------------------- 
(b) P Job 
-------------------------- - ------ 
(c) Other (specify) 
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6. wilicil or tile foliowing, best describes your educational attainment? 




(c) Post-graduate clualification ---------------- 
(d) Professional qualification onl) - 
---------------------- 
7. How many dependailts do you have? ------------------------ 
8 Do you ov., n the house you live in Yes'No 
(a) What is its market value? 
................ 
(b) If you are a tenant, how much rent do you pay? 
.............. 
(c) Do you own any other house? 
.................... 
(d) What is its market value? 
........................ 
9 Would you consider yourself to be a health and fit person? 
.................... 
PART TWO: THE QUESTIONNAIRE 
I/We will now ask you personal questions about the National Social Security Scheme 
(NSSS) and your personal saving towards old age and retirement plans. 
1. When did you first here of the NSSS? 
........................................... 
(a) What was your immediate reaction when the NSSS was first introduced into 
the pensions/labour market as a compulsory scheme? 
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(b) Do you think 3% of your monthly salary paid towards the NSSS is a fair 
prerniurn/price for the benefits you will get? Yes/No/Don't know 
(c) We/I would like you to tell us about what you think of the following staternent, 










'. Rtrnnplv cii.,; afyr 
(d) Apart from the state insurance scheme, are you a member of any other 
occupational scheme? 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
2 Is it a compulsory scheme if you have answered in the affirmative in I (d) above? 
3 Are you a member of any other retirement pension plan? 
---------------- 
(a) What percentage of your monthly salary do you pay towards that pension plan? 
4 Do you contribute more than the mandatory 3% to the National Insurance scheme? 
Yes/No/Don't know 
(a) If so, what % of your salary do you pay towards this extra contribution to the 
NSSS? 
--- -- 
(b) In order of preference, kindly state your preferred retirement saving 
instrument listed below. 
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Type of saving Choice 
State pension plan, i. e. NSSS 
Private pension plan 
Company occupational pension plan 
Estate and housing 
Others 
5 What percentage of your monthly salary do you contribute towards your firnl*s 
private pension scheme? 
............................... 
6 What percentage of your monthly salary do you pay towards non-conventional 
retirement provision plans? 
--------------------------------------- 
7. Do you have any other retirement provisions other than as covered above? 
........... 
(a) If you have answered in the affinnative, what % of your salary do you pay 
towards these other retirement provlýsions? 
........................ 
8 How would you rate the following retirement schemes in terms of satisfaction? 
8.1 The NSSS (a) Security 
(b) Value for money I 
-() ý F-1 
8.2 Company sponsored scheme 
(a) Security 
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(b) Value for money [-2 
(c) PAPP Schemes 171 FF 
N. B The degree of satisfaction is assumed to be in ascent form. 
8.3 Do you have any comment about confidence in the retirement vehicles above? 
9 Do you expect to continue in active employment after attaining the State retirement 
aae? 
........................................... 
(a) Any particular reason to explain your decision above? 
....................... 
(b) At what age do you expect to retire9 
.................................. 
10 Do you expect to retire in to the rural community or continue to live in the urban? 
(a) Do you have any particular reason(s) about your choice of retirement? 
(b) If your retirement choice is not urban or rural were would you want to spend your 
retirement life? 
.............................................................................. 
II Do you want to leave the country after retirement? 
.................................. 




Do YOU have any specific, or rather particular reasons as to your cliolce above? 
12 If you wcre to make a bLld(Tctary allocation based on the hypotlictical fiý'llrcs as 
presented in the table below, how much money from each band will YOU be prepared 
to spend on pension provision by the state, your employer and the private pensions 
insurance markets? 
Allotment State Occupation Private Other 













12.1 We/I would like you to tick the box representing your salary range and state how 
much you spend on NSSS and company pension scheme if you are a member of one. 
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Salar ran,, e y It, 
NSSS Company scheme Other 
$25000430000 

















13. How often do you compare your pension provision(s) including the national 
pension provision with that of your peers? 
Never Once Regularly I 
14. How conversant are you with NSSA Act (1989) and the state pension rules? 
Not at all Average 
Excellent 
Verv oood 
(a) If you were to be entitled to a benefit payable under NSSS today. will you be able 
to calculate on your own how much benefit you are entitled to? 
............. 
(b) Any other comment about benefit calculations? 
............................................................................................. 
le th (c) Do you know that your contributions to the NSSS are refundable togetl r wi 
interest? Yes/No 
(d) Are you aware that there are other benefits other than retirement benefits from 
the NSSS? Yes/ No 
15. What would you consider to be the single most important factor that can entice 
you to make a pension provision or contribute to a retirement plan? 
PART THREE: GENERAL MARKET 
I/ We will now ask you general questions about the pensions market and your 
perceptions, particularly the relationship between the NSSS and the private schemes. 
15 Do you think that the state pension scheme will improve your welfare? 
I NO I Do not know 
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(a) Any other comment you would like to make about welfare gains/losscs from the 
NSSS? 
............................................................................................ 
16.1n order of preference, starting with the most influential factor, how Would you rate 
the following labour factors as forces most likely to influence your choice of 
employment? N. B Put your choices in the boxes next to each factor. 
Preferences 









17. What impact do you think the NSSS has in the pensions 
market? 
................................................................... 
18. What would you consider to be the most urgent reforms needed to make the 
Zimbabwean pensions market more competitive? 
....................................... 
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19. If NSSS membership were to be optional, would you still continue to be its 
member? Yes /No/ Don't know 
(a) Do you have any particular comment to make aboutyour answer abo-ve? 
20. Would you consider the presence of the NSSS before movino to anotherjob? 
I NO :] 
2 1. Do you think the conflict between the NSSS and the private markets is real or just 
academic? 
...................................................................................... 
(a) Do you have an opinion that you can state about the relationship between the 
NSSS and the private schemes? 
(b) Do you an opinion that you can state about the demand for private pension 
schemes vis-d-vis the compulsory NSSS? 
22. What other comments do you have about the state pension scheme and/or the 
private schemes (including the occupational schemes)? 
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Appendix C: questionnaire used to solicit tile views and opinions of the legislators 
and regulators of the NSSS and pensions market. 
This survey is purely an academic exercise, aimed at soliciting inforniation that will 
enable us to analyse and document the complex progression and factors of the NSSS 
that impinge directly to you, your organisation/department or the society at large. I/wc 
would appreciate all the assistance that you can offer by sparring a few minutes of 
your time answering the following questions. We may have sent similar 
questionnaire/or questionnaires to your colleagues, please complete even if a 
colleague has already completed one. All the collected data will be treated with strict I 
confidence and no names of individuals or organisations will be identified in the 
results to be published. 
We will appreciate if you can place a tick in the appropriate box or desired response 
and making your views were requested. Where you have to choose between a "no and 
yes" responses, kindly delete the inapplicable response. Thank you for your co- 
operation and time. 
Survey number 
.................... 







PART ONE: BASIC INFORMATION 
We now like to ask you a I'm questions about yourselfand personal backoround 







Period in current employment 
Type of employer 
...................... 
4. Rank/position in your department 
......................... 
5. Which of the following best describes your educational attainment? 
I No formal education 
I 
I" degree I 




6. Would you consider yourself to be a health and fit person? 
Yes/No/Don't know 
7. Marital status 
............................... 
8. Number of dependants 
.................. 
PART TWO: The survey 
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I. Which of the following do you think best describes your opinion of the impact 
of the NSSS to the pensions market? Tick one only. 
(a) Positive and good for the market. 
(b) Negative and detrimental to the market. = 
(c) Premature to judge 
(d) No impact = 
(e) No opinion 
I Any other comment that you would like to make? 
2. As an employer/person in a position of influence, what was your immediate 
reaction to the compulsory introduction of the NSSS? 
3. Are you happy with the way that the NSSS was introduced into the market? 
Yes/No. 
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3.1 1 would like you to tell us what you thInk about the following statements. 
Number Statement SA A DA I SDA DK 
1.1 The NSSS has disrupted the 
evolution and operations of the 
pension schemes in Zimbabwe 
1.2 The government has done little to 
consider the market interests of the 
private pension schemes. 
Ln There is need to arriend the NSSSA 
Act and NSSS rules to reflect the 
interests of all stakeholders. 
1.4 The direction of the NSSS is 
obscure 
1.5 My organisation has not been in 
regular consultation with the state 
operatives in shaping the direction 
of the pensions development. 
1.6 My organisation is seeking ways to 
improve efficiency in the wake of 
the emergence of the NSSS. 
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4. How conversant are you with the law and rules governing the NSSS? 
ýNotat 
all 
IF Averape Verv Excellent 
5. Do you feel that there are obstacles to the co-existence of the NSSS and the 
private pension schernes? Yes/No/ Don't know 
6. If you have answered in the affirmative in 4 above, which of the following do 
you think best describes the major obstacles? Put marks 1-5 in order of 
preference starting with the most significant with a score of 1. 
I Con-, erv2tiqm' 
I Nepative. 
[ 
Poor rn. irketinp, 
- -1 
F-Market 
failure k. nth 1political 
-71 
6.1 Apart from the factors mentioned in 6 above, which other considerations do 
you think explain the conflict of co-existence between NSSS and other schemes? 
7. What was your expected reaction of the private pension schemes to the 
introduction of the NSSS? 
8. What is your projected life span of the NSSS? 
(a) Less than 15 years? [71 (b) More than 15 years but less than 30 years? 171 
(c) More than 30 years but less than 45 years? F-ý (d) More than 45 years? 
(d) Don't know 
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8.1 IXould you like to make any other opinion about the lifespan of the NSSS? 
Yes/No 
8.1 If you have answered in the affirmative above, kindly let us know ýMir opinion. 
9. What are the changes that you would like to see being mtrodUCed tO the 
NSSS? 
10. Are there any other commen! s that you would like to make about the NSSS 
and the pensions market? 




Appendix D: Detailed descriptive statistical breakdown. 
The sample was based on the workers and executives who agreed to be 
interviewed during the research for this report. The workers were interviewed 
from the two biggest cities of Zimbabwe. The interviews for the workers were 
mainly done in the evening. On the other hand the executives interviews were 
done during tile working hours. The locations of the executives were in Harare, 
Bulawayo, Gweru and Mutare. 
Table D I: population of employees 
Total employees interviewed 620 
Less spoiled/incomplete responses 17 
Total usable population 603 
Table D2: Breakdown of employees according to class 
Usable population 603 Sex 
Females Males 
Working class 363 175 188 
Middle class 240 96 144 
Formal qualification 185 77 108 
No formal qualification 418 194 224 
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Table D3: Period of employment 
Less than 5 years 85 
5 years <I 0 years 107 
I Oyears< 15 years 120 
15years< 20years 130 
20years< 25years 109 
More than 25 years 52 
Table D4: Responses to employees having more than one job 








Do you have more than one 
job? 
431 71.48 172 28.52 
2"' job 222 36.82 0 0.00 
Pj ob, 105 17.41 0 0.00 
Others 104 17.25 0 0.00 
N. B The most mentioned response under the "others" section response in 
table D5 is the informal vending in small consumables. Sixty people used 
cross boarder importing to supplement their incomes. Another twenty-six 
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relied on rural farm projects to supplement their incomes, while the rest 
mentioned things ranging from illegal trading of beverages to unprintable 
sources of income. 




0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 8> 
Females 4% 7% 13% 14% 21% 16% 10% 
1 
7% 5% 3% 
Males 7% 9% 12% 16% 24% 14% 8% 5% 3% 2% 
Average 4% 8% 13% 15% 23% 15% 9% 6% 4% 3% 
Table D6: Employee home ownership 
Do you own the house 









Working class 148 40.77 215 59.23 
Middle class 157 65.42 83 34.58 
Total 305 50.58 298 49.42 
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Table D7: Accommodation expenses as a% of salary 
What % of your salary do you pay 
towards your accommodation? 
10%< 10%>20% 20%>25% 25%> 
Working class females 10% 23% 38% -T9-% 
Working class males 7% 19% 42% 32-% 
Middle-income earners females 13% 24% 34% 29% 
Middle-income males 9% 17% 39% 35% 
Average 9.75% 20.75% 38.25% 31.25% 
N. B the responses to the question of second home ownership have been 
deliberately omitted as it was established well into the interviews that it is 
illegal in Zimbabwe to own more than one house in the former black 
township suburbs where most people still reside. 
Table D8: Questions about health 
Q9: would you consider 
yourself to be healthy? 
-- 
Yes No Don't know 
Working class women 65 5 105 
Working class men 101 3 84 
Middle class women 76 5 15 
Middle class men 114 7 23 
Total 356 20 227 
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Table D9: Membership to other pension schemes 
Are you a member of any other 









Working class women 21 3.48 154 25.54 
Middle class women 96 15.92 0 0 
Working class men 39 6.47 149 24.71 
Middle class men 144 23.88 0 0 
Total 255 42.29 348 57.71 
Table D 10: Chi square results on I (b) 
square 
236.3 
The proposition was that one's social class affects his/her positive responsive 
to the question of satisfaction Nvith the 3% contribution to the national 
scheme. 
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Table DI 1: Summary of responses to NSSS consideration before purchasing a 
retirement plail according to income and sex 











Working class women 12.6 9.8 3 1.7 
Middle class women 4.1 1.8 2.8 
Working class men 10.4 5 4.1 9.6 
Middle class rnen 5.5 2.8 5.1 9.3 1.2 
Total 32.7 19.4 15.1 26.5 6.3 
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Table D12: Summary of responses to retirement preferences 
Kesponses 
Type of saving I" choice - -fý'-Choice 3"' Choice 4"' Cho-ice 
MC WC MC WC MC WC Kfc- WC 
Employers' 
occupational scheme 
60% 45% 35% 33% 10% 15% 0 5% 
Private pension plan 9% 21% 12% 27% 30% 12% 45% 14% 
State pension 0 12% 5% 10% 45% 33% 50% 45% 
Estate and housing 25% 18% 40% 27% 5% 22% 3% 18% 
Others 6% 4 8% 3 10% 18 2% 18 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 













Working class women 0 0 163 27.03 12 2 
Middle class women 0 0 94 15.59 2 0.33 
Working class men 0 0 165 27.36 23 3.81 
Middle class men 0 0 138 23.88 6 1 
Total 0 0 560 92.87 43 7.13 
Table D 14: Money spent on non- conventional retirement provision (annually) 
Live stock Burial and charity Others 
Women 1.5%p. a 8% 0.5% 
Men 2.5%p. a 10% 0.7 5YO 
Total 4%p. a 18% 1.25% 
All the responses to question 7 where no, thereby rendering its ancillary 
questions irrelevant. 
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Table D15: Saving instruments in terms of security and value for money 
Excellent Very 
good 
Average Poor Very poor 
NSSS Security 3% 13% 47% 31% 6% 
Value for 
money 
18% 26% 40% 12% 4% 
ESOPS Security 56% 31% 11% 2% 0% 
Value for 
money 
63% 27% 10% 0% 0% 
PAPPS Security 30% 30% 11% 3% 
Value for 
money 
30% 26% 34% 8% 2% 
The most common comment amongst the low-income employees was that the 
pension contributions were a form of tax that reduced employees' net income. 
On average the employees are happy to belong to a pension scheme of some 
kind. 
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Table D 16: breakdown of employees' conversancy of NSSA Act and other rLdes 
Level of understanding of the Act and rulcs 
Not at all Average Very good Excellent 
Females with educational 
qualification 
10% 4.8% 2.51//o 2.49% 
Females without 
educational qualification 
23.167% 1% 0.82% -0 
Males with educational 
qualification 
7.5% 3.95% 8% 
Males without 
educational qualification 
2-33.5% 4.5% 1.1% 0 
Total 64.7% 14.28% 12.44% 8.46% 
Table D17: Chi- square of formal education and understanding of rules 
Chi square Sig. 
28.41 0.003 
The hypothesis proposition was that those employees with educational 
qualification were most likely to report that they understood the rules of the 
NSSS. 
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Table D 18: Effect of NSSS on retirement plans for employees 
NSSS would be a strong factor 
before purchasing a retirement 
plan 
AG SAG DAG SDAG DK 
Females with formal education 1.99% 1% 2.82% 5.80% 1.16% 
Females without formal 
education 
13.93% 10.61% 3.48% 2.16% 1.99% 
Males with formal education 2.65% 1.49% 3.81% 8.46% 1.49% 
Males without fon-nal education 10.95% 5.62% 6.63% 4.31% 9.62% 
Total per sample 29.52% 18.72% 16.74% 20.73% 14.26% 
TableD19: Expected retirement ages according to sex and age 
Retirement age Females Males Total 
50 years 4% 6% 9% 
50years<55years 7% 5% 12% 
55years<60years 0 8% 14% 
60years<65years 10% 12% 22% 
65years> 13% 15% 28% 
Don't know 10% 5% 15% 
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Table D20: Pension membership factors 
Question 15 Females Males Total 
Security guarantee 5% 7% 16% 
Premium levels 8% 7% 15% 
Salary 9% 6% 15% 
Maturity of investment 6% 6% 12% 
Marital status 7% 5% 12% 
Dependency ratio 3% 6% 9% 
Type of pension 
scheme 
4% 5% 9% 
Tax relief 4% 3% 7% 
Others 3% 2% 5% 
N. B The most mentioned factor under the "others" column is the place of 
retirement, followed by the economic conditions. 
Table D2 1: Employees' willingness to j oin an optional state scheme 
Questionl6: Would you join an 
optional NSSS? 
Yes No Don't know 
Females 24% 57% 19% 
Males 21 58% 21% 
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Table D22: Breakdown of executive respondents by sector 
Males Females 
Public sector 60 30 
Private sector 83 27 
Total 143 57 
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